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Abstract	
Rebuilding a contested state following an authoritarian breakdown requires widespread 
support for the new political system from all communal groups. A central theoretical assertion 
of the institutional design literature is that inclusion of communal groups in institutional 
frameworks creates support for a political system. However, empirical evidence to either 
verify or refute this claim is inconclusive. A survey of institutional design literature reveals an 
implicit distinction between de jure inclusion (inclusive frameworks) and de facto inclusion 
(inclusion in practice). To date, this distinction has not been sufficiently differentiated and 
systematically examined, with large-N studies most often examining the impact solely of de 
jure inclusion on support, and case studies failing to make a clear conceptual distinction 
between these two elements of inclusion. To address this gap in the research, this study asks: 
during a period of political transition in a contested state, does de jure inclusion, de facto 
inclusion, or a combination of both, build support for a political system? 
To investigate this question, the study undertakes a small-N comparative study of 
institutional design during political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa region. Four 
countries are selected that underwent rebuilding of their political institutions following 
authoritarian breakdown: Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia. Four hypotheses are advanced that 
capture the expectation that either de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of 
both, will build support for a political system. The hypotheses are investigated in two key 
institutional design moments in the selected countries: electoral system design and 
constitution-making. 
The study finds that de jure inclusion is not a sufficient mechanism to create support 
of all communal groups for the political system, whilst de facto inclusion may be sufficient. In 
no case where de jure inclusion alone was observed, was support for the political system 
present. In all cases where de facto inclusion was present, there was support for the political 
system, regardless of whether or not there was de jure inclusion. The study contributes to 
our understanding of the rebuilding of contested states following authoritarian breakdown, 
suggesting that, alongside an emphasis on de jure inclusion in electoral system design and 
constitution-making, de facto inclusion deserves consideration. 
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Chapter	One		Rebuilding	Contested	States	
 
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), tasked 
with overseeing the immediate aftermath, was faced with the question: how best to facilitate 
the rebuilding of a contested state? The US stated that it would oversee a transition to a 
political system that would accommodate Iraq’s three main ethno-sectarian communal 
groups: Shia-Arabs, Sunni-Arabs, and Kurds (Coalition Provisional Authority 2003; Dobbins et 
al. 2009, 265). The CPA emphasised inclusion in the choice of institutional frameworks for the 
new regime, aiming to incorporate all communal groups and build confidence in the political 
system (Ghai and Cottrell 2005; Simonsen 2005; United Nations 2004b). And yet, if success is 
measured by transition to a stable regime that enjoys widespread support, then evidence for 
at least the decade post-2003 must judge Iraq’s transition as a failure. The regime failed to 
create support from all communal groups, leading to on-going insurgency violence (Al-Ali 
2014). One could attribute Iraq’s political trajectory to the fact that the CPA was a foreign 
power imposing regime transition, or to long-standing ethno-sectarian divisions. However, 
following Saddam’s ousting there was genuine enthusiasm that spanned ethno-sectarian 
divisions for a transition to a new political system underpinned by inclusive political 
institutions (Diamond 2005; Morrow 2005).  
The case of Iraq underscores a core challenge for transition scholars: under what 
conditions can a contested state be rebuilt with stable institutions that enjoy the confidence 
of all communal groups? A central assertion of the institutional design literature is that 
inclusion of communal groups in institutional design creates support for a political system. 
However, there is no clear empirical evidence to substantiate this claim. Some studies find a 
relationship between inclusive institutional design and perceived legitimacy of the political 
system, whilst others do not. This puzzle prompts the study’s central research question: in a 
contested state undergoing a political transition, what is the mechanism through which the 
inclusion of communal groups in institutional design builds support for the political system?  
The next section presents one of the major challenges to successful rebuilding of a 
contested state following authoritarian breakdown, namely, ensuring support from all 
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communal groups for the political system. Section 1.2 presents the puzzle that drives the 
study: a key theoretical assertion of the institutional design literature is that incorporating 
key societal groups in institution-building creates confidence in a political system, yet 
empirical evidence is inconclusive. In response to this puzzle, section 1.3 outlines the study’s 
argument: disaggregation of de jure and de facto inclusion is central to understanding the 
mechanism through which inclusion leads, or does not lead, to support. Section 1.4 outlines 
the study’s research design, followed by a discussion of the study’s outcome. The chapter 
ends with an overview of the thesis structure.  
 1.1	 Problem:	building	support	for	a	political	system	
In rebuilding the political institutions of a contested state following authoritarian breakdown, 
creating support from all communal groups for the new political system is key to fostering 
stability and avoiding the outbreak of violent inter-communal conflict (Horowitz 1985; 
Lijphart 2004). Authoritarian breakdown is defined as ‘transition from [a] certain 
authoritarian regime towards an uncertain “something else”’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 
1), that occurs under the auspices of transition to a new political system (Linz and Stepan 
1996; Schedler 2001). The outcome of a political transition can vary from a democratic 
political system, to the re-emergence of an authoritarian regime, or on-going political 
violence and a failure to institutionalise political power in a central governing body (O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986, 1–4).  
A contested state, also referred to as a divided society (Guelke 2012; Oberschall 2007), 
is one in which there is a salient political division amongst communal groups that indicates a 
core unresolved tension regarding the principles that should underpin the state’s political 
system (Gellner 1983; A. Smith 2010; Wimmer 2002). Communal divisions are often 
exacerbated by overlap with political and economic grievances (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 
2009; Germane 2012). A communal group is defined as a group consisting of members of a 
society that self-identify as belonging to a common group entity based on ethnic, linguistic, 
racial, religious, sectarian, or tribal attributes (Norris 2002, 206; Stavenhagen 1990), or indeed 
‘any other form of ascriptive affiliation' (Horowitz 2014, 5).  
Unresolved tension amongst communal groups regarding the core principles of the 
state and the distribution of political power and resources, can heighten tension during a 
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period of state-building and increase the chances of violent inter-communal conflict 
(Horowitz 2003; Sambanis 2001; Sisk 1996). Lustick (1979, 328) notes that control of one 
communal group over another is a common mechanism for authoritarian regimes in 
contested states to maintain political stability. Control functions through ‘the emergence and 
maintenance of a relationship in which the superior power of one segment is mobilized to 
enforce stability by constraining the political actions and opportunities of another segment 
or segments’. In other words, an authoritarian regime in a contested state often defines the 
state entity according to the values of one communal group and privileges that group in terms 
of access to political power and state resources. At the same time, other groups are 
disadvantaged or discriminated against (Gurr 2011; Horowitz 2003; Wimmer 2002). Political 
transition can therefore expose suppressed inter-communal antagonism and could lead to 
civil conflict.  
Communal divisions have presented challenges to many political transitions and led 
to civil conflict in states in Africa, Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, and the Middle East (Chirot 
2009; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; Sisk 1996). As noted by Lijphart (2002, 37), since the 1990s 
‘ethnic divisions have replaced the Cold War as the world's most serious source of violent 
conflict’. Nordlinger (1972, 7) notes the mechanism through which inter-communal tension 
increases the chance of conflict: ‘conflict groups develop when a significant number of 
individuals believe that their segment’s1 social identity, cultural values, or material interest 
coincide with the segmental attachments of other individuals and are inspired to political 
efforts designed to influence the conflict’s outcome.’ Whilst civil conflict scholars dispute 
whether inter-communal conflict is directly attributable to communal divisions (Ostby 2008; 
Theuerkauf 2010) or is a function of grievance and opportunity (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 
2009; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000), many scholars purport that conflict perpetuated by 
communal groups is rising and that communal divisions increase the risk of, and strengthen 
the severity and duration of, civil conflict (Cordell and Wolff 2016; Theuerkauf 2010, 117; 
Wimmer 1997). This is heightened during political transition, when ‘heated debates have 
given way to conflict and even violence as transitioning societies struggle to resolve 
fundamental conflicts over identity’ (Bali and Lerner 2016, 227). 
                                                        
1 Segment refers to communal group  
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Building support from all communal groups for the political system is key to reducing 
inter-communal tension and avoiding the outbreak of violent inter-communal conflict during 
a political transition (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007; Widner 2005). In order for a political 
transition to result in a functioning political system, ‘the system of government must be 
capable of governing effectively and the people must acquiesce in it’ (Galligan and Versteeg 
2013b, 23). This is particularly important in a contested state where ‘transitional leaders must 
build deep consensus across deep divisions’ (Gluck and Brandt 2015, 5). Elite theory (Higley 
and Burton 2006), transitions literature (Cho 2014; Chu et al. 2008; Dowley and Silver 2002; 
Lagos 2003), power-sharing literature (Grofman 2013; Norris 2009; B. O’Leary 2013), and 
literature on constitution-making (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Blount 2011; Hart 2010) note that 
widespread support from all significant societal groups underpins the architecture of a stable 
political system.  
Support for a political system is defined as the perceived legitimacy of political 
frameworks, demonstrated by actors striving to achieve political goals within the system’s 
political institutions and procedures, and not through extra-constitutional means such as 
violence (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Mishler and Rose 2001; Roy 2004). In the context of 
democratic consolidation, Linz and Stepan (1996, chap. 1) note three types of support that 
underpin consolidation of a new political system: behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional. 
Behavioural support refers to an absence of violent anti-system or secessionist action; 
attitudinal support consists of majority confidence in the current political system; and 
constitutional support indicates broad agreement to resolve conflicts within the ‘laws, 
procedures, and institutions’ (6) of the political system. These three dimensions capture the 
core elements of confidence in a political system as defined in this research, namely, absence 
of anti-system violence, perceived legitimacy of the political system, and cooperation with 
the system’s political frameworks. The importance of building support during political 
transition raises the question of how such confidence can be generated.  	1.2	 Puzzle:	does	inclusion	build	support?	
Rebuilding a contested state begins with the design of the political institutions for a new 
political system (Papagianni 2008, 67). A key theoretical assertion of the institutional design 
literature is that inclusion of all communal groups in political institutions during regime 
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transition is a central mechanism to generate support for a new political system (Lijphart 
2004; Norris 2009; Reynolds 1995b; Widner 2005). Institution-building is considered ‘most 
likely to generate legitimacy for the state when it is inclusive of all major political forces and 
open to participation of the public’ (Papagianni 2008, 50). Elkins, Ginsburg, and Blount (2011, 
101) assert that ‘public involvement in constitution making is increasingly considered to be 
essential for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the process’. The policies of government, 
non-government, and intergovernmental bodies involved in the architecture of transitional 
institutions reflect an emphasis on participation and representation of all societal groups 
(Democracy Reporting International 2011c; European Commission United Nations 
Development Program 2015).  
 
Table 1.1 Inconclusive findings for impact of inclusion on support 
 Relationship found No relationship or  
no clear relationship  
Large-N studies  Bogaards (2013) 
Ruiz-Rufino (2013) 
Saideman et al. (2002) 
Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) 
Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino (2007) 
Elkins and Sides (2007) 
Norris (2002) 
Widner (2005) 
 
Small-N or single case 
studies 
Call (2012) 
Carlson (2010) 
Ebrahim and Miller (2010) 
Selassie (2009) 
Wallis (2014) 
Aucoin and Brandt (2010) 
Cottrell and Ghai (2007) 
Moehler (2008) 
 
 
However, despite broad scholarly and policy-maker consensus on the importance of 
the inclusion of societal groups in institutional design, empirical studies provide inconclusive 
evidence to validate this assertion. Table 1.1 shows both large-N studies and small-N or single 
case studies that examine the relationship between inclusive institutional design and 
confidence in a political system. Whilst some studies do find a relationship, others either find 
that inclusion does not create support, or find no clear relationship. For example, despite the 
same independent variable (an inclusive electoral system) used in large-N studies by Alonso 
and Ruiz-Rufino (2007), Bogaards (2013), Elkins and Sides (2007), Ruiz-Rufino (2013), Norris 
(2002), Saideman et al. (2002), and Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008), four studies do find 
that inclusion creates support for the political system, whilst two studies do not find a 
relationship. In a similar manner, small-N and single case studies that investigate constitution-
making examine various indicators of inclusive institutional design (elections to select a 
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constituent body, inclusive deliberations, public consultations, approval by referendum) that 
in some cases are shown to lead to confidence in the new constitution, whilst in other cases 
this does not occur. The lack of clear evidence either to verify or to refute the contention that 
inclusion creates confidence in political institutions, suggests that we do not sufficiently 
understand the mechanism through which inclusion creates support for a political system.  	1.3	 Argument	
This thesis argues that distinguishing between de jure inclusion and de facto inclusion is 
central to understanding the mechanism through which inclusive institutional design builds 
support for, or fails to build confidence in, a political system. In the context of institution-
building, de jure inclusion refers to institutional frameworks that facilitate (or are expected 
to facilitate) the inclusion of all key societal groups¾in a contested state this means 
communal groups. So, for example, de jure inclusion could refer to the selection of a 
constituent body that includes representatives from all societal groups such as the highly 
inclusive National Constitutional Conference in Kenya (Cottrell and Ghai 2007). De jure 
inclusion could also refer to holding a constitutional referendum to approve a new 
constitution which has become a modal form of constitutional ratification (Ginsburg, Elkins, 
and Blount 2009, 207). De jure inclusion could also constitute the choice of a proportional 
electoral system such as chosen in most post-conflict contexts as it is expected to facilitate 
representation of key groups in the political arena (Bogaards 2013).  
De facto inclusion sequentially follows de jure and refers to the actual inclusion of all 
societal groups in institutional procedures. For example, de facto inclusion could refer to the 
actual representation of all groups in the political arena following transitional elections 
(Bogaards 2013). De facto inclusion also pertains to sustained consultation with all groups on 
institution-building up until an outcome is determined, such as occurred in the South African 
constitution-making process that culminated in the 1996 constitution (Ebrahim and Miller 
2010). In addition, de facto inclusion constitutes an opportunity for all groups to influence an 
institutional outcome. De facto inclusion would not be present if, for example, in the final 
instance, a key political actor determined a constitution to the exclusion of other actors, as 
occurred in Timor Leste in the early 2000s (Garrison 2005, 20).  
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A survey of the institutional design literature reveals an implicit distinction between 
de jure and de facto inclusion that is not sufficiently differentiated or systematically 
examined. For example, one of the most rigorous studies of the impact of inclusive electoral 
system design on minority support for a political system (see Norris [2002]) hypothesises that 
there is a causal link between an inclusive electoral system (de jure inclusion), representation 
of minority groups in the political arena (de facto inclusion), and minority-group support for 
the political system. However, without measuring or testing de facto inclusion, the study 
examines whether a proportional electoral system (de jure inclusion) impacts confidence in a 
political system. The study finds no clear relationship. This may be due to a lack of attention 
to de facto inclusion as either an intervening variable or a separate independent variable.  
The most comprehensive large-N study to date examining the impact of inclusive 
constitution-making on support for a political system by Widner (2005) also neglects to 
examine de facto inclusion. The study alludes to the importance of de facto inclusion, 
expecting that the relationship between inclusion and political support will be ‘conditioned 
by the way [inclusive] functions are carried out’ (507). However, the study almost exclusively 
examines indicators that measure de jure inclusion (composition of the constituent body, 
institutional actors approving the constitution, holding of a constitutional referendum) (510–
15). Out of three categories of inclusion consisting of 15 indicators, only one indicator clearly, 
and another two possibly, measure de facto inclusion, with the remainder measuring de jure 
inclusion. There is no explicit justification for this. The study finds no clear relationship 
between inclusive institutional design and confidence in the political system. This may be due 
to the lack of a systematic examination of de facto inclusion in constitution-making. 
A similar lack of clarity regarding the distinction between de jure and de facto inclusion 
can be observed in both single country and comparative case-studies. For example, Ebrahim’s 
(1998) in-depth case study of constitution-making in South Africa, that describes how a highly 
participatory process created confidence in the new constitution, describes both de jure and 
de facto inclusion without identifying them as such. In another example, Wallis’s (2014) 
comparative study of citizen participation in constitution-making in Timor-Leste and 
Bougainville outlines that there was both de jure and de facto inclusion in Bougainville, 
whereas in Timor-Leste there was de jure inclusion alone, without making a conceptual 
distinction between the two. Wallis asserts that constitution-making in Bougainville 
highlighted ‘the important role that achieving consensus can play in diffusing conflict and 
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achieving widespread support for the constitution’ (307), whilst in Timor-Leste one party 
dominated decisions in the constitution-making body. The lack of sufficient conceptual 
differentiation between de jure and de facto inclusion may account for the fact that no clear 
generalisable mechanism of inclusive institutional design has emerged from small-N and 
single case studies (see Miller [2010b]).  
A likely reason that de facto inclusion in institution-building is not as systematically 
examined as de jure, at least in large-N studies, can be traced to logistical and research 
constraints. Information on de jure inclusive institutional design is typically easily-accessible 
for a large number of cases, either stipulated in policy or legislation, or otherwise made 
publicly available. However, the observation of de facto inclusion requires qualitative analysis 
to determine whether or not it is present. For example, in a different context, the 
Parliamentary Powers Index, that assesses de facto legislative power in over 150 countries, 
draws on an international survey of experts, extensive study of secondary sources, and 
analysis of constitutions and other documents (Fish and Kroenig 2009). The time-consuming 
qualitative assessment of de facto inclusion presents a challenge to examining it in a large 
number of cases, leading to a lack of systematic examination of the separate or combined 
impact of de jure and de facto inclusion on confidence in a political system.  
Nevertheless, an examination of existing studies suggests that the implicit separation 
between de jure and de facto inclusion requires explicit examination if we want to further 
understand the mechanism through which confidence is created in political institutions. This 
thesis aims to address this gap in the literature by investigating whether either one of these 
two elements of inclusion is alone sufficient to create support for a political system, or 
whether both are jointly sufficient to achieve this objective.  	1.4	 Research	design		
In response to the question: does de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of 
both, build support for a political system in a contested state undergoing political transition? 
the thesis employs a small-N comparative study of institutional design during political 
transitions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. A small-N research design is 
selected over a large-N study as it enables a comparative qualitative examination of both de 
jure and de facto inclusion in institutional design moments following an authoritarian 
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breakdown. It is favoured over a single case study, as it allows for articulation of a causal 
mechanism that is generalisable beyond a single case. 
A key challenge when using a small-N comparative research design is that of ‘too many 
variables and too few cases’ (Lijphart 1975, 159). To address this criticism, the case selection 
for a small-N study is purposive and not random (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 295) 
constituting an important tool to control for extraneous variables and increase 
generalisability (Ebbinghaus 2005; Goggin 1986). This study uses a most-similar-systems-
design (Anckar 2008), introducing an element of control by ‘focusing the analysis on 
comparable cases’ (Lijphart 1975, 159), that share structural attributes but differ on the 
independent variable under investigation. One strategy of case selection using a most-similar-
systems-design is to select countries that are ‘found within a geographical-cultural area’ 
(159). This is the method employed by this study; cases are selected from the Arab-majority 
states of the MENA region.  
It is important to note that, with a small-N study, generalisability beyond the region 
under investigation is limited. This thesis constitutes an exploratory study to test the 
theoretical argument regarding the importance of a distinction between de jure and de facto 
inclusion. A wider validation of the study’s theoretical contribution would require testing 
across a far wider range of countries than are examined in this study. Unfortunately, such a 
large-N project is beyond the scope of what is attempted in the current thesis. However, as 
Lijphart (1975, 172) notes: ‘partial generalizations may be useful as a first step, and may be 
followed up by replications in different settings’. In other words, the causal mechanism 
identified in this study provides a framework for further validation of the study’s theoretical 
argument in a broader context.2    
The Arab-majority states of the MENA region constitute a coherent region for case 
selection given that, for all their differences in historical experience and contemporary 
strategic interests and perspectives, they also share and see themselves as sharing important 
similarities along demographic, ethnic, geographic, linguistic, religious, socio-cultural, and 
political-historical dimensions (Gasiorowski 2014). Two criteria were applied to select states 
                                                        
2 The small-N research design means that hypotheses are advanced regarding inclusion as a sufficient, and not 
a necessary, condition. A small-N study does not provide adequately robust control of all structural variables in 
order to make claims regarding inclusion as a necessary condition. In addition, due to the constraints of a small-
N study, the hypotheses make deterministic and not probabilistic claims.  
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from this pool of cases: 1) states underwent an authoritarian breakdown in the context of a 
salient communal cleavage; 2) the state carried out institution-building during political 
transition either introducing a new electoral system that was used in transitional 
parliamentary elections, or designing and approving a new constitution (some states did both, 
however one was sufficient for selection). A full discussion of research design and case 
selection is given in Chapter 3. 
Four states met the selection criteria: Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia (Table 1.2). In 
2003, the US-led invasion of Iraq ousted Saddam Hussein, prompting the design of a new 
electoral system, holding of first transitional elections to elect a legislative body in January 
2005, and approval of a new constitution in mid-October 2005. Seven years later, in late 2010, 
a wave of regional protest, dubbed the Arab Uprisings, began in Tunisia and swept across the 
MENA region, prompting political transition in several countries (Brownlee, Masoud, and 
Reynolds 2015; Isakhan, Mansouri, and Akbardazeh 2012). Long-term leaders in Egypt, Libya, 
and Tunisia either abdicated or were executed, prompting a period of political uncertainty. 
During this period, all three countries chose new electoral systems and held transitional 
elections to appoint either a legislative or constituent legislative assembly; Egypt and Tunisia 
went on to design and approve new constitutions. All four countries underwent political 
transition in the context of a salient communal cleavage¾discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
The study examines the period of time from the deposition of an authoritarian leader 
up until either the holding of first transitional parliamentary elections or the approval of a 
new constitution (whichever comes later). The dependent variable is support for the political 
system following important institutional design moments, and not the transition outcome 
itself. However, it is interesting to note that the political outcome varied markedly across the 
four selected countries. The term ‘political transition’ may imply that each state consolidated 
a new political system, however this was not necessarily the case. Whilst institutional design 
took place under the auspices of a transition to a new political system in each country, Egypt’s 
transition effectively ended in July 2013 when a military coup ousted the elected president, 
Mohammed Morsi, reinstating and intensifying the authoritarian character of the pre-2011 
military-dominated regime, but with populist overtones. The outcome of Iraq’s post-2003 
political transition defies a clear definition. Iraq is a ‘federal parliamentary representative 
democratic republic’ (Irfad 2014, 1) and has held a series of competitive elections to select 
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political leaders subsequent to approval of the new constitution in 2005.3 However, as of 
2018, Iraq is ‘not free’ and not an electoral democracy.4 Since 2003, Iraq has been plagued by 
civil violence, but has not reverted to a personalist-authoritarian regime such as existed pre-
2003 under Saddam Hussein. The transition outcome is perhaps best described as a Shia-
dominated competitive-authoritarian regime (Alaaldin 2018; Kadhum 2018). 
 
Table 1.2 Political transitions in Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia 
 Iraq Egypt Libya Tunisia 
Communal cleavage Ethno-sectarian: 
Sunni-Arab; Shia-
Arab; Kurds 
 
Civic-religious:  
Islamist; non-
Islamist 
Regional: 
Cyrenaica; Fezzan; 
Tripolitania 
 
Civic-religious:  
Islamist; non-
Islamist 
Political transition 2003 US-led 
invasion 
 
2011 Mubarak 
abdicates 
2011 Gaddafi 
executed 
2011 Ben-Ali flees 
Electoral system design 
negotiations 
 
2004 2011 2011-2012 2011 
Transitional elections 
for legislative (or 
constituent legislative) 
assembly 
 
Jan 2005 Nov 2011 – Jan 
2012 
July 2012 Oct 2011 
Constitution-making 
negotiations 
 
2005 2012 N/A 2011-2014 
Approval of new 
constitution 
Oct 2005 Dec 2012 N/A Jan 2014 
Source: see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of sources 
 
In Libya, following the election of a National Council in 2012, competing governance 
bodies claimed political legitimacy and violent conflict broke out, growing in severity during 
2014. As of 2018, Libya is best described as a ‘failed state’ (Al Jazeera 2018). Since 2014, Libya 
has two rival governments, neither of which holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of force 
(Kirkpatrick 2014; Toaldo and Fitzgerald 2016). In Tunisia, the outcome of the political 
transition was, as of 2018, a democratic political system. Freedom House assessed Tunisia in 
2018 as ‘free’ and an electoral democracy.5     
 
                                                        
3 See IFES election guide country profile for Iraq, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/104 
4 See Freedom House assessment of civil and political freedom in Iraq and electoral democracy status, available 
at: https://freedomhouse.org/content/freedom-world-data-and-resources 
5 See Freedom House assessment of civil and political freedom in Tunisia and its status as an electoral 
democracy, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/content/freedom-world-data-and-resources 
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12 1.5	 Outcome		 	
The study finds that de jure inclusion of communal groups in institution-building is not a 
sufficient mechanism to create support for a political system, whilst de facto inclusion may 
be sufficient. In every institutional design moment where there was de jure inclusion alone, 
without de facto inclusion, confidence in the political system was not created. At the same 
time, in every case of institution-building where there was de facto inclusion, regardless of 
whether or not de jure inclusion was present, support was built for the political system. This 
suggests that de jure inclusion is not a sufficient mechanism to build support for a political 
system, whilst de facto inclusion may be sufficient.   
Two policy implications emerge from the study regarding the facilitation of de facto 
inclusion during institution-building. Where de facto inclusion was sustained across both 
electoral system design and constitution-making two factors were present, providing policy 
implications for the focus and implementation of institutional design during political 
transition. First, communal groups responded to heightened tension by engaging directly and 
persistently with each other on salient and contentious issues. This was juxtaposed to cases 
where, faced with conflicting positions, communal groups withdrew from engaging with each 
other, or one group overrode others in order to produce a desired institutional outcome. In 
the latter cases de facto inclusion was not sustained. The policy implication that arises from 
this finding is that, during institution-building, the proscribed response to tension amongst 
key societal groups should be to persist with inter-group engagement on contentious issues.   
Second, in cases with continuous de facto inclusion there was a consistent focus from 
the interim authority on reaching agreement amongst key communal groups. Under 
heightened pressure and risk of civil conflict, the body overseeing institutional design focused 
first-and-foremost on reaching agreement amongst communal groups. This was in contrast 
to cases where, for example, the interim authority put central emphasis on achieving a 
particular institutional outcome, or executing an institutional framework, despite resistance 
from one or more key communal groups. This implies that institutional design during political 
transition needs to place agreement amongst all key groups at the heart of its agenda. The 
findings suggest that where these two factors form the basis of transitional institution-
building, a contested state will have a greater chance of building support from all communal 
groups for the new political system.  
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
13 1.6	 Thesis	overview	
The thesis can be conceptually divided into two parts. In the first part, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
provide the background to the study, outlining the study’s theoretical underpinnings, 
hypotheses, and research design, as well as the political context of the selected countries. 
This is followed, in the second part, by an empirical investigation of the hypotheses in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7. These three chapters are organized thematically, according to 
institutional design events, rather than per country. This is due to the study’s central focus on 
a comparative study of institution-building during political transition, which is illustrated with 
an investigation of the selected countries. Chapter 8 concludes with a discussion of the study’s 
theoretical contribution and discusses the implications of the study for research and policy.  
In the first part, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the theoretical framework that 
informs the study. The chapter discusses a central contention in the electoral system design 
and constitution-making literatures, namely, that inclusive institutional design creates 
confidence in the political system. The lack of conclusive empirical evidence to either confirm 
or reject this assertion, is presented. An implicit distinction in both literatures between de 
jure inclusion and de facto inclusion is highlighted. I argue that this distinction may be central 
to advancing our understanding of the causal mechanism through which inclusive 
institutional design builds political support. Four hypotheses are advanced to test this claim. 
Chapter 3 presents the study’s research design. The use of a small-N comparative study is 
justified in light of the research question, and the selection of country-cases is discussed in 
detail. The measurement of the population proportion of key communal groups in each 
selected country is outlined. The operationalisation of the independent variables (de jure and 
de facto inclusion) and the dependent variable (support for a political system) is specified for 
each of the three empirical chapters. Finally, the data that is used to measure the 
independent and dependent variables is presented.  
Chapter 4 explores the political context of the salient communal cleavage in each one 
of the four selected countries. The chapter delineates the way in which this cleavage shaped 
the political landscape in each country under colonial administration in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s, and in the following period of colonial-backed monarchical rule. The identified 
communal cleavage constituted a key fissure in each state between competing visions for the 
character and values that should underpin the political system. In each state, upon 
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declaration of an independent republic in the early-to-mid twentieth century, one communal 
group captured political leadership and governing institutions, whilst other groups were 
excluded from leadership positions and full participation in political governance. This is the 
context in which the various political transitions took place.  
In the second part of the thesis, Chapter 5 investigates whether the involvement of 
communal groups in negotiations on electoral system design in each country, created support 
for the elections. Three hypotheses are investigated to test the impact of de jure inclusion 
and de facto inclusion on confidence in the elections. In accordance with expectations, where 
both de jure inclusion and de facto inclusion were observed, there was support for elections. 
Contrary to expectations, where de jure inclusion was observed without de facto inclusion, 
support was not created. However, negotiations that did not have de jure inclusion, but did 
involve de facto inclusion, were shown to build support for elections. This suggests that de 
jure inclusion is not a sufficient mechanism to create support, but de facto inclusion may be 
sufficient.  
Chapter 6 builds on the findings from Chapter 5 by examining whether inclusion in 
constitution-making leads to support for a new constitution. Two hypotheses are investigated 
to test the impact of de jure and de facto inclusion in constitution-making in Egypt, Iraq, and 
Tunisia (Libya did not approve a new constitution). In accordance with the findings from 
Chapter 5, constitution-making that involved both de jure and de facto inclusion, created 
support for the constitution; whilst negotiations that began with de jure inclusion but did not 
involve de facto inclusion, failed to create support. This reinforces the contention that de jure 
inclusion in institution-building is not sufficient to create political confidence, whilst de facto 
inclusion may be sufficient.  
Chapter 7 investigated whether inclusive electoral system design for first transitional 
elections built support for the elected assembly in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia (de facto inclusion 
in Libya could not be examined at this stage because the distribution of seats amongst 
communal groups was pre-determined). Three hypotheses are examined to test whether a 
de jure inclusive electoral system was, or was not, sufficient to build support for the elected 
assembly. Congruent with the findings for Chapters 5 and 6, it is found that where there was 
de jure inclusion without de facto inclusion, there was no confidence in the elected assembly. 
At the same time, where both de jure and de facto inclusion were present, support for the 
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elected assembly was observed. This strengthens the assertion that de facto inclusion may be 
sufficient to create support for a political system, whilst de jure inclusion is not sufficient.  
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the study’s key findings and discusses the implications 
for research and policy. The study’s main theoretical contribution is the assertion that de 
facto inclusion may be a sufficient mechanism to build support for a political system whilst de 
jure inclusion is not. In light of this finding, the apparently inconclusive empirical evidence 
from the institutional design literature is re-examined. The study’s key theoretical 
contribution provides a coherent explanation for why some studies have found a relationship 
between inclusion and support, whilst others have not. Regarding political transitions in the 
MENA region, the study suggests that de facto inclusion may be a mechanism to facilitate 
transition to a stable political system, and, in particular, to navigate the salient Islamist – non-
Islamist cleavage relevant across the region.
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Chapter	Two		Theorising	Inclusion	in	Institutional	Design		
South Africa’s transition from an oppressive apartheid regime to a democracy with stable 
political institutions has been acknowledged as one of the most significant political events of 
the twentieth century (Inman and Rubinfeld 2013). The possibility of building support from 
all groups for a new political system seemed elusive as apartheid was dismantled in the early 
1990s (Jenkins 1996). Following decades of brutal repression of non-white South Africans 
under the apartheid regime, the threat of inter-communal violence between the white 
minority that had been in positions of political leadership and the non-white majority 
population was palpable (Morris and Hindson 1992). And yet South Africa’s transition was 
characterised by the involvement of all communal groups, and did succeed, largely without 
violence, in rebuilding political institutions that now enjoy widespread confidence (Ebrahim 
1998; Reynolds 1995a). 
 Constitution-making in Kenya between 2000 and 2005, another deeply divided society 
in Africa, presents a contrasting case. Cottrell and Ghai (2007, 2) note that Kenyan 
constitution-making was similar to South Africa in that it was ‘to be inclusive – 
accommodating all’ and ‘as far as possible, decisions were to be by consensus’ (6). However, 
in contrast to South Africa, confidence of all communal groups was not created for the 
proposed constitutional framework. The constitution was decisively rejected in a 
constitutional referendum with 58 percent opposed, and 42 percent in favour.1 Public support 
or rejection of the constitution was very much divided along communal lines (Cottrell and 
Ghai 2007; G. Lynch 2006).  
How can we account for the building of support for the new political system in South 
Africa, whilst in Kenya such confidence was not created for a new constitution? Both electoral 
engineering and constitution-making scholars assert that representation of all communal 
groups in institution-building in South Africa was central to avoiding severe inter-communal 
violence and building confidence in the new political system (Ebrahim and Miller 2010; 
Reynolds 1995a). Conversely, in Kenya, scholars have argued that a highly inclusive and 
                                                        
1 See IFES election guide country profile for Kenya, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/18 
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participatory process failed to overcome conflicting preferences and did not create a buy-in 
from all societal groups (Cottrell and Ghai 2007). Given these dramatically contrasting cases, 
what is the mechanism through which inclusion operated to build support in South Africa, 
that was not present in Kenya? Answering this question forms the basis of this chapter. 
The next section outlines the scholarly argument that inclusion of communal groups 
in institution-building in a contested state will create support for the political system. Section 
2.2 examines this claim in the electoral system design and constitution-making literatures, 
and notes the inconclusive empirical evidence to either verify or refute this contention. This 
suggests the need for a better understanding of the mechanism through which inclusion leads 
to support. Section 2.3 notes an implicit distinction in the institutional design literature 
between de jure inclusion and de facto inclusion. I argue that a systematic examination of the 
separate or combined impact of these two elements of inclusion, on building confidence in a 
political system, may be key to identifying the mechanism through which inclusion creates 
support.2 Based on this supposition, four hypotheses are advanced. The chapter concludes by 
summarising the study’s theoretical framework.   
 2.1	 Contested	states,	inclusive	institutions,	and	political	support	
A key theoretical assertion of the institutional design literature is that, in a contested state 
undergoing a transition, inclusion is a central mechanism to create confidence from all 
communal groups in a new political system. As outlined in the introduction, confidence (also 
referred to as support) is defined as the perceived legitimacy of a political system 
demonstrated by actors striving to achieve political goals within the system’s political 
institutions and procedures, and not through extra-constitutional means (Beetham 2004; 
Bratton and Mattes 2001; Mishler and Rose 2001; Roy 2004). This definition can be further 
broken down into three key elements: behavioural support or the absence of anti-system 
violence; attitudinal support or the perceived legitimacy of the political system; and 
constitutional support or cooperation with the system’s political frameworks (Linz and Stepan 
1996, chap. 1).  
                                                        
2 Note that the key theoretical contribution of this study regards the function of inclusion in institution-building, 
and, in particular, the distinction between de jure and de facto inclusion. Support for a political system is 
measured to illustrate the argument, however, the main theoretical argument that is advanced relates to our 
understanding of how inclusion operates to create political confidence.  
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Some scholars argue that the type of communal cleavage in a contested state impacts 
on the likelihood of building support for a political system, contending that a bi-polar cleavage 
has a higher risk of violent conflict compared to a multi-polar cleavage (Fraenkel and Grofman 
2006; Horowitz 2013, chap. 1; Reilly 2002b, 168). An example of a bipolar cleavage is the 
sectarian cleavage in Northern Ireland between Protestants and Catholics (McKittrick and 
McVea 2002), or the ethnic cleavage in Fiji between indigenous Fijians and Fijians of Indian 
descent (Guelke 2012, 22–23). Examples of multi-polar communal cleavages include the 
religious-ethnic division between Bosniacs (Muslims), Croats (Catholics), and Serbs 
(Orthodox) in Bosnia-Herzegovinia (Burg and Shoup 1999, 6), or the religious-sectarian 
division between Sunni-Muslims, Shia-Muslims and Christians in Lebanon (Winslow 1996). 
However, the view that multi-polar cleavages provide more stability than bipolar ones 
through diffusing ethnic tension across multiple focal points is contradicted by violent inter-
communal conflict in multipolar societies such as those mentioned above.   
Other scholars contend that the extent to which communal cleavages intersect with 
other societal divisions creating overlapping identities, the greater the chance to avoid inter-
communal tension and build widespread support from all groups for the political system (Linz 
and Stepan 1996, chap. 2). A citizen may possess multiple communal identities by self-
identifying with more than one communal group or by intermarrying with someone from a 
different communal group; these identities may have varying salience at different times and 
in different contexts (A. Smith 2010, chap. 1). In addition, communal cleavages may overlap 
with other societal or economic divisions (Wimmer 1997, 639–40). However, the moderating 
effect of intersecting identities is undermined in two ways. First, communal identities often 
overlap with socio-economic groups in a way that reinforces, rather than weakens, inter-
communal separation and antagonism (Horowitz 2000, 6-12). Second, in times of political 
uncertainty, communal identities gain in salience, and interactions between communal 
groups can function like a security dilemma (Posen 1993; Rose 2000). This raises the risk of 
allegiance to a communal identity overriding support for the political system and increasing 
the risk of violent confrontation.  
An understudied, but increasingly noted, contentious communal cleavage is the civil-
religious one between Islamist and non-Islamist groups in majority-Muslim countries (Stepan 
2012a). This division is present in societies where ‘differences over the appropriate 
relationship between religion and the state become a source of political fragmentation’ (Bali 
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and Lerner 2016, 241). Whilst the term ‘Islamist’ has been used in different contexts to 
different effect (Bowker 2010, 104-105; Mansouri and Azbarzadeh 2006, 3-4), this study uses 
the term to mean a member of society that supports the insertion of Islamic values and 
teachings into the political arena as the key basis for determining laws and political systems 
(Schwedler 2007). Hamid (2014, 15) comments that ‘whether stated or unstated the goal of 
an Islamist group is the ‘Islamisation’ of society,’ meaning, ‘the gradual Islamisation of laws, 
in politics, economics, and society’. This is not to deny that Islamist groups may operate within 
non-Islamist political frameworks on the path to creating a political system underpinned by 
Islamic values (Bowker 2010, 109). Non-Islamists are those members of society who do not 
support this goal. 
Scholarly attention to the Islamist - non-Islamist communal cleavage intensified in the 
early twenty-first century. Following the rise in global prominence of Islamic extremism 
(Palmer and Palmer 2008; Rashid 2008) ‘the salience of Islam in contemporary world politics… 
increased dramatically’ (Mansouri and Akbarzadeh 2006, 3). In particular, scholars focused on 
whether such a communal division inevitably leads to either a secular authoritarian regime 
(such as Egypt) or a theocratic regime based on Islamic law (such as Iran); and excludes the 
possibility of an inclusive political system such as democracy (Diamond 2010; Stepan and 
Robertson 2003). On the one hand, scholars focused on political developments in Turkey 
post-2002, which seemed to confirm the risk of erosion of an open, inclusive civil space under 
the leadership of a political party aligned with Islamist values (Baran 2010; Yesilada and Rubin 
2011). On the other hand, scholars examined the emergence of democracy in the world’s 
largest majority-Muslim country, Indonesia, as evidence of the potential compatibility of 
Islamic values with a democratic political system (Barton 2010; Kunkler and Stepan 2013). 
The Islamist – non-Islamist cleavage received particular attention following the Arab 
Uprisings of 2011 in the MENA region and consequent leadership change in several countries 
(Hamid 2014, 8). As foreshadowed by Bowker in 2010 (104) ‘much of the… discussion of the 
prospects for political reform in the Arab Middle East leads inevitably to the question of the 
future of political Islam in the region’. Stepan and Linz (2013, 15) note that ‘the hegemony, 
perceived or actual, of religious forces over much of civil society in the Arab world… had no 
parallel in [previous political transitions]’ and that this therefore presents transition scholars 
‘with a novel phenomenon, and prompts them accordingly to come up with new concepts 
and fresh data to shed light upon it’ (17).  
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In any contested state undergoing a political transition, building support from all 
communal groups for the political system is integral to creating stable political institutions 
and avoiding inter-communal violence. The important function of political support has 
prompted scholarly investigation into the factors that drive such support. A body of literature 
going back to Lipset’s seminal article of 1959, examines economic and socio-cultural 
conditions as drivers of widespread support for a political regime. This literature argues that 
certain levels of economic development (Evans and Whitefield 1995; McAllister and White 
2017), and specific socio-cultural attributes (Almond and Verba 1989; Inglehart and Welzel 
2006, 2010), will serve to build confidence in a particular type of political system, such as 
democracy, over other types. According to this approach, support for a political system during 
political transition is primarily determined by pre-existing conditions in the relevant country.  
In recent decades, scholars have increasingly emphasised the central impact of 
institutional choices made during political transition itself, as determinants of support for a 
new political system (see edited volumes by Barany and Moser [2009]; Bastian and Luckham 
[2003]; Lindberg [2009]; and Reynolds [2002]). Scholarship on macro-institutional design has 
burgeoned, contending that political transitions are formative moments that shape political 
legacies for the new political system (Munck and Leff 1997, 345). From this perspective, 
building support for a new political system in a contested state is a function of political and 
institutional choices made during the transition itself (Guo and Stradiotto 2014). As noted by 
Belmont, Mainwaring, and Reynolds (2002, 1): ‘it is probably in divided societies that 
institutional arrangements have the greatest impact’, and that therefore ‘macro institutional 
rules… have become key in the efforts to… reduce violent conflicts in divided societies’ (3).   
A core theoretical assertion of the institutional design literature is that, in a contested 
state undergoing transition, inclusion of all communal groups is a key mechanism to create 
confidence in the political system (Call 2012; Lijphart 2004; Norris 2009; Reynolds 1995b; 
Widner 2005). During the rebuilding of a contested state, inclusion is important at two stages 
of institutional design: 1) the negotiations stage; and 2) the implementation stage. The 
negotiations stage involves the decision-making process that takes place amongst political 
stakeholders to determine institutional frameworks. For example, this could be negotiations 
to determine an electoral system for first, transitional elections (Benoit and Schiemann 2001), 
or a constitution-making process to determine a new constitution document (Miller 2010b). 
The implementation stage refers to the implementation of the institutional framework itself. 
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In practice, this could be holding transitional elections using a new electoral system (Norris 
2004), or executing a constitutional document that defines the political institutions and 
procedures for a new political regime (Galligan and Versteeg 2013a). 
Inclusive institutional design is expected to build support across the three dimensions 
outlined by Linz and Stepan (1996, chap. 1). The first dimension is behavioural support, 
denoted by an absence of anti-system actions such as political violence. The second 
dimension is attitudinal support, that is, the perceived legitimacy of the political system. The 
final dimension is constitutional support, and concerns cooperation with proscribed 
institutional frameworks. Each one of these three separate dimensions operates 
independently of the others. Support will be strongest if all three dimensions are present, 
however one or two could exist without the others.  
The inclusion of communal groups in institutional design encompasses both political 
actors (an elite dimension) and the broader society (a mass public dimension). Post-conflict 
literature (Call 2012; Ingram 2014; Simonsen 2005, 302; Wagner and Dreef 2014) emphasises 
the elite dimension, stressing the importance of the inclusion of representatives from all key 
societal groups in political institutions to ensure access to state power and resources and 
create loyalty towards the new political system. Lindemann (2008, 21) notes that 
‘exclusionary elite bargains will foster antagonism and violent conflict,’ whilst inclusive elite 
bargains ‘will foster ethno-regional cohesion and political stability’ (22).  
Alongside the inclusion of representatives of communal groups in the political arena, 
channels for civil society input and public participation is a second important dimension to 
build confidence in a political system. As noted by Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount (2009, 205), 
‘public involvement… has become the subject of particular attention in recent years and is 
urged by scholars, governments, and international organisations’. A key claim in the 
constitution-making literature is that public participation ‘makes the constitution itself, 
transitional authorities, and subsequent governments more legitimate in citizens’ eyes’ 
(Gluck and Brandt 2015, 6). In particular, in a contested state, given that communal divisions 
run through society, widespread support amongst the populace is important (Belmont, 
Mainwaring, and Reynolds 2002, 3; Ruiz-Rufino 2013, 102).  
The elite and mass public dimensions overlap and should be considered 
interconnected, not distinct (Bali and Lerner 2016, 235). The inclusion of political 
representatives from all communal groups in political frameworks is expected to increase 
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perceived legitimacy of the political system amongst their constituencies (Lijphart 1977; 
Mujtaba 2013; Norris 2002). This is the ‘politics as a microcosm’ concept of representation,3 
where the political arena is expected to visually represent the characteristics of a population, 
on a smaller scale, leading to higher perceived legitimacy of the political system and the 
avoidance of anti-system violence.4 As noted by Simonsen (2005, 302) ‘inclusion – understood 
in this case as fair representation of categories of citizens defined by social cleavages – is 
essential for the legitimacy of political institutions in divided societies and contributes 
towards stability’. This is corroborated by Krook and Moser (2013, 31) who state that 
‘legislatures that do not reflect society are typically deemed less legitimate and less likely to 
protect the interests of marginalized groups, and they can even spur excluded marginalized 
groups to destabilize the polity’.  
The function of inclusion as a means to foster support is discussed in relationship to 
the Islamist – non-Islamist communal cleavage (discussed above), with much attention paid 
to the question of whether inclusion can moderate potentially anti-system or extreme 
Islamist groups (Schwedler 2007) by ‘opening new channels of non-confrontational 
engagement between state and society’ (Mansouri and Akbarzadeh 2006, 11). Islamist 
individuals and groups that are already, as a matter of collective identity, self-consciously 
outside the existing system, and are often deeply antagonistic toward those who are willing 
to abide by its constraints, may be unlikely to engage meaningfully in discussion of more 
inclusive models of governance. Beyond extremist groups of that kind, inclusion in credible, 
constitutionally-bounded political frameworks that allow room in practice for the ongoing 
pursuit of Islamist goals through political means have the potential to incentivise cooperation 
with other political actors in the system (Bowker 2010, 107-125). Where political outcomes 
are achieved through inclusive procedures, participation within such frameworks has the 
potential to make anti-system violence less attractive, and may encourage compromise and 
cooperation across societal divisions in order to achieve political objectives. 
                                                        
3 Politics as a microcosm refers to the idea that a member of a communal group should be politically represented 
by a representative from that group, and representatives in the political arena should proportionally reflect the 
demographic composition of a state’s key communal groups. This is opposed to a focus on political 
representation of all groups’ policy preferences, without attention to political representation from a member of 
one’s own communal group. For further discussion of types of representation see Celis (2006); and Wangnerud 
(2009). 
4 See, for example, Norris’ (2002) outline of the expectation that inclusion will drive support from minority 
groups for the political system. See also Papagianni (2008) on the importance of inclusion to foster legitimacy. 
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Two institutions that shape the trajectory of a political transition are the electoral system and 
a new constitution. Institutional design during a political transition spans a range of 
institutional choices including the choice of a parliamentary or a presidential political 
framework; the crafting of legislative, executive, and judicial institutions; and the choice of a 
unitary or federal system (Foweraker and Landman 2002; Horowitz 2009; Powell 2000; 
Wimmer 2003). However, perhaps the two most important and highly contested institutions 
that are designed (or re-designed) during the immediate period of political transition in a 
contested state are the electoral system and a new constitution (Birch 2005, 282; Wallis 2014, 
2). Electoral system design here refers to the rules governing the translation of votes into 
seats (Moser 2009, 133), and constitution-making refers to the design of a new constitutional 
document (Elster 1995).  
Electoral system design and constitution-making can be considered two distinct and 
equally significant institutional design moments when the former precedes the latter in the 
sequencing of the transition. Where elections are held before constitution-making they 
typically determine either the constitutional design body itself, or the political actors 
responsible for selecting this body. In such cases, electoral system design is not only separate 
to constitution-making but is typically sharply contested (Carey 2009) as it will impact which 
groups gain political power and the ability to influence the constitution-making process and 
the political frameworks of the new system (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2006, 434; Mansfield 
and Snyder 2005). As noted by Luong (2000, 564): ‘The struggle to define the nature of 
electoral systems is at the center of transitional politics. Particularly in a new state, they are 
the rules of the game that matter most because they determine who will set future rules of 
the game’.  
Similarly, constitution-making plays a ‘central role in state building’ (Wallis 2014, 2), 
defining the political procedures of the new regime, and the inclusion or exclusion of different 
groups from the structures of political power (Blount 2011; Jung and Deering 2015, 61; Miller 
2010b). A constitutional document not only captures the core values and principles of a state 
(Galligan and Versteeg 2013b, 8–13; Samuels 2006) but also ‘establishes a system of 
government [and] defines the powers and functions of its institutions’ (Galligan and Versteeg 
2013b, 6). Hart (2010, 20) notes that constitution-making is ‘a contest over the distribution, 
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redistribution, and limitation of power [therefore] the making or remaking of a constitution 
is of particular significance in divided and conflicted societies’. During political transition, 
designing a new constitution is often fraught with tension due to the potential lasting impact 
of constitutional decisions on the trajectory of the political system (Carey 2009). 
There is a scholarly debate in both the electoral system design and constitution-
making literatures regarding the benefits and drawbacks of inclusion in institution-building. 
One group of electoral system scholars emphasises the importance of choosing an electoral 
framework that is expected to incentivise the political representation of all communal groups 
(Lijphart 1991, 2004; Norris 2009; Reynolds 1995b). This is a part of the consociational 
approach to power-sharing in contested states, most comprehensively articulated by Arend 
Lijphart (1969). Lijphart (2004, 100) notes that ‘for divided societies, ensuring the election of 
a broadly representative legislature should be the crucial consideration, and PR [proportional 
representation] is undoubtedly the optimal way of doing so’. A second group of electoral 
scholars claims that electoral systems, rather than aiming to include representatives of all 
societal groups, should rather incentivise the election of moderate, centrist candidates who 
will represent a broad spectrum of views (O’Leary 2013, 22). This is known as the centripetal 
approach; key proponents of this view include Donald Horowitz (1991) and Benjamin Reilly 
(2001).  
The consociational approach has been criticised on two grounds. First, it is claimed 
that consociationalism has only been shown to work well over the long term in states that are 
not deeply divided societies, prompting the claim that it ‘only works where it is not needed’ 
(Guelke 2012, 31). Second, it is claimed that consociationalism can entrench communal 
divisions and give disproportionate political power to extreme groups (Mansfield and Snyder 
2005). ‘The danger of consociationalism is that through accommodating ethnicity and 
incentivising communal politics, [it] will bolster the power of ethnic extremists, who will use 
ever-escalating, mutually exclusive ethnic claims’ (Nagle and Clancy 2012, 84). This can 
entrench communal divisions and encourage divisive politics along increasingly-salient 
communal lines (Chandra 2005; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Reilly 2002b). 
Despite these caveats, the high risk of inter-communal tension in a contested state 
undergoing transition, has led to the consociational approach’s emphasis on the inclusion of 
communal-group representatives in the political arena gaining traction over the centripetal 
approach as the best framework for this context (Bogaards 2013; Krook and Moser 2013; 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
25 
Ruiz-Rufino 2013; Simonsen 2005; Wagner and Dreef 2014, 290).5 In recent years, one of the 
founders of the centripetal approach, Donald Horowitz, himself acknowledged the 
importance in some cases of political representation for all communal groups and, to this end, 
the need to follow the consociational recommendation for a proportional electoral system. 
Following Mubarak’s abdication from power in Egypt in early 2011, Horowitz (1) endorsed the 
use of a PR electoral system in the first post-Mubarak elections, rather than an electoral 
system that incentivises centripetal behaviour. He explained that ‘Ordinarily, proportional 
representation has a centrifugal effect, because it allows many parties, some of them 
extreme, to win a few seats and enter the legislature… In Egypt, however, the small parties 
are concentrated in the liberal, secular center. This kind of system (or at least most versions 
of it) would help them… to win a level of representation they could not achieve in individual, 
majority-runoff constituencies’.  
In the constitution-making literature, whilst some scholars contend that inclusion in a 
process of creating a new constitution is critical for the constitution’s legitimacy (Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Blount 2011; Miller 2010a, 627–38; Widner 2005) other scholars cite the 
dangers of a highly participatory constitution process (Landau 2013; Partlett 2012). From one 
perspective, designing a constitution is considered a moment of ‘high’ law-making that sets 
out the ‘core and constitutive commitments’ of a polity (King 2013, 73) and as such should be 
a deliberative process that is as inclusive as possible of a state’s societal groups (Hart 2010; 
Ndulo 2010). A second perspective is that elite-led constitution-making may produce a more 
coherent constitution than one produced through extensive deliberation with multiple 
groups (Wheatley and Germann 2016). This view contends that civil and political rights may 
be better protected in a constrained, rather than an inclusive, process (Landau 2013). For 
example, the involvement of multiple stakeholders could threaten textual coherence and 
internal consistency of the constitution (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 2009, 210).  
Despite these misgivings, constitutional scholars and transition architects increasingly 
consider inclusive constitution-making as ‘best practice’ in a contested state (Gluck and 
Brandt 2015; Hart 2010; Widner 2005). Ndulo notes that constitution-making is a ‘national 
exercise in building national consensus’ (Ndulo 2010, 192) and that inclusion affords an 
                                                        
5 An additional reason for the increased prominence of the consociational approach is that, due to logistical 
concerns, transitioning states almost never use the electoral recommendation of the centripetal approach, 
namely, a majoritarian-preferential electoral system.  
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opportunity to facilitate the broad commitment of all societal groups to the new constitution 
(Aucoin 2010, xii; Papagianni 2008; Samuels 2006). This is particularly pertinent in a contested 
state where ‘an inclusive approach can be vital to enabling all conflicting parties to debate 
and negotiate the terms of the new national order and resolve important differences 
peacefully’ (Miller 2010a, 628). Constitutional design processes in recent decades in 
Cambodia, Uganda, South Africa, Thailand, Eritrea, and Kenya have emphasised participation 
(Galligan and Versteeg 2013b, 33; S. Marks 2010; Miller 2010b).  
Whilst both electoral system design and constitution-making literature emphasise 
inclusion as a mechanism to create political confidence, the former focuses primarily on the 
implementation stage, whilst the latter focuses on both the negotiation and implementation 
stage. A swathe of literature focuses on the implementation of electoral frameworks 
examining, amongst other things, how electoral systems facilitate the inclusion of societal 
groups in the elected assembly (Colomer 2004; Horowitz 2014; Gallagher and Mitchell 2008; 
Norris 2004; Powell 2000; Reilly 2002a). In comparison, there is minimal focus on the 
importance of inclusion of all societal groups in negotiations to determine an electoral 
system, before elections are held. Literature that does examine the electoral framework as a 
dependent variable, primarily investigates the way in which bargaining amongst strategic 
actors, aiming to achieve their preferred electoral system under conditions of political 
uncertainty, produces an electoral framework (Andrews and Jackman 2005; Benoit and 
Schiemann 2001; Luong 2000; Shvetsova 2003). The emphasis is not on inclusion of groups in 
negotiations as an important factor in building confidence in the political system.  
Literature on constitution-making examines the importance of inclusion in both the 
process of designing a new constitution, and in the content and implementation of a 
constitution. A large body of literature examines participation and inclusion of all societal 
groups in constitutional design (Elster 1995; Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 2009; Miller 2010b; 
Widner 2005) as a key factor expected to produce perceived legitimacy of the new 
constitution. Alongside an interest in deliberations, scholars also examine the content of 
constitutions, in terms of groups’ inclusion in political institutions and guarantees of civil and 
political freedoms for all groups, as well as investigating how these proscriptions are 
implemented and whether they create confidence in the political system (Galligan and 
Versteeg 2013a; Ginsburg 2012; Kuperman 2015; Wheatley and Mendez 2016).  
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Despite a clear theoretical claim in both the electoral system design and constitution-
making literatures that inclusion creates confidence in a political system, the empirical 
evidence is inconclusive. In the electoral system design literature, Bogaards (2013, 72) notes 
that ‘surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence to back up the popularity of [inclusive 
electoral systems]’. Whilst some large-N studies have found that inclusive electoral system 
design does build support for a political system (Blais and Carty 1990; Bogaards 2013; Ruiz-
Rufino 2013; Saideman et al. 2002), others find that it does not have the expected impact or 
actually exacerbates political violence (Norris 2002, 2004; Selway and Templeman 2012). For 
example, Norris (2002, 232-233) tests whether inclusive electoral systems build minority 
support for a political regime and finds the relationship unconfirmed, stating that the findings 
‘indicate that there is a complex pattern at work’. 
 Similarly, in the constitution-making literature, ‘the claim that participatory design 
processes generate constitutions with higher levels of legitimacy and popular support has 
been subject to only limited study’ (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 2009, 215). Wallis (2014, 4) 
notes that ‘the literature has not progressed far beyond speculation about what benefits 
public participation in constitution making may offer, and there have been few empirical 
studies of the benefits of public participation both during the constitution-making process 
and in its aftermath’. In probably the most comprehensive study to date, Widner (2005) 
surveyed almost 200 constitutional design processes to conclude that ‘differences in the 
degree of participation in the drafting of constitutions has no major effect… in some parts of 
the world… but does make a difference [in others]’ (503). Widner does not expand on what 
differentiates the former cases from the latter. Similarly, Miller (2010a, 636), on lessons learnt 
from 19 in-depth case studies on constitution-making, does not suggest a clear mechanism 
through which inclusion leads to support; rather she summarises the findings saying ‘the 
overarching conclusion that emerges most clearly from the case studies is that context is of 
paramount importance’.  
The lack of clear empirical evidence to either verify or refute the assertion that 
inclusion builds confidence in a political system, suggests that this relationship requires 
further investigation. Greater clarity is needed regarding what differentiates cases where 
inclusive institutional design in a contested state does create political support, from those 
where it does not. The following section examines the institutional design literature, noting 
an implicit distinction between de jure and de facto inclusion in discussions of institution-
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building. I argue that this distinction may be integral to a clearer understanding of the 
mechanism through which inclusion builds support.  	2.3	 Disaggregating	de	jure	and	de	facto	inclusion	
A survey of the literature on the importance of inclusion of societal groups in electoral system 
design and constitution-making reveals an implicit distinction between two elements of 
inclusion: de jure inclusion and de facto inclusion. The division between these two categories 
of inclusion may be key to understanding the mechanism through which inclusion builds 
political support. The distinction between de jure legislative and political frameworks, and de 
facto implementation of institutional procedures, is not novel to political literature; this 
division has been noted in the literatures on judicial politics (Hayo and Voigt 2007; Melton 
and Ginsburg 2014a), public governance (Maggetti 2007), political power (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006; Sampson 2014; Zheng 2007), and state sovereignty (Bahcheli, Bartmann, and 
Srebrnik 2004; Berg 2007; D. Lynch 2004). 
The definition of de jure and de facto in the literatures mentioned above varies 
according to the issue under examination. De jure independence of governance bodies is 
defined as formal independence based on ‘a series of prescriptions, enshrined in the 
constitutions of agencies’, and de facto independence as ‘the effective independence of 
agencies as they manage day-to-day regulatory actions’ (Maggetti 2007, 272). De jure political 
power is defined as ‘the type of political power allocated by political institutions (such as 
constitutions or electoral systems)’ and de facto political power as ‘the ability to galvanise 
collective action, brute force, lobbying or bribery’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 325–26) to 
achieve certain objectives. De jure sovereignty is defined as formal recognition of the control 
of a government over a specific territory vis-à-vis other governments, whilst de facto 
sovereignty is ‘the objective degree to which a nation asserts control over a… territory’ 
(Colangelo 2009, 625–26). 
Literature on institutional design implicitly discusses de jure and de facto inclusion, 
without advancing an explicit definition of these two elements of inclusion. De jure inclusion 
can be understood as the inclusion of key societal groups in institutional frameworks or 
bodies responsible for determining institutional design. This could include the use of a 
proportional electoral system that is expected to facilitate the inclusion of all societal groups 
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in the political arena (Norris 2002; Reynolds 1995b); the selection of a constituent body with 
representatives from all societal groups (Cottrell and Ghai 2007, 6-7); or the holding of a 
constitutional referendum to approve a new constitution (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 2009, 
206-207). De facto inclusion sequentially follows de jure and refers to the actual inclusion of 
all groups in institutional procedures. For example, de facto inclusion is present if key groups 
actually gain representation in the political arena following transitional elections (Ruiz-Rufino 
2013, 105), or if all groups are consulted on constitution-making and have an opportunity to 
influence the final constitution document (Ebrahim and Miller 2010, 146).  
An often-implicit assumption in the institutional design literature is that de jure 
inclusion will produce de facto inclusion, which will in turn build support for a political system, 
as shown in Figure 2.1. This expectation is outlined by Norris (2002, 211) in the context of the 
consociational approach to electoral system design. Norris explains that ‘in plural societies 
with strong cleavages… PR systems… are believed to facilitate minority representation’. In 
other words, an inclusive electoral system (de jure inclusion) is expected to facilitate 
parliamentary representation of communal groups (de facto inclusion). In turn, it is expected 
that, ‘by facilitating the inclusion of ethnic minority parties into parliament, [inclusive 
electoral] systems increase ethnic minority support for the political system’ (213).  
 
Figure 2.1 De jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, and support for a political system 
 
Source: For an overview of this conceptual expectation see Norris (2002, 210) 
 
There are contradictory findings regarding whether or not de jure inclusion does in 
fact produce de facto inclusion (Krook and Moser 2013, 33), some studies find that it does 
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(Bogaards 2013; Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000; Ruiz-Rufino 2013), whilst others find that it does 
not (Ruedin 2009; Thier 2010; A. Tripp 2010). Miller (2010a, 628) notes in her conclusion to 
an impressive volume of 19 constitution design case studies that ‘in some cases, the formal 
promise of representation and inclusion [was] unfulfilled in reality’. It is certainly plausible 
that de jure inclusion could exist without de facto inclusion, or vice versa. A de jure inclusive 
institutional framework that is expected to produce an inclusive outcome may not do so, 
either because human agents do not respond to the institutional incentives as expected or 
because the framework is not implemented as proscribed.6 It is also possible (though perhaps 
less likely) that de facto inclusion could be present without its de jure counterpart.7 In this 
case, an institutional framework that is not expected to produce an inclusive outcome instead 
produces one, for example, a majoritarian electoral system could facilitate representation of 
all societal groups in the political arena if groups are geographically concentrated (Barkan, 
Densham, and Rushton 2006). In an example from constitution making, it is plausible that 
where a constituent body does not include representatives of all groups, such representatives 
may in fact be consulted on the constitution and have an opportunity to influence the final 
document, constituting de facto inclusion.  
The distinct impact of de jure and de facto inclusion in institutional design on support 
for a political system has not, to date, been sufficiently differentiated and systematically 
examined. Table 2.1 divides the available studies on inclusive institutional design into those 
that examine de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of both, and shows 
whether or not a relationship was found between inclusion and support. Support in the 
identified studies is measured either as perceived legitimacy of the government and political 
system, absence of anti-system violence, or participation in institutional frameworks 
measured by indicators such as voter turnout.   
Studies examining de jure inclusion in institutional design are divided between those 
that find a relationship between inclusion and support and those that do not, shown in the 
first row of Table 2.1. Studies by Banducci, Donovan, and Karp (1999), Ishiyama (2000), 
Saideman et al. (2002), and Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) use a proportional electoral 
                                                        
6 For descriptions of de jure independence without de facto in studies on judicial and institutional independence 
see: Maggetti (2007); and Melton and Ginsburg (2014b). 
7 The concept of de facto political power existing without de jure is outlined in the literature on territorial 
sovereignty, see, for example Colangelo (2009).  
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system as the independent variable (de jure inclusion) in large-N studies that find a 
relationship between inclusion and support. Conversely, studies by Aucoin and Brandt (2010), 
Cottrell and Ghai (2007), Elkins and Sides (2007), Norris (2002), Ruiz-Rufino (2013), and 
Widner (2005) examine the impact of either a proportional electoral system or various 
measures of de jure inclusion in constitution-making (selection and composition of 
constituent body, public consultation, constitutional approval by public referendum) on 
political support, and do not find a clear relationship.  
The second row in Table 2.1 shows, first, that de facto inclusion in institutional design 
is not often examined without its de jure counterpart. Second, a lack of clear empirical 
evidence is revealed. Ruiz-Rufino (2013) finds that representation of minority groups in the 
political arena (de facto inclusion) positively impacts support of minority groups for the 
political system, whilst Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino (2007), in an earlier study, find that the same 
measure of de facto inclusion had no impact on communal group support for the political 
system.  
Studies that examine both de jure and de facto inclusion, shown in the third row, 
mostly find a relationship between inclusion and political support. However, an examination 
of these studies shows that the impact of de jure and de facto inclusion is not considered 
conceptually distinct. Whilst Bogaards (2013) examines both de jure inclusion (proportional 
electoral system) and de facto inclusion (representation of key groups in the political arena), 
he frames the study as an examination of the impact of de jure inclusion on support for the 
political system; de facto inclusion is included to examine whether de jure inclusion in fact 
produces de facto, not to separately assess whether the latter builds political support. Studies 
by Ebrahim and Miller (2010) and Wallis (2014) concurrently examine de jure inclusion 
(selection of the constituent assembly, official avenues for public participation, and the 
holding of a constitutional referendum) and de facto inclusion (the actual inclusion of all 
significant societal groups in consultations on constitution-making and these groups’ 
opportunity to influence the constitution document) in case-studies of constitution-making, 
without making a clear conceptual distinction between the two elements of inclusion. In the 
second column of the third row in Table 2.1, Moehler (2008) does not find a clear relationship 
between de jure and de facto inclusion in constitution-making in Uganda, and support for the 
political system.  
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Table 2.1 De jure and de facto inclusion in existing studies  
 Inclusion Support for political system: 
relationship found  
Support for political system: 
no clear relationship 
Row 1 De jure inclusion  Banducci, Donovan, and Karp (1999) 
Ishiyama (2000)  
Saideman et al. (2002) 
Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008)8 
 
Aucoin and Brandt (2010) 
Cottrell and Ghai (2007) 
Elkins and Sides (2007) 
Norris (2002) 
Ruiz-Rufino (2013) 
Widner (2005) 
 
Row 2 De facto inclusion Ruiz-Rufino (2013) Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino (2007)  
 
Row 3 De jure and de 
facto inclusion  
Bogaards (2013) 
Call (2010) 
Carlson (2010) 
Ebrahim and Miller (2010) 
Wallis (2014) 
Moehler (2008)  
 
 
The lack of conceptual distinction between de jure inclusion and de facto inclusion in 
the literature may account for the uneven empirical evidence regarding whether inclusive 
institutional design builds support for a political system. Studies that examine de jure 
inclusion produce contradictory findings. Studies on de facto inclusion alone are rare. The 
undifferentiated examination of de jure and de facto inclusion in other studies does not allow 
us to ascertain the distinct impact of de jure or de facto inclusion on support for a political 
system. This constitutes a gap in the literature that this study aims to address. The study’s 
central research question is: does de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of 
both, build support for a political system in a contested state undergoing political transition? 
In order to investigate this question, four hypotheses are advanced, shown in Table 2.2.  
If inclusion in institutional design is necessary to build support, as asserted in the 
literature, then we can expect that if neither de jure nor de facto inclusion are present, 
support will also not be observed. This proposition is captured in hypothesis one. Note that 
because this study focuses on institution-building in contested states, inclusion of all key 
communal groups is of primary importance.  
Hypothesis 1: In a contested state undergoing political transition, where neither de 
jure nor de facto inclusion of key communal groups in institutional design is observed, 
support for the political system will not be observed.  
 
                                                        
8 Note that this study also examines the impact of the effective number of political parties which could be a 
measure of de facto inclusion, however, the authors do not relate this to the political representation of 
communal groups.  
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Table 2.2 Hypotheses  
 De jure inclusion De facto inclusion Expected observation of support for political 
system 
H1 - - - 
H2 x x y 
H3 x - y 
H4 - x y 
 
The electoral system design and constitution-making literatures implicitly assume that a 
combination of both de jure inclusion and de facto inclusion is sufficient to build support for 
a political system. This expectation is reflected in hypothesis two.  
Hypothesis 2: In a contested state undergoing political transition, where both de jure 
and de facto inclusion of key communal groups in institutional design is observed, 
support for the political system will be observed.  
However, if de jure inclusion or de facto inclusion alone is sufficient to build support for a 
political system, then we would expect that either 1) where de jure inclusion exists without 
de facto inclusion, support will be observed, or 2) where de facto inclusion is present without 
de jure, support will be observed. These expectations are reflected in hypotheses three and 
four.  
Hypothesis 3: In a contested state undergoing political transition, where de jure 
inclusion of key communal groups in institutional design is observed, and de facto 
inclusion is not, support for the political system will be observed.   
Hypothesis 4: In a contested state undergoing political transition, where de facto 
inclusion of key communal groups in institutional design is observed, and de jure 
inclusion is not, support for the political system will be observed.   
 2.4		 Conclusion		
In response to the puzzle posed at the beginning of this chapter¾why did inclusive 
institutional design lead to support for the political system in South Africa whilst an inclusive 
constitution-making process in Kenya failed to build support?¾evidence from this chapter 
suggests that, differentiating between de jure and de facto inclusion may provide an 
explanation for the discrepancy between these two cases. Indeed, an examination reveals 
that whilst both de jure and de facto inclusion were present in South Africa, in Kenya there 
was de jure inclusion without de facto. In South Africa, alongside inclusive deliberative bodies 
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and public consultations (de jure inclusion), the ‘priority given to consensus was critical’ 
(Ebrahim and Miller 2010, 146). Persistent ongoing negotiations took place up until a 
constitution document was finalised (Democracy Reporting International 2011d, appendix; 
Ebrahim 1998). De facto inclusion in South Africa was demonstrated by the fact that ‘each 
side realised that they needed the other to be able to deliver the support of its constituency’ 
and were willing to ‘transcend their past experiences as oppressed and oppressor, and to 
work patiently and persistently over a long period of time to reach the desired end’ (Ebrahim 
and Miller 2010, 147).  
In Kenya, by contrast, whilst there were widespread consultations and debate on 
constitution-making, this was not accompanied by de facto inclusion. Cottrell and Ghai’s 
(2007) detailed analysis of Kenyan constitution-making outlines the numerous provisions for 
de jure inclusion set out by the Kenya Review Act that ‘provided for a very participatory 
process’ (8) including ‘the most representative body ever assembled in Kenya [that] was set 
up to reflect public concerns and to be the primary negotiating forum in the process’ (6). 
However, in practice, de facto inclusion did not eventuate. Civil society actors wanted to 
‘exclude the government and parliament from any role as such in the review process’, and 
government actors ‘wanted to exclude the people’ (21). As a result, political actors boycotted, 
withdrew from, or otherwise stalled the constitutional review process. A draft constitution 
was produced through an inclusive process, but was subsequently altered in a non-inclusive 
forum by political actors, and then adjusted again by the Attorney General before being put 
to a referendum in which it was rejected. Cottrell and Ghai (2007, 7) allude to the lack of de 
facto inclusion: ‘the process was conducted… in accordance with the formal provisions of the 
[Kenya Review] Act [but] not… in its spirit’.  
Rebuilding a contested state begins with the design of political Institutions. Despite a 
theoretical assertion that inclusive institutional design creates support for a political system, 
there is a puzzling lack of a coherent body of evidence to support this claim. An investigation 
of the literature on inclusive institutional design reveals a conceptual distinction between de 
jure inclusive institutional frameworks and de facto inclusive implementation of institutional 
procedures, that has not been systematically examined. This study addresses this gap, 
contending that a better understanding of the mechanism through which inclusive 
institutional design creates support would not only further our theoretical understanding of 
inclusion, and shed light on the seemingly contradictory findings in existing studies, but may 
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also deepen our comprehension of transitional architecture and the creation of stable 
political institutions.      
The next chapter outlines the study’s research design in order to investigate the four 
hypotheses advanced above. A small-N comparative method is used, employing a most-
similar-systems-design for case selection. The operationalisation of the independent variables 
(de jure inclusion and de facto inclusion) and the dependent variable (support for a political 
system) are detailed for each empirical chapter, as well as the data used to measure each 
variable.  
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Chapter	Three		Research	Design	
 
This study investigates the casual mechanism through which inclusion of communal groups in 
institutional design creates support for a political system. This chapter addresses the question 
of how this mechanism can be best investigated. A small-N comparative study is considered 
most appropriate to this task as it enables both a qualitative investigation of key variables as 
well as identification of a causal mechanism that is generalisable across cases. A most-similar-
systems-design is used to select countries from the Arab-majority states of the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region. Drawing on measurements of inclusion and support in the 
literature, indices are developed to measure the independent variables (de jure and de facto 
inclusion) and the dependent variable (support for a political system). Data used to measure 
the indicators for each index is outlined.  
 3.1	 Research	design	and	case	selection	
This study investigates the mechanism through which inclusive institution-building creates 
political support. Large-N studies have found that the relationship between inclusive 
institutional design and support is complex (Norris 2002, 232–33; Widner 2005, 503). At the 
same time, single or comparative case studies have not identified a generalisable causal 
mechanism (Miller 2010b). On the one hand, investigation of a causal mechanism typically 
requires a more granulated approach than is possible with a large-N study (George and 
Bennet 2004, 74–75), and, in particular, the investigation of de facto inclusion requires 
qualitative investigation. On the other hand, examination of a single case may prevent the 
capacity to make assertions that can be applied beyond the specific case under investigation. 
Therefore, a small-N comparative study is used to enable an investigation of the mechanism 
through which inclusion leads to support in the selected cases. The small number of cases 
used here enables qualitative investigation, whilst the comparative element provides greater 
leverage than a single case study to identify a causal mechanism that is generalisable beyond 
a single case (Lijphart 1975).  
A key challenge when using a small-N comparative research design is that of ‘too many 
variables and too few cases’ (Lijphart 1975, 159). This challenge can compromise a study’s 
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capacity to fulfil two important criteria for good research design: 1) control for extraneous 
independent variables; and 2) permit the investigator to generalise from his or her findings 
(Goggin 1986, 329). Case selection is one method to address the challenges of control and 
generalisability (Ebbinghaus 2005). This study uses a most-similar-systems-design for case 
selection. This means that in order to control for structural factors, cases are chosen that have 
similar contextual conditions but differ on the independent variable under examination 
(Anckar 2008, 391). This introduces ‘an element of control by selecting cases on the basis of 
comparability and similarity’ (Goggin 1986, 331). Whilst most-similar-systems-design controls 
for extraneous variables to the extent that cases share structural factors, the study still faces 
the problem of generalisability beyond the study’s pool of cases. This study is best considered 
an exploratory investigation. The findings are indicative in support of the study’s theoretical 
argument. The illustration of a causal mechanism using a small-N comparative study in this 
thesis, provides a framework for these findings to be applied across additional cases, beyond 
those under investigation, to test their robustness and generalisability, in a future study. Such 
a large-N study is beyond the scope of the current project.  
Lijphart (1975, 14-15) outlines four strategies of case selection using a most-similar-
systems-design, one of which is to select countries that are ‘found within a geographical-
cultural area’ (159). This is the method employed by this study; countries are selected from 
the Arab-majority states of the MENA region. The MENA region is considered a political entity 
for the purposes of scholarly analysis (see for example: Beinin and Vairel [2013]; Gasiorowski 
and Yom [2017]; and Yousef [2004]) and is treated as a unit for regional comparison by 
political research bodies such as Freedom House,1 the International Foundation for Electoral 
systems (IFES),2 and the World Bank.3 Given that this study examines institution-building 
during political transition in states with a salient communal cleavage, the political upheaval 
in the MENA region in recent decades, coupled with strong communal divisions, provides 
fertile ground for this analysis.  
Case selection for the study is confined to Arab-majority states of the region to 
maximise similarity in structural conditions. These are defined as states with a majority-
population that is of Arab ethnicity, and Arabic as an official state language. This excludes the 
                                                        
1 See: freedomhouse.org/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa 
2 See: ifes.org/middle-east-and-north-africa 
3 See: worldbank.org/en/region/mena 
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MENA states of Iran, Israel, and Turkey from the pool of cases. This leads to identification of 
16 Arab-majority states and one territory: five states situated along the very northern border 
of Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia) as well as 11 states and one territory in the 
Middle East and Gulf region (Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestinian 
territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen).4 Scholars have used 
broader definitions of the MENA region (see, for example Fawcett [2013, 3]), that include 
states in sub-Saharan Africa that hold membership in the Arab League [Comoros, Djibouti, 
Mauritania, South Sudan, Sudan and Somalia]). However, given that these countries are 
geographically considered to be a part of Sub-Saharan Africa, the more-narrow definition of 
the MENA region outlined above is used here.   
Of these 16 states and one territory, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories are 
excluded from the pool of cases due to the long-running impact of external influences on their 
sovereignty and politics. The Palestinian territories have never enjoyed independent state 
sovereignty, being consistently under foreign control (Jordanian governance from 1948 to 
1967, and Israeli occupation post-1967) (Bickerton and Klausner 2016). Whilst Lebanon 
enjoys sovereignty, its political environment is characterised by external influence. Lebanon 
is unique in the Arab-majority states of the MENA region in that it underwent a period of 
democratic governance in the twentieth century. However, this was followed by a civil war 
lasting from 1975 to 1990. Today, Lebanon has a form of ‘proto-democracy that differs 
qualitatively from the political conditions in other Arab states’ (Brownlee, Masoud, and 
Reynolds 2015, 13). The civil war, its conclusion, and Lebanon’s political context to date are 
characterised and driven by external players including Iran, Israel, Syria (until recently) and 
Saudi Arabia (Najem 2012). The exclusion of Lebanon and the Palestinian territories leaves 15 
states in the pool of cases, henceforth referred to as the MENA region.  
Economic and political indicators for the MENA region demonstrate diversity across 
the region, shown in Table 3.1. Population size ranges from under two million in Bahrain, to 
more than 95 million in Egypt; gross domestic product (GDP) per capita ranges from less than 
$US1,000 in Yemen to almost $US60,000 in Qatar. Countries in the region can also be broadly 
divided into those that possess significant natural resource wealth and those that do not, with 
                                                        
4 This definition of the Arab-majority states of the MENA region has been used in academic studies of the region, 
see for example: Diamond (2010); Gasiorowski (2014); Stepan and Robertson (2003).  
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nine countries deriving between 14 and 48 percent of GDP from natural resource rents, whilst 
seven countries derive less than four percent GDP from resource rents. However, in terms of 
political freedom Table 3.1 shows little variation. Only Tunisia was rated ‘free’ in 2018, 
following the increase in political and civil freedoms that occurred post-2010. Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, and Morocco were considered partly free, whilst the remaining 11 states were 
classified as not-free. Similarly, in 2018, Tunisia was the only country assessed as an electoral 
democracy. In terms of regime type, there is a division between monarchical political systems 
and republics. As of 2018, there were seven monarchies and six republics, with Libya and 
Yemen in a state of political uncertainty.  
Until the twenty-first century, the MENA region was noted for regime stability, in 
particular authoritarian persistence (Bellin 2004; Gause 2011). The post-1975 wave of political 
transitions that swept across parts of southern and eastern Europe, Latin America, South-East 
Asia, and Africa, appeared to by-pass the MENA region (Diamond 2010). Leadership changes 
that did occur in MENA states did not threaten the stability of long-standing regimes. For 
example, the replacement of Bourguiba with Ben Ali in Tunisia in 1987 did not lead to regime 
change (Alexander 2012). Similarly, leadership changes in Egypt from Nasser to Sadat in 1970, 
and then to Mubarak in 1981 did not destabilise the governing regime (Osman 2013). 
Transition from al-Bakar to Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 1979 occurred in the context of regime 
persistence (Stansfield 2007). Equally in the monarchical regimes of the region, leadership 
change from one ruling monarch to another occurred without threatening the established 
political order (Anderson 1991; Hammond 2014; Menaldo 2012).   
However, despite regime stability, salient communal cleavages resulted in violent 
conflict in several states, that was harshly repressed by the ruling regime. For example, 
Yemen’s regional and sectarian division between the Shia-sect of the Houthis in the North 
and the Sunni-populated south drove civil war during the 1980s and 1990s (Dresch 2000). The 
ethno-sectarian cleavage in Iraq between Sunni-Arabs, on the one hand, that held 
governance, and Shia-Arabs, Kurds, and other minority non-Arab or non-Muslim groups, on 
the other, led to oppression of the latter groups. Notably, violent confrontation between 
Kurdish groups and the government of Iraq led to the death of close to 200,000 Iraqi Kurds in 
the late 1980s (C. O’Leary 2002; Stansfield 2007).   
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Table 3.1 Arab-majority MENA states: select economic and political indicators  
State* Population 
size 
(millions) 
GDP per 
capita (US$)  
Natural 
resource 
rents (% 
GDP) 
 Political 
freedom 
2018 
Electoral 
democracy 
2018 
Regime type 
Algeria 40.6 3,916 14  Not free No 
 
Presidential 
republic 
 
Bahrain 1.4 22,579 4  Not free No 
 
Monarchy 
 
Egypt 95.7 3,478 4  Not free No 
 
Presidential 
republic 
 
Iraq 37.2 10,297  
(1990) 
42  Not free No Parliamentary 
republic 
 
Jordan 9.5 3,917 1  Partly free No Monarchy 
 
Kuwait 4.1 27,359 45  Partly free No 
 
Monarchy 
 
Lebanon  6 8,257 0  Partly free No 
 
Parliamentary 
republic 
 
Libya 6.3 5,603  
(2011) 
 
48 
(2011) 
 Not free No In transition 
Morocco 35.3 2,893 2  Partly free No Monarchy 
 
Oman 4.4 14,982 27  Not free No 
 
Monarchy 
 
Qatar 2.6 59,324 21  Not free No 
 
Monarchy 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
32.3 20,029 27  Not free No 
 
Monarchy 
 
Syria 18.4 2,058  
(2007) 
 
21 
(2007) 
 Not free No Presidential 
republic 
Tunisia 11.4 3,689 3  Free Yes 
 
Parliamentary 
republic 
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
 
9.3 37,622 15  Not free No Federation of 
monarchies 
Yemen 27.6 990 1  Not free No In transition 
*No data available for the Palestinian territories  
Sources: Population size, GDP per capita, and resource rents from World Bank indicators available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; all values for 2016 unless specified otherwise. Regime type from CIA World 
Factbook, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook; all values for 2018. 
Political freedom scores and electoral democracy evaluation from Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World 2018’ 
report available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018; all values for 2018. 
 
The notable communal cleavage in the MENA region between Islamists and non-
Islamists (Hamid 2014; Schwedler 2007) led to insurgency violence in some states with 
Islamist groups constituting key opposition to long-standing authoritarian regimes (Wickham 
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2004, 205). For example, in Algeria, a violent insurgency broke out following the annulling of 
election results in 1991, continuing in decreasing intensity for over a decade (McDougall 
2017). Violence has also been used to a greater and lesser extent by Islamist groups in Egypt 
including members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Cook 2012) and by Islamist-aligned actors in 
Tunisia (Louden 2015). Such civil violence was for the most part met with brutal force on 
behalf of governing regimes (Hafez 2003).  
Despite the diversity displayed in Table 3.1, the Arab-majority states of the MENA 
region can be considered a coherent ‘most similar’ pool of cases for the purposes of case 
selection given that they share structural attributes along seven dimensions (demographic, 
ethnic, geographic, linguistic, religious, socio-cultural, and political-historical), shown in Table 
3.2.5 Demographically, the states of the MENA region share youthful populations, known as 
the ‘youth bulge’. In 2010, preceding the Arab Uprisings, youth aged 15-29 constituted 
between 25 and 34 percent of the populations of these countries (Kraetsch and Constant 
2010). Along the ethnic dimension, all states have populations that are primarily of Arab 
ethnicity.6 Geographically, whilst spanning two continents, MENA states are clustered within 
the same geographic area, forming a common geostrategic area (Brownlee, Masoud, and 
Reynolds 2015, 8–9). Linguistically, Modern Standard Arabic is the official state language and 
the lingua franca amongst Arab-majority MENA states.7 Along the religious dimension, these 
states have a majority-Muslim population (Obermeyer 1992; Tessler 2002).8 
 
Table 3.2 Arab-majority MENA states: shared structural conditions  
Dimension Description 
1. Demographic High youth population 
2. Ethnic Majority-ethnicity: Arab 
3. Geographic Located in Middle East North Africa 
4. Linguistic Official language: Arabic 
5. Religious Majority religion: Islam 
6. Socio-cultural Shared popular culture, traditional values 
7. Political-historical Shared political identity 
Source: see text for detailed discussion of sources 
                                                        
5 It is acknowledged that alongside these shared structural attributes, each state in the MENA region has its own 
unique political and historical context.  
6 Within states, there are minority ethnic groups such as the Berber in the Maghreb states, see Maddy-Wietzman 
(2011), and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, for more detail see Abdulla (2012).   
7 Dialects of the Arabic language vary from state to state, and there is more than one official language in some 
states.  
8 There are also minority religious groups in several states, see for example, Nisan (2002). In addition, there is 
an important sectarian division between Shia Muslims and Sunni Muslims that constitutes a communal cleavage 
in states such as Bahrain and Iraq (Gasiorowski 2014, 8).  
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 Perhaps one of the most important shared dimensions in the MENA region is a socio-
cultural one. Arab-majority states share Arabic-language popular culture including movies, 
music, and television shows (Hammond 2007; Hamamsy and Soliman 2013), creating a shared 
cultural experience. In addition, common values and attitudes are shared by these states’ 
majority-populations. This is demonstrated in Wave Six of the World Values Survey that 
included 10 of the 15 states in the pool of cases for this study. Chief architects of the World 
Values Survey project make a broad global distinction between countries with 
traditional/survival values and those with secular-rational/self-expression values as key lines 
of socio-cultural differentiation (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). In all 10 MENA states included 
in the survey strong traditional/survival values were displayed, as opposed to secular-
rational/self-expression values.9  
A final, important shared dimension in the MENA region is a political-historical one. 
All 15 states in the pool of cases have in common, at least to some extent, a shared political 
identity as part of an Arab-Muslim region. This traces back to pan-Arabism, initiated by Egypt’s 
President Nasser in the 1950s (Mellon 2002; Osman 2013), an attempt to create a shared 
Arab identity, consolidated at the time around a shared sense of injustice at the Israel-
Palestine conflict (Bickerton and Klausner 2016), and a shared anti-colonial sentiment focused 
on ‘the West’ (Bowker 2010, 8). As noted by Bowker (1996, 38): ‘the Palestine issue is part of 
the shaping of the political identity of the Arab world and has fundamentally affected the 
nature of Arab governance and politics’. Whilst the strength of a pan-Arab political 
community has diminished in the minds of MENA citizens in recent decades, the fact remains 
that the Arab-majority states of the MENA region share a political history and identity that 
extends beyond state borders. 
Out of the pool of 15 cases, two criteria were applied to select cases for the small-N 
comparative study. The first criterion was that a state underwent authoritarian breakdown in 
the context of a salient communal cleavage. As noted in the introductory chapter, 
authoritarian breakdown is defined as a period of political uncertainty (Linz and Stepan 1996, 
chap. 1; Schedler 2001), following the deposition of an authoritarian leader or government. 
                                                        
9 In terms of survival values, the 10 Arab-majority states included in Wave 6 of the World Values Survey fall 
between .22 and .32 (as an average) on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being closest to survival values, and 10 being 
closest to self-expression values; and between 0.1 and 0.38 on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being closest to traditional 
values and 10 being closest to secular-rational values. Data available at: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp 
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A salient communal cleavage is defined as a politically-salient cleavage running along 
communal lines, that indicates a core dispute regarding the character of the political system 
(Wimmer 1997). Given the study’s focus on institution-building, the second criterion was that, 
during the uncertain period following authoritarian breakdown, new political institutions 
were designed, either a new electoral system that was used in transitional elections, or a new 
constitution. Whilst some states carried out both electoral system design and constitution-
making, one was sufficient for selection.  
 
Table 3.3 Case selection criteria 
  Authoritarian breakdown + communal cleavage* 
  YES NO 
New electoral 
system & 
transitional 
elections  
OR  
constitution-
making and 
constitution 
approved 
 
YES  
 
 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Libya 
Tunisia 
 
 
NO 
 
 
Syria** 
Yemen 
Algeria*** 
Bahrain 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Morocco  
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab Emirates 
*There could conceivably be a category of cases that underwent political transition but do not have a salient 
communal cleavage. For the sake of parsimony these are aggregated as one condition. All four states that 
underwent transition and institutional design do contain such a cleavage.  
**Conflict devolved into civil war; did not undergo authoritarian breakdown and political transition.  
***Algeria’s 1991 elections do not fulfill the criteria as they took place under the auspices of an ongoing 
authoritarian regime. 
Source: for Iraq: Al-Ali (2014); for the remaining countries: Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (2015, chap. 1). 
 
Table 3.3 displays how the 15 states fulfill the selection criteria. In the top, left-hand 
corner of the table we see that four states meet both criteria: Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia. 
In the bottom right-hand corner we see that nine states did not undergo political transition 
at all. The bottom left-hand corner shows that Yemen underwent a political transition in 2011, 
in the context of a salient communal cleavage, but did not undergo a process of institutional 
design. Whilst Yemen carried out a National Dialogue in 2013, this process did not produce a 
new electoral system or a constitution document (Gaston 2014). Syria experienced strong 
protests in 2011 that descended into civil war; however, Syria has not, to date, undergone 
complete authoritarian breakdown or a process of institutional design in the context of 
political transition (Hatahet 2017).  
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All four states that fulfill the selection criteria underwent political transition following 
authoritarian breakdown, in the context of a salient communal cleavage, and designed a new 
electoral system or new constitution during this time. Iraq underwent authoritarian 
breakdown and political transition following the US-led invasion of 2003 that ended Saddam 
Hussein’s long-standing regime (Dobbins et al. 2009). Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia underwent 
authoritarian breakdown and a political transition as part of the Arab Uprisings of 2010-2011; 
long-term authoritarian leaders either abdicated (Egypt and Tunisia) or were caught and 
executed (Libya) following widespread civil protest (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 
9–12).  
All four countries underwent an authoritarian breakdown under the auspices of 
transition to a regime underpinned by political and civil freedom. In each country, the interim 
authority (shown in Table 3.4) declared that the political transition would constitute the 
building of inclusive institutions that would form the framework for a new political system. In 
Egypt, following Hosni Mubarak’s abdication on 11 February 2011, the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces (SCAF), was self-appointed to oversee a political transition (International 
Crisis Group 2012). The SCAF dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution, 
announcing that they would oversee political transition to a democratic regime. The SCAF’s 
constitutional declaration of 13 February 2011 stated that: ‘the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces believes that human freedom, the rule of law, support for the value of equality, 
pluralistic democracy, social justice, and the uprooting of corruption are the bases for the 
legitimacy of any system of governance that will lead the country in the upcoming period’ 
(Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 2011).  
In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established by the occupying US 
government and vested with executive, legislative and judicial powers following the US-led 
invasion of Iraq that ousted President Saddam Hussein (Coalition Provisional Authority 2003). 
The CPA declared that they would oversee a transition to a regime underpinned by elections 
to select political leaders, and guarantees of civil and political rights (Dobbins et al. 2009, 
chap. 9). The CPA stated in CPA Regulation Number One of 16 May 2003 that a core tenet of 
its mission in Iraq was to create conditions in which the Iraqi people could ‘freely determine 
their own political future, including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and 
local institutions for representative governance’ (Coalition Provisional Authority 2003). 
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In Libya, the National Transitional Council (NTC) was self-tasked with overseeing a 
transition in Libya to a new political system where leaders would be freely elected and civil 
rights guaranteed. The NTC was formed in East Libya on 27 February 2011, composed of 
defected members of Gaddafi’s regime, exiled opposition figures, and members of local 
councils (Pack and Cook 2015, 181), and declared itself the sole representative of the Libyan 
people on 5 March 2011 (NTC Libya 2012). The NTC declared that ‘The aim of the Transitional 
National Council is to steer Libya during the interim period that will come after its complete 
liberation and the destruction of Gaddafi’s oppressive regime. It will guide the country to free 
elections and the establishment of a constitution for Libya’ (Temehu 2016).  
 
Table 3.4 Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia: interim authority type 
Interim authority type Country Interim authority 
Body associated with ancien regime  Egypt (military)  Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
 
Foreign Power Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority  
 
Transitional council Libya  
Tunisia 
National Transitional Council  
Higher Council for the Fulfillment of 
Revolutionary Goals 
Source: see text for detailed discussion of sources; for a discussion of interim authority types see Shain and Linz 
(1992, 76-77). 
 
In Tunisia, the Higher Council for the Fulfillment of Revolutionary Goals (HCFRG) was 
a transitional body composed of civil, opposition, and ancien regime actors, established in 
February 2011 following President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s abdication, tasked with 
overseeing transition to an open political regime (Pickard 2011; Stepan 2012a). Article one of 
the constitutional declaration issued on 23 March 2011, stated that: ‘The public authorities 
in the Republic of Tunisia shall be provisionally organized in accordance with the provisions 
of the decree-law herein, until a national constituent assembly elected with universal, free, 
direct and secret vote according to an electoral system chosen for this purpose, takes its 
functions’ (The President of the Tunisian Republic by Interim 2011).  
All four countries have a salient communal cleavage that has shaped the political 
context since the state’s inception (discussed in detail in Chapter 4). Whilst all four states have 
multiple and overlapping cleavages, the key line of communal division that constitutes an 
obstacle to a shared state identity, is considered the central communal cleavage. In Iraq, this 
is the ethno-sectarian division between Shia-Arabs, Sunni-Arabs, and Kurds (Stansfield 2007). 
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In Egypt and Tunisia, it is the division between Islamist and non-Islamist groups (Bali and 
Lerner 2016), that is, the division between those that support Islamic values and laws as the 
key basis for political and legal frameworks, and those that do not (Bowker 2010, 104-107; 
Louden 2015). In Libya, the key communal cleavage that has consistently threatened state 
cohesion is the geographic division amongst Libya’s three key provinces: Cyrenaica, Fezzan, 
and Tripolitania (Vandewalle 2006).  
 
Table 3.5 Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia: political transition and institutional design   
 Start of 
political 
transition  
Salient 
communal 
cleavage 
Electoral 
system 
determined 
First 
transitional 
elections 
Constitution-
making 
Constitution 
approved  
Egypt Feb 
2011 
Civic-religious: 
Islamist;  
non-Islamist 
 
Sep 
2011 
Nov 2011 – 
Jan 2012 
 
During  
2012 
Dec 
2012 
Iraq May 
2003 
Ethno-sectarian: 
Shi’a-Arab; 
Sunni-Arab; 
Sunni-Kurd 
 
June 
2004 
Jan  
2005 
During  
2005 
Oct 
2005 
Libya Oct 
2011 
Regional:  
Cyrenaica 
Fezzan; 
Tripolitania 
  
March 
2012 
July  
2012 
N/A N/A 
Tunisia Jan 
2011 
Civic-religious: 
Islamist;  
non-Islamist 
Sep 
2011 
Oct  
2011 
2011- 
2014 
Jan 
2014 
Source: See text for detailed discussion of sources; see Chapter 4 for discussion of salient communal cleavage 
in each country.  
 
 Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia all designed and implemented new political institutions 
following authoritarian breakdown, shown in Table 3.5. In all four countries a new electoral 
system was established within 14 months of the previous leader’s abdication or demise, 
following which first transitional elections were held.10 Subsequent to these elections, Iraq, 
Egypt, and Tunisia went on to design and approve a new constitution to underpin the political 
system (Haugbolle et al. 2017; Morrow 2005; Project on Middle East Politics 2013). The 
transitional authority in Libya stated that a constitution-making process would take place 
during the transition, however the central governing authority lost monopoly over the use of 
                                                        
10 See IFES election guide country profiles for all four countries, available at: 
http://www.electionguide.org/countries 
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force in the country before this occurred, derailing plans for constitution-making, that, as of 
2018, have not eventuated.11  
A survey of socio-economic indicators in the selected countries in the year preceding 
transition (2010 for Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia; 2002 for Iraq), shows a degree of similarity 
amongst the four countries; this is displayed in Table 3.6. Three of the four countries had a 
GDP per capita below $US5,000. Despite Iraq’s significant oil reserves, severe sanctions during 
the 1990s led to a low level of GDP per capita (Alnasrawi 2001). Libya alone displays higher 
GDP due to its substantial resource wealth, at $US12,000. However, this is still far below the 
oil-rich states of the Gulf (see Table 3.1). The gini index in the second column of Table 3.6 
shows the level of income inequality in the three countries for which data is available; all 
three were clustered around 30 on the index, falling between 28 and 36. Life expectancy at 
birth was between 69 and 75 years for all four countries; adult literacy ranged from 72 to 79 
percent; and gender parity in education was close to one in all four countries, on a scale of 
zero to one, with one meaning full parity.  
 
Table 3.6: Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunsia: socio-economic conditions  
 GDP per 
capita (US$) 
Gini index 
(World Bank 
estimate) 
Life expectancy 
(at birth) 
Adult literacy 
(percent) 
Gender parity in primary 
& secondary education 
 
Egypt 
 
 
2,602 
 
31.5 
 
70 
 
72 
 
.971 
Iraq 1,391 (2004) 28.6  
(2006) 
75 74  
(2000) 
.8  
(2003) 
Libya 12,120 No available 
data 
72 No available 
data 
 
1  
(2006) 
Tunisia 4,140 35.8 69 79 1 
Source: World Bank Indicators available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. All indicators are in the year 
before transition (2010 for Egypt, Libya, Tunisia; 2002 for Iraq) unless specified otherwise. 
 
Alongside these similarities, it is important to note three lines of division amongst the 
four selected cases: regime type, oil wealth, and mode of transition; this is shown in Table 
3.7. In terms of regime-type, all four states were presidential republics pre-transition, and 
would be best classified as authoritarian regimes; there was no variation in the level of 
                                                        
11 A governance body in Libya did undertake a constitution design process in 2017 that produced a draft 
document. However, due to competing centres of governance, this document has not been approved to date, 
see Toaldo (2017).  
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political and civil freedom in the year preceding transition, with Iraq assessed as ‘not free’ in 
2002, and Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia considered ‘not free’ in 2010.12 However, there was 
variation in terms of the type of authoritarian regime. According to the Autocratic Breakdown 
and Regime Transitions dataset (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014), Iraq and Libya were 
classified as ‘personal’ authoritarian regimes pre-transition, whilst Egypt was party-personal 
and Tunisia was party-based. In terms of oil wealth, there is a similar line of division between 
Iraq and Libya, on the one hand, that are both oil-rich, and Egypt and Tunisia, on the other 
hand, that do not have significant income from natural resource rents (see Table 3.1). 
A third line of division is the mode of transition, that is, how authoritarian breakdown 
occurred and when the period of political transition began; this is noted by scholars as 
important for the transition trajectory (Guo and Stradiotto 2014; Munck and Leff 1997). Here 
too, there is a division between the countries. On the one hand, Iraq and Libya underwent a 
political transition following foreign military intervention: the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 
(Dobbins et al. 2009); and the NATO bombing campaign of Libya in 2011 that enabled victory 
for rebel groups fighting Gaddafi (Pack and Cook 2015). On the other hand, Egypt and Tunisia 
underwent authoritarian breakdown and political transition following the abdication of a 
long-term authoritarian leader due to widespread popular protest and civil unrest (Hilal 
2012). This creates two pairs of country-profiles, Iraq and Libya with personalist, oil-rich 
regimes whose mode of transition was characterised by foreign military intervention; and 
Egypt and Tunisia with a party-personal or party-based regime that were oil-poor and 
underwent transition following the abdication of a long-term authoritarian leader.  
 
Table 3.7 Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia: resource wealth, mode of transition, and regime type 
 Mode of transition: abdication  Mode of transition: foreign military intervention 
Oil-Rich  Iraq (personalist regime) 
Libya (personalist regime) 
 
 Oil-poor Egypt (party-personal regime) 
Tunisia (party-based regime) 
 
Sources: Mode of transition for Egypt: International Crisis Group (2012), for Iraq: Dobbins et al. (2009), for 
Libya: Pack and Cook (2015), for Tunisia: Stepan (2012a); resource wealth: World Bank indicators, see Table 
3.1; regime type: Autocratic Regimes dataset, available at: http://sites.psu.edu/dictators, values for 2002 in 
Iraq, 2010 in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.  
 
                                                        
12 Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World’ country reports, available at: 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 
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These distinctions indicate that, in terms of structural conditions, Iraq and Libya 
constitute one pair of cases, whilst Egypt and Tunisia constitute a second pair. If these 
structural factors provide an alternative explanation for the creation of political support in 
the identified countries, then they present a potential challenge to the study’s most-similar-
systems research design. Diamond (2010) suggests that the authoritarian states of the MENA 
region have similar structural economic conditions regardless of whether or not they possess 
resource wealth. In addition, whilst in Iraq an occupying power oversaw institutional design 
during the transition period, in Libya the immediate period of transition was overseen by the 
NTC, a Libyan body, and international assistance took place in cooperation with this interim 
authority (Mattes 2014). Nevertheless, the implications of these divisions are returned to and 
addressed in the conclusion in the discussion of the findings.  
Two institutional design processes are observed: electoral system design and 
constitution-making. Two stages of institutional design are considered: the negotiations stage 
and the implementation stage. Electoral system design is examined in all four selected 
countries at the negotiations stage. The implementation of elections was examined in Egypt, 
Iraq, and Tunisia, but not in Libya. This was due to the fact that in Libya the distribution of 
seats amongst communal groups in first transitional elections was pre-determined at the 
negotiations stage, before elections took place, this rendered meaningless an evaluation of 
de jure and de facto inclusion at this stage. Constitution-making is only examined in three of 
the four countries and only at the first stage. Libya did not undergo a constitution-making 
process and so is excluded from this analysis. In addition, the temporal and logistical 
limitations of the study meant that it was only possible to observe constitution-making at the 
negotiations stage and not at the implementation stage. Examining whether a state’s 
constitution document has been de facto implemented involves an in-depth examination, 
over time, of the implementation of multiple articles on judicial, political, and legislative 
behaviour; this was beyond the scope of this study.   
The study’s use of most-similar-systems-design for case selection requires that cases 
vary on the independent variable, namely inclusion of communal groups in institutional 
design. Table 3.8 shows variation on the independent variables both amongst and within the 
four selected countries, and the number of observations to test each one of the four 
hypotheses advanced in Chapter 2.  The table also shows the type of institutional design 
moment (electoral system or constitution) and the stage of institutional design (negotiations  
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Table 3.8 Variation on the independent variable and observations for hypotheses 
 De jure 
inclusion 
De facto 
inclusion 
Country Institution: electoral 
system or constitution 
Stage: negotiations 
or implementation 
H1 - - 1. Egypt 
 
1. Electoral system 1. Implementation 
 
H2 x x 1. Tunisia 
2. Tunisia 
3. Tunisia 
1. Electoral system 
2. Electoral system 
3. Constitution 
1. Negotiations 
2. Implementation 
3. Negotiations 
 
H3 x - 1. Egypt 
2. Iraq 
3. Iraq 
4. Iraq 
1. Constitution 
2. Electoral system 
3. Constitution 
4. Electoral system 
1. Negotiations 
2. Negotiations 
3. Negotiations 
4. Implementation 
 
H4 - x 1. Egypt 
2. Libya 
1. Electoral system 
2. Electoral system 
1. Negotiations 
2. Negotiations 
 
or implementation). There is one observation for the first hypothesis, where neither de facto 
nor de jure inclusion were present. For the second hypothesis, there are three observations 
of institutional design where both de jure and de facto inclusion were present. In four 
institutional design moments, de jure inclusion was present without de facto, constituting 
observations that are used to test hypothesis three. Finally, there are two observations with 
which to test the fourth hypothesis; cases where de facto inclusion was present without de 
jure. This demonstrates variation on the independent variable both between countries, and 
within countries in separate institutional design moments.   
 3.2		 Measurement	of	variables		
3.2.1	Measuring	the	salient	communal	cleavage	
In some chapters, indicators to measure inclusion of communal groups rely on an estimation 
of the population proportion of each communal group, shown in Table 3.9. Identifying 
population proportions of communal groups can be complex (Patsiurko and Campbell 2012); 
in a contested state, communal identities can be politically contentious or not easily 
observable (Fearon 2003). For example, ‘in several North African countries… a large majority 
of the population could, if they wished, claim Berber descent, but attitudes vary on whether 
to classify oneself as “Arab” or “Berber”’ (Fearon 2003, 197). In many states national census 
data captures communal group populations. However, where communal identities are 
politically sensitive, perhaps forming the basis for social or political discrimination (see, for 
example, Ergil [2000] on discrimination against Kurdish groups in Turkey; and Hintjens [2008, 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
51 
16] on the intentional removal of ethnic groups from the public discourse in Rwanda post-
1990s) individuals may be reticent to report communal-group status on a government census. 
If otherwise unavailable, nationally-representative survey data can capture communal group 
identities, providing an indication of population proportions. The population proportion of 
each communal group is measured preceding or at the outset of transition, to capture these 
populations before possible disruption from civil conflict during the political transition.  
In both Egypt and Tunisia, the most salient communal cleavage is a civic-religious one 
between Islamists and non-Islamists. Given that this is not an externally observable identity, 
the best method to measure these communal groups is to use public opinion surveys that ask 
questions evaluating whether or not participants support Islamic values and proscriptions as 
a basis for the political system. For example, Tessler and Gao (2005, 89-90) operationalise 
Islamist-alignment in several majority-Muslim countries in the Middle East with two questions 
asked in a representative survey, namely, whether ‘the government should only implement 
laws of the Sharia’; and whether ‘men of religion should have influence over government 
decisions’. Responses were assessed on a four-point scale, with agree and strongly agree 
assessed as Islamist; disagree and strongly disagree were assessed as non-Islamist. Similarly, 
Ozen (2017, 7) uses three questions to assess non-Islamist versus Islamist groups in Egypt, 
namely, ‘religion and government should be separate’; ‘religious officials and leaders should 
not influence how people vote in elections’; and ‘religious officials and leaders should not 
influence government decisions’. Responses were measured on a four-point scale with agree 
and strongly agree assessed as support for non-Islamist values, whilst disagree and strongly 
disagree were assessed as a lack of support.   
 
Table 3.9 Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia: communal group population proportions 
State Type of cleavage Key communal groups Proportion of populace (%) 
Egypt Civic-religious  Islamist; non-Islamist 
 
54; 46 
Iraq Ethno-sectarian 
 
Sunni-Arabs; Shia-Arabs; Kurds 61; 17; 18 
Libya Regional 
 
Cyrenaica; Fezzan; Tripolitania 28; 8; 64 
Tunisia Civic-religious Islamist; non-Islamist 37; 63 
Source: see text for a detailed discussion of sources 
 
This study measures Islamist and non-Islamist population proportions in Egypt and 
Tunisia using similar questions to those used by Tessler and Gao (2005) and Ozen (2017) that 
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were asked in Wave II of the Arab Democracy Barometer in both countries four to eight 
months after the country entered a period of political transition (see Appendix A for survey 
methodology). The four questions used assess participants’ attitudes to the insertion of 
Islamic law into political frameworks. Four questions13 ask respondents to what extent they 
agree or disagree that ‘the government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with 
Islamic law’; ‘the government and parliament should enact penal laws in accordance with 
Islamic law’; ‘religious leaders should have influence over government decisions’; and 
‘religious practices are private and should be separated from social and political life’. For each 
question, agreement was coded on a four-point scale.14 For the first three questions a 
response of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ was coded Islamist-aligned; whilst ‘disagree’ and 
‘strongly disagree’ was coded as non-Islamist-alignment. This was reversed for the last 
question. The responses were averaged, and converted to percentages. The population 
proportion of Islamist to non-Islamist communal groups in Egypt was assessed as 54 percent 
to 46 percent, and in Tunisia as 37 percent to 63 percent.  
In Iraq, the most salient communal cleavage is ethno-sectarian between Shia-Arabs, 
Sunni-Arabs, and Kurds. Iraq is one of only two Arab-majority countries with a predominantly 
Shia-Muslim population,15 and is home to the most significant Shia holy sites (Stansfield 2007, 
58–60). Iraq also contains a significant Kurdish minority clustered in the north of the country 
(C. O’Leary 2002). The population proportion of each group was a politically sensitive issue 
under Saddam Hussein, since a public confirmation of the demographic majority of Shia-Arabs 
could have detracted from the perceived legitimacy of the Sunni-led ruling regime. Censuses 
were conducted infrequently, and the data was treated with great suspicion (Daponte, 
Kadane, and Wolson 1997; Siperco 2017). Post-2003, population proportions of the main 
communal groups in Iraq remains a contentious issue. A census was planned to be conducted 
in 2010, however it was postponed due to political controversy (S. Myers 2010).  
Given these measurement difficulties, the population proportion of the three ethno-
sectarian groups in Iraq is drawn from three sources: US Library of Congress factsheet on 
                                                        
13 Questions 6052, 6054, 6063, 6064 
14 The four point scale was coded as follows: 1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Disagree 4. Strongly disagree 
15 The second Arab-majority country with a majority Shia-Muslim population is Bahrain. All other countries have 
a majority Sunni-Muslim population.  
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Iraq’s demography;16 a PEW Research Center report on Iraq’s population percentages;17 and 
the CIA World Factbook.18 These three sources estimate the Kurdish population at 19 percent, 
16 percent, and between 15 and 20 percent, respectively. The study takes an average of 
these, determining the Kurdish population of Iraq at 18 percent.  Shia-Arabs are estimated at 
55 percent, between 64 and 69 percent, and 62 percent, respectively. The average of these 
puts the estimated Shia-Arab population proportion at 61 percent. Based on the estimation 
of Arab-Iraqis at between 75 and 80 percent, Sunni-Arabs are estimated at between 14 and 
19 percent. Therefore, Sunni-Arabs are estimated at 16.5 percent rounded up to 17 percent. 
The remaining approximately five percent of the population are composed of other ethnic 
and religious minority groups including Assyrians, Yazidis, and Turkmen.  
In Libya the salient communal cleavage is regional, between the three provinces of 
Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania. Libya is only examined at the negotiations stage of 
electoral system design and population proportions are not used to determine de facto 
inclusion at this stage. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the population proportions of Libya’s 
key communal groups. A study conducted for the National Democratic Institute reports 
population proportions of Libya’s three provinces based on 2006 census data (Kjaerum et al. 
2013, 13). Whilst the province of Tripolitania has the smallest land mass of the three 
provinces, at the time of transition it was home to 64 percent of the Libyan population. At the 
outset of transition, Cyrenaica was home to approximately 28 percent of Libya’s population, 
and Fezzan, with the largest land mass, was home to only about eight percent of Libyans.  
	
3.2.2	Measuring	the	independent	variables:	de	jure	and	de	facto	inclusion	
The independent variables examined in the three empirical chapters, Chapters 5, 6 and 7, are 
de jure inclusion and de facto inclusion. These variables are operationalised in each of the 
three chapters according to the stage and type of institutional design under examination. 
Chapters 5 and 6 both examine the inclusion of communal groups in negotiations to 
determine a new institutional framework: an electoral system or a new constitution, 
respectively. Chapter 7 examines inclusion of communal groups in the implementation of first 
transitional elections. In Chapters 5 and 6, the indices for de jure and de facto inclusion range 
                                                        
16 Available at: http://countrystudies.us/iraq 
17 Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/20/who-are-the-iraqi-kurds 
18 Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook 
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from zero to four, with zero the lowest value and four the highest. A score of zero indicates a 
total absence of inclusion and a score of one denotes low inclusion; where there is a score of 
zero or one out of four, inclusion is not considered present. A score of two is considered 
medium inclusion, three is high, and a score of four means that inclusion is very high. In 
Chapter 7, the index of inclusion ranges from zero to two. In this case, zero is assessed as no 
inclusion, one as medium, and two as high inclusion.   
 It is important to note that the measurement of both de jure and de facto inclusion in 
this study is according to variables that are measured dichotomously and not on a spectrum. 
This means that, for each indicator from which the indices are constructed, the study 
examines whether or not inclusion is present, but does not comment on the quality of that 
inclusion. The strength of this approach is that it enables indices to be constructed that allow 
for a comparison of the strength of inclusion between cases. However, the weakness of this 
approach is that is does not allow for a measurement of the quality of inclusion, beyond the 
score on the relevant inclusion index as outlined above. A measurement of the quality of 
inclusion would require a far more detailed in-depth qualitative exploration of each case, 
which was sacrificed in this study for comparative leverage.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, de jure inclusion in negotiations on electoral system design 
or constitution-making refers to institutional frameworks that are intentionally set up to 
facilitate the involvement of all communal groups. Whilst electoral system design literature 
does not focus extensively on inclusion at the negotiations stage, constitution-making 
literature emphasises inclusion in three key areas: 1) the selection and composition of the 
constituent body (Carey 2009; Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 2009); 2) official avenues for 
public consultation on constitutional design (Moehler 2008, chap. 1; Widner 2005), and 3) the 
means of approving the constitution (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Blount 2011; Hart 2010, 35-36). 
This provides three categories of de jure inclusion in negotiating institutional design: selection 
and composition of the design body, consultation on design, and means of approval of the 
institutional framework (Hart 2010, 32).   
 Based on these categories of de jure inclusion, four indicators are identified to 
measure de jure inclusion in negotiations on electoral system design and on constitution-
making, shown in Table 3.10. In negotiations on electoral system design, the first two 
indicators concern inclusion in the composition of the electoral system design body. First, did 
the transitional authority publicly focus on involvement of all groups in determining an 
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electoral system? Second, were all communal groups included in the body responsible for 
electoral system design? The third and fourth indicators relate to consultation on and 
approval of the electoral system. First, were there official channels of consultation with the 
broader public on electoral system design? Second, was the body responsible for approving 
the final choice of electoral system inclusive of all communal groups?  
 De jure inclusion in constitution-making is similarly operationalised according to the 
composition and selection of the constituent body, consultations on constitution-making, and 
approval of the new constitution. A common form of de jure inclusion in the selection of a 
constituent body is holding national elections either to select a constituent body, a legislative 
constituent body, or representatives who will appoint this body (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 
2009, 208); this is the first indicator. The second indicator is whether the constituent body 
included representatives from all key communal groups, given that the inclusion of 
representatives of all ‘demographic groups in terms of the population, geographic regions, or 
political parties’ (Hart 2010, 33) in deliberative discussions is considered important.  
The third indicator for de jure inclusion in constitution-making is whether widespread 
consultations were held with members of the public on constitutional design options and 
preferences. Official avenues for public consultation are diverse and can include hearings on 
draft constitutions, public surveys on constitution-preferences, consultations with civic 
groups, open public forums in cities and rural areas, or websites set up to gather input.19 The 
final indicator is whether a referendum was held to approve the constitution, considered an 
indicator of inclusion. As noted by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Blount (2011, 103): ‘the modal form 
of participation in constitutional design is the power to ratify or approve the charter, usually 
by referendum on the final document as a whole’.  
The indicators of de jure inclusion for Chapter 7 vary from those used in Chapters 5 
and 6, given that this chapter examines inclusion in the implementation of first transitional 
elections. Before outlining these indicators, it bears noting that the study only examines 
lower-house elections and only the first transitional election following authoritarian 
breakdown. This enables comparability across cases as in all four countries lower house 
elections were the first transitional elections held following authoritarian breakdown (see 
                                                        
19 For a discussion of modes of public participation in constitution-making see Hart (2010, 37-42) and Widner 
(2008, 1513-14).  
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Table 3.4). Subsequent to this, only one country, Egypt, held upper house elections in several 
rounds in January and February 2012, whilst Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia had unicameral systems 
following political transition. Egypt was also the only country to hold a presidential election 
in close temporal proximity to legislative elections, in June 2012.20 Tunisia held the first post-
transition presidential election in 2014;21 Iraq and Libya do not currently have presidential 
elections. Only the first transitional elections are examined given that this study focuses on 
institution-building and political support during transition and these elections occurred 
during the politically uncertain transition period. 
 
Table 3.10 Operationalisation of de jure inclusion  
Chap. Indicators Index 
 Inclusion of communal groups in design 
body 
Inclusion of communal groups in consultations 
on / approval of institutional design 
 
 
5 1. Public focus from transitional 
authority on inclusion in determining an 
electoral system design (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Members of design body include all 
key communal groups (Yes=1, No=0) 
1. Official policy of public consultation on 
electoral system design (surveys, open forums, 
focus groups) (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Electoral system design approved by body 
inclusive of all communal groups (Yes=1, 
No=0) 
 
0-4 
6 1. Nationally elected constituent body 
or nationally elected representatives 
tasked with appointing such a body 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Public focus on inclusion of all key 
communal groups in composition of 
constituent body members  
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
1. Official channels of public consultation on 
constitution-making (surveys, open forums, 
focus groups) (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
 
2. Referendum to approve the constitution 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
0-4 
 Inclusive electoral framework   
7 1. Stated objective of inclusion in choice of electoral system design (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Proportional electoral formula: av. district magnitude ³ 3; electoral threshold £ 3% 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
0-2 
 
There are two indicators of de jure inclusion in electoral system design. First, was 
inclusion publicly stated by the interim authority overseeing elections as a key reason for the 
choice of electoral system. Second, following operationalisation by Bogaards (2013), Ruiz-
Rufino (2013), and Norris (2002), was a proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) system 
                                                        
20 IFES country profile election guide for Egypt, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/65 
21 IFES country profile election guide for Tunisia, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/217 
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chosen. A proportional electoral formula is perhaps the most important element of electoral 
system design expected to produce an elected assembly that will provide representation for 
all communal groups (Bogaards 2013; Carey and Reynolds 2011; Lijphart 2004; Norris 2009; 
Reynolds 1995b; Wagner and Dreef 2014, 290). A proportional system is assessed as both a 
single-tier proportional system and a mixed-member-proportional system in which a 
proportional tier compensates for a lack of proportionality in a second, majoritarian, tier. As 
noted by Lijphart (2004, 100) in mixed systems where ‘the PR component overrides the 
plurality component, these should be regarded not as mixed but as PR systems’. Conversely, 
a non-proportional electoral formula is assessed as both a single-tier majoritarian system and 
a mixed-member-parallel system in which the majoritarian tier distorts the proportionality of 
the proportional tier (Dunleavy and Margetts 1995; Farrell 2011, chap. 5; International IDEA 
2005, 29).   
Alongside the choice of a proportional electoral formula, it is verified that two 
important elements, district magnitude and imposition of a legal electoral threshold,22 did 
not constrain the expected inclusive impact of a proportional electoral formula. District 
magnitude ‘refers to the size of the constituency’23 (Farrell 2011, 6), that is, the numbers of 
members elected per constituency. So, if one nation-wide constituency is used, as in Israel to 
elect the 120-seat parliament, district magnitude equals 120. Alternatively, if multi-member 
districts are used, average district magnitude is calculated by divided the number of seats 
elected in constituencies by the number of constituencies. Proportional electoral systems, by 
design, have a district magnitude above one, and almost always above two. Low district 
magnitude can constrain the facilitation of inclusion of communal groups using a proportional 
formula. An average district magnitude of three or above under a proportional electoral 
system24 is considered sufficient to produce inclusion of key societal groups in the distribution 
of seats in the electoral outcome (Carey and Hix 2011).  
A second important element is the imposition of a minimum legal threshold, usually a 
minimum vote percentage ‘that a party must pass in order to be granted any seats in 
                                                        
22 There are several additional important elements to electoral system design, such as quotas and reserved seats, 
ballot structure, and the specific formula used to translate votes into seats under a proportional system (Farrell 
2011), however, whilst these elements may impact the degree of inclusivity, they are not expected to obstruct 
the inclusive impact of a proportional electoral formula vis-à-vis a majoritarian electoral system. 
23 Constituencies are also referred to as electorates or districts 
24 Under certain majoritarian systems high district magnitude can have the opposite effect creating a deeply 
non-inclusive political arena, for example using the single-non-transferable- vote or bloc vote systems.  
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parliament’ (Farrell 2011, 206). An imposed legal threshold can obstruct the capacity of a 
proportional electoral formula to produce an inclusive elected assembly. If the electoral 
threshold is set very high, for example, Turkey’s 10 percent electoral threshold25 it can negate 
the expected inclusive impact of the proportional electoral formula (Moraski and Loewenberg 
1999). Electoral thresholds can range from less than one percent up to seven or 10 percent. 
However, an electoral threshold of three percent or below is considered low and would be 
expected not to obstruct the election of an inclusive assembly (Farrell 2011, 206). It is 
confirmed that average district magnitude is three or above, and any legal electoral threshold 
is three percent or below to confirm that the proportional electoral system chosen can be 
expected to facilitate inclusion and therefore constitutes de jure inclusion.  
The operationalised of de facto inclusion is shown in Table 3.11. For Chapters 5 and 6, 
de facto inclusion is measured according to two categories of inclusion: 1) whether there was 
persistent involvement of key communal groups in negotiations, and 2) whether all groups 
had an opportunity to influence the institutional outcome. The first category consists of two 
indicators that measure whether consultation with representatives of all communal groups 
in fact took place, and, if yes, whether this continued up until institutional design was 
determined. As noted by Papagianni (2008, 59) ‘in order for new institutions to be perceived 
as legitimate, they need to result from lengthy political processes inclusive of all major 
political actors’. If consultations discontinue before an outcome is reached, a dominant actor 
may have captured decision-making in the final stages, which would indicate an absence of 
de facto inclusion.  
The second category of de facto inclusion is measured according to two indicators that 
capture whether there is demonstrated evidence that all groups had an opportunity to 
influence institutional design, measured along both an elite and a mass public dimension. 
Along the elite dimension, if certain actors were excluded from the final negotiations that 
determined the institutional design then they did not have an opportunity to contribute to 
the outcome determined in these negotiations. Similarly, along the mass public dimension, if, 
for example, public comments were only received after an institutional framework was 
finalised, they did not have an opportunity to influence the outcome.   
 
                                                        
25 For information on Turkey’s electoral system see the IPU Parline database entry on Turkey: 
archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2323_B.htm 
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Table 3.11 Operationalisation of de facto inclusion  
Chap. Indicators  Index 
5 & 6 Persistent inclusion of all communal 
groups in consultation 
All communal groups have an opportunity to 
impact the institutional design outcome 
 
 
 1. Actual consultation with 
representatives of all key communal 
groups on electoral system design / 
constitution-making (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
 
 
 
2. Demonstrated evidence consultation 
with representatives of all key communal 
groups continued up until electoral system 
design / constitution document was 
determined (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
1. Demonstrated evidence that 
representatives from all key communal 
groups had opportunity to impact electoral 
system design / constitution document 
(through official negotiations or unofficial 
channels such as political pressure) (Yes=1, 
No=0) 
 
2. Demonstrated evidence mass public had 
opportunity to impact electoral system 
design / constitution document (through 
official consultations or unofficial channels 
such as public protest) (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
0-4 
7 
 
Inclusion in political arena  
1. Seat-share of communal groups is proportional to their population-share  
(mean discrepancy £15 percent) (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Absence of one communal group winning a supermajority of seats (>66 percent)  
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
0-2 
 
For Chapter 7, that examines the implementation of first transitional elections, de 
facto inclusion refers to actual inclusion of all communal groups in the elected assembly. 
Following Ruiz-Rufino (2013), the first indicator of de facto inclusion is the proportional 
representation of key communal groups in the distribution of seats in the political arena, 
according to their population proportion.26 To measure this indicator, each political party that 
won seats in each election was assessed as aligned with a communal group (or as non-
aligned).27 The proportion of seats won by political actors aligned with each key communal 
group was then compared with the proportion of that communal group in the broader 
population. Based on the discrepancy between these two, over- and under-representation of 
each group was calculated; the mean discrepancy was arrived at by dividing the combined 
over- and under-representation of groups by the number of communal groups. Some 
discrepancy between population share and seat share is expected (Farrell 2011, 153-159). 
Around 10-15 percent discrepancy per communal group could be expected, therefore, the 
                                                        
26 De facto electoral inclusion has also been operationalised as the proportional translation of votes into seats, 
see, for example Bogaards (2013). However, a proportional translation of votes into seats could still under-
represent a particular key communal group in the political arena, which would not be de facto inclusive 
according to this study’s definition.  
27 See detailed breakdown in Appendix B 
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study considers a mean discrepancy of 15 percent or below as an inclusive electoral result. If 
the combined over and under-representation of key communal groups was more than 15 
percent, then the result was coded as non-inclusive.  
The second indicator of de facto inclusion was whether or not parties aligned with one 
communal group,28 won a super-majority of seats in the elected assembly.29 A key objective 
of using a proportional electoral system is to avoid one key societal group gaining a majority 
(above 50 percent) or a supermajority (above 66 percent) of seats in the political arena (Carey 
and Reynolds 2011; Norris 1997). Whilst a majority-win for one communal group could have 
certain consequences such as the capacity to form governement, and ability to pass 
legislation. During a period of political transition, a supermajority is typically needed to gain 
control over processes that will shape the post-transition regime. This can be critical in a 
contested state. A supermajority—win for one communal group is likely to have negative 
implications during a period of political transition in a contested state (Carey and Reynolds 
2012; Norris 2009, 156; Sisk 1996; Wagner and Dreef 2014, 292–93; Wimmer 1997, 646). This 
indicates that one communal group will not only capture government, and can pass important 
legislation during the transition period, but will also capture constitution-making to the 
exclusion of other groups (Carey 2009, 2013).  	
3.2.3	Measuring	the	dependent	variable:	support	for	a	political	system	
Support for the political system is operationalised in the three empirical chapters according 
to the three dimensions of support mentioned in Chapter 2. Linz and Stepan’s (1996, chap. 1) 
distinction of behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions of political 
consolidation, are applied to distinguish three categories of support. Behavioural support is 
defined as a lack of anti-system behaviour such as political violence. Attitudinal support refers 
to perceived legitimacy of the political system. Constitutional legitimacy refers to cooperation 
with the institutional frameworks and procedures of the political system. Support was 
measured in close temporal proximity to the institution-building moment under examination, 
to mitigate challenges noted by Carey (2009, 161) of linking inclusivity to support for the 
political system, if they are temporally separate (Carey 2009, 161). In Chapter 5, support is 
                                                        
28 See appendix B for a breakdown of parties per communal-group alignment and relevant sources 
29 Lindberg (2004) uses the winning party’s share of seats and the second largest party’s share of seats as 
indicators of electoral competition, whereas here it is an indicator of de facto inclusion. 
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operationalised as support for elections, in Chapter 6 as support for the new constitution, and 
in Chapter 7 as support for the elected assembly. Each dimension of support is discretely 
measured and can exist in isolation from the other two dimensions. However, the more 
dimensions that are present, the higher the evaluation of confidence in the political system.   
The indicators used to measure the three dimensions of support in Chapters 5, 6, and 
7, are shown in Table 3.12. For Chapters 5 and 6 the indices range from zero to four, and in 
Chapter 7 from zero to two. Behavioural support is measured as an absence of anti-system 
behaviour, in particular political violence, during institutional design moments. Violence and 
protest tend to ‘cluster around election time’ (Hoglund 2009, 415) focusing on electoral 
contests, referenda or key pronouncements during political transition (Lindberg 2004, 69; 
Mansfield and Snyder 2005). For Chapter 5, behavioural support for elections is measured as 
an absence of electoral violence. Electoral violence ‘refers to physical violence and coercive 
intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or to an announced electoral 
result’ (Strauss and Taylor 2009, 8); such violence demonstrates that ‘major actors do not see 
elections as legitimate’ (Lindberg 2004, 104 note 40). Election-related violence includes 
violence on election day targeting polling booths, polling officers, or voters, and violence 
during the campaign period that is focused on the up-coming electoral contest.30 In Chapter 
6, behavioural support for a new constitution, is measured as an absence of political violence 
in the lead-up to and on the day of approval of a constitution by referendum or in a 
constituent body. For Chapter 7 behavioural support for an elected assembly is measured as 
political violence, mass protest and other behaviour intended to undermine the elected 
assembly, in the three months following transitional elections. Strauss and Taylor (2009) 
similarly measured political violence occurring within three months after an election.  
It is important to note that, similar to all indicators measured in the study, electoral 
violence is measured only as a dichotomous variable based on whether or not it was present; 
the specific groups involved in electoral violence and the severity of the violence is not 
captured by the study’s operationalisation of this variable. This does not deny that the 
severity of electoral violence and the groups involved can impact the extent to which electoral 
violence should be considered an indicator of a lack of political support. However, this study 
                                                        
30 See Lindberg (2004, 69) for comparable operationalisation as ‘cases where there have been no reports of any 
serious election-related violence during the campaign or polls’. 
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follows Strauss and Taylor (2006) and Lindberg (2004) who operationalise electoral violence 
as a dichotomous variable and do not consider the severity or the identity of the perpetrating 
groups. This study chooses to sacrifice some degree of qualitative depth for parsimony in 
determining whether or not electoral violence was present, which lends greatest comparative 
power.  
 
Table 3.12 Operationalisation of support for the political system  
 Behavioural support 
Absence of anti-system 
behaviour 
 
Attitudinal support 
Perceived legitimacy 
Constitutional support 
Cooperation with institutional 
frameworks and procedures 
Index 
Ch. 5 
Support for 
elections 
1. Absence of election-
related violence  
(Yes=1, No=0) 
1. Perception of 
legitimacy: intention to 
vote in elections (<50 
percent) (Yes=1, No=0) 
1. Absence of a boycott of 
elections by political actors 
associated with a key 
communal group  
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Absence of low turnout 
overall or on behalf of one 
communal group (£33) 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
0-4 
Ch. 6 
Support for 
the 
constitution 
1. Absence of violence and 
mass protest against new 
constitution in the lead-up 
to and on the day of 
referendum OR in the 
lead-up to and on the day 
of promulgation by 
constituent assembly 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 1. Absence of high NO 
vote for new 
constitution in 
referendum OR 
constituent assembly 
overall or on behalf of 
one communal group 
(>50 percent) 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
1. Absence of boycott 
of referendum OR 
of constituent assembly 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Absence of low turnout in 
constitutional referendum OR 
abstentions on approval in 
constituent body (£33) 
(Yes = 1, No = 0) 
 
0-4 
Ch. 7 
Support for 
the elected 
assembly 
1. Absence of anti-system 
activity such as political 
violence, mass protest 
and other activity to 
undermine the elected 
assembly within three 
months of election 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
1. Absence of Low 
support for elected 
assembly overall or on 
behalf of one 
communal group (£33) 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 0-2 
 
Attitudinal support refers to perceived legitimacy of the political system, and is 
measured using public opinion surveys; for studies that use survey data to assess support for 
a political system see, for example, Chu et al. (2008), Dowley and Silver (2002), Inglehart 
(2003), and McAllister and White (2017). Attitudinal support for elections (Chapter 5) is 
measured using survey data that questions respondents regarding their intention to vote in 
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the first transitional elections. The excitement surrounding first transitional elections is 
typically high, with strong intention to vote expected.31 It is expected that between 60 and 80 
percent of a population will intend to vote in founding elections (Kostadinova and Power 
2007, 367).  As a consequence, anything less than 50 percent of respondents claiming an 
intention to vote is considered low.  
Attitudinal support for a new constitution (Chapter 6) was measured by the absence 
of a high ‘no’ vote, overall or on behalf of one communal group, either in a referendum or a 
constituent body. Given that a simple-majority is usually required to pass or reject a 
constitution in a referendum (Lorenz 2005, 346-347), a ‘no’ vote of above 50 percent overall 
or on behalf of one communal group was assessed as rejection of the constitution. Attitudinal 
support for the elected assembly (Chapter 7) was measured using survey data and opinion 
polls that asked participants whether they had confidence in the elected assembly. Given that 
confidence in institutions ‘is a declaration by citizens that institutions are reliable’, it is 
typically measured using individual-level perceptions of legitimacy reported in nationally 
representative surveys, see for example, measurement of political trust by Catterberg and 
Moreno (2006) and Torcal (2014). Confidence in political institutions in established 
democracies ranges widely, from as low as 20 percent to close to 80 percent (Catterberg and 
Moreno 2006, 36-37). During political transition below a third (33 percent or below) 
confidence in political institutions can be considered problematic, indicating a challenge to 
political legitimacy.   
Constitutional support, that is, cooperation with political institutions and frameworks, 
is measured in Chapters 5 and 6 as an absence of low voter turnout, and the absence of a 
boycott of elections or referenda. Turnout is often ‘used as an indirect measure of popular 
legitimacy’ (Lindberg 2004, 66) with low turnout demonstrating a lack of support (Birch 2010; 
Gilley 2006), as it is associated with ‘voter apathy and mistrust of the political process 
(Solijonov 2016, 13). Turnout in established democracies ranges from above 85 percent in 
Scandanavian countries, to just above 42 percent in the United States (47-48). This means 
that below a third (33 percent or below) voter turnout can be considered a challenge to the 
legitimacy of elections. A boycott, defined as active non-participation in political procedures 
is considered non-cooperation with a political system, as discussed by Beaulieu and Hyde 
                                                        
31 See Fornos, Power, and Garand (2004) on high turnout in founding elections. 
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
64 
(2009). If political actors representing one communal group publicly announce a boycott of 
elections, referenda, or a political body, then boycott was considered present.32 
 3.3	 Data	
In line with the qualitative nature of the research project, data is drawn from several sources 
including expert interviews; independent reports on elections and constitution-making; 
publicly available data on votes, turnout, and results of elections and referenda; interim 
constitutions and public communiques; as well as public opinion surveys conducted in the 
countries of focus preceding or following institutional design moments. Table 3.13 shows data 
used to measure the independent and dependent variables. 
De facto inclusion and de jure inclusion in Chapters 5 and 6 are measured using expert 
interviews, independent reports from bodies monitoring elections or reporting on 
constitution-making. Interviews were conducted with six electoral experts and political 
analysts involved in the four countries during political transition. Whilst this number is neither 
representative nor comprehensive it provides additional verification for the qualitative 
assessment of de jure and de facto inclusion in each country. For Chapter 7, the independent 
variables are measured using communique from transitional authorities and electoral design 
bodies; interim constitutions; and voting data published on the websites of electoral high 
commissions, or, where data was not available or had been removed from electoral 
commission websites, from independent election reports. Support for the political system 
was measured in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 using independent reports (as specified); the IFES 
election guide country profiles (http://www.electionguide.org/countries) for voter turnout 
and referenda results; and public opinion survey data from the World Values Survey, the Arab 
Democracy Barometer, and PEW Global Attitudes and Trends survey (see Appendix A for 
survey methodology).  
The three specified survey instruments were chosen for three reasons: 1) use of a 
rigorous survey methodology and a nationally-representative sample; 2) use of appropriate 
questions to assess attitudinal support for the political system in some or all of the countries 
examined in this study; and 3) execution of surveys in temporal proximity to the institutional 
design moments examined in this study. The World Values Survey is the largest non-
                                                        
32 For similar coding of election boycott see Lindberg (2004, 104). 
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commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values. Since 1981, 
six waves of the survey have been conducted in almost 100 countries, with a seventh wave 
to be completed by December 2019.33 The World Values Survey uses a rigorous, 
representative methodology in each country and is used in academic research to assess 
political attitudes across countries and across time.34 
   
Table 3.13 Data used to measure independent and dependent variables 
 Data source Details 
1 Interviews with 
experts involved 
on the ground in 
the countries 
Ahmed Badawi, 10 March 2016 (Egypt and Tunisia); Andrew Reynolds, 21 May 2015 
(Egypt and Libya); Larry Diamond, 16 July 2015 (Iraq); Feisal Istrabadi, 12 August 2015 
(Iraq); Dirk Vandewalle, 21 July 2015 (Libya); Radwan Masmoudi, 21 February 2016 
(Tunisia) 
 
2 Reports from 
independent 
bodies on 
elections 
Egypt: Democracy Reporting International (2011a, 2011b); Electoral Institute for 
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2012); International Foundation for Electoral 
systems (IFES 2011, 2012, 2013a); International Crisis Group (2012); The Carter 
Center (2012b) 
Iraq: International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE 2005); International Republican 
Institute (2005) 
Libya: Democracy Reporting International (2012); International Foundation for 
Electoral systems (IFES 2013b); European Union Election Assessment Team (2012); 
National Democratic Institute (Kjaerum et al. 2013); The Carter Center (2013) 
Tunisia: National Democratic Institute (2011); The Carter Center (2012a) 
 
3 Reports from 
independent 
bodies on 
constitution-
making 
Egypt: Project on Middle East Political Science (2013); Arab-West Report: The Center 
for Intercultural Dialogue and Translation (Serdio and Casper 2013); United States 
Institute of Peace (Albrecht 2013)  
Iraq: Democracy Reporting International (2011c); International Crisis Group 
(Hiltermann 2006); United States Institute of Peace (Morrow 2005)  
Tunisia: Berghof Foundation (Haugbolle et al. 2017); Center for Global Cooperation 
Research (Bockenforde 2015) 
 
4 Interim 
constitutions 
Egypt: The Provisional Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 30 March 2011 
Iraq: Interim constitution: Transitional Administrative Law, 2004 
Tunisia: Provisional Constitution of Tunisia, 16 December 2011  
Retrieved from ConstitutionNet: http://www.constitutionnet.org 
 
5 Communique 
from interim 
authority 
Egypt: Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF); Iraq: Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA); Libya: National Transitional Council (NTC); Tunisia: Higher 
Commission for the Fulfilment of Revolutionary Goals (HCFRG) 
 
7 Public opinion 
surveys 
Arab Democracy Barometer Wave II and Wave III; World Values Survey Wave 4; PEW 
Global Attitudes and Trends 2012 and 2013. See Appendix A for survey methodology  
 
6 Information on 
voting and 
elections  
Electoral commission websites (where data is available): Egypt: www.elections.eg; 
Iraq: www.ihec.iq; Tunisia: www.isie.tn 
IPU Parline database: http://archive.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp 
IFES election guide country profiles: http://www.electionguide.org/countries;  
                                                        
33 See: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
34 For studies that use World Values Survey data see, for example, Fuchs-Schundlen and Schundlen (2015), Foa 
and Mounk (2016), and Magalhaes (2014). 
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The Arab democracy Barometer is part of the broader global barometer surveys 
project that encompasses six regional barometers. Barometer surveys ask standardised 
questions, as well as region-specific questions that provide insight into relevant regional 
issues.35  In partnership with academic institutions, the Arab Democracy Barometer aims to 
create scientifically-reliable data on political attitudes; four waves have been conducted since 
2005.36 The survey data generated from these waves has provided a valuable resource to 
assess attitudes in the region.37 PEW Global Attitudes and Trends surveys are conducted by 
the PEW Research Center, a nonpartisan institute that conducts ‘public opinion polling, 
demographic research, content analysis and other data-driven social science research’.38 
Scholarly studies have used PEW Center survey data to assess global trends.39 
Where survey data was unavailable from the three specified survey instruments 
reports were used from IFES and the International Republican Institute. These are two 
research and analysis institutes that conduct focus groups, polls, and surveys around the 
world, including in the MENA region. IFES is a global leader in the promotion of democratic 
rights and good governance. IFES conducts field-based research ‘to improve the electoral 
cycle’.40 The International Republican Institute is a leading international institute for 
democracy-development. The institute frequently conducts polls in countries in which they 
work to assess attitudes to elections and democracy.41   
This chapter has outlined the research design used to investigate the four hypotheses 
advanced in Chapter 2. A small-N comparative study is deemed most appropriate to identify 
the casual mechanism through which inclusion of communal groups in institutional design 
creates support for a political system during political transition in a contested state. 
Independent and dependent variables are operationalised according to indices composed of 
multiple indicators. Chapter Four provides an overview of the political background preceding 
political transition in the examined countries including the political foundations of the salient 
communal cleavage in each country. 
                                                        
35 See: https://www.globalbarometer.net 
36 See: http://www.arabbarometer.org 
37 For studies that use Arab Democracy Barometer data see, for example, studies by Benstead (2013), Chu et al. 
(2008), and Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins (2012).  
38 See: http://www.pewresearch.org 
39 For studies that use PEW Global Attitudes and Trends data see, for example, Fair and Shepherd (2005), and 
Shafiq (2010). 
40 See: http://www.ifes.org/who-we-are 
41 See: http://www.iri.org/who-we-are 
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Chapter	Four		Contested	States	in	Context	-	Egypt,	Iraq,	Libya,	and	Tunisia	
 
Periods of political transition in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Iraq in the twenty-first century 
stirred deep societal divisions reaching back to before state formation in the twentieth 
century. In Egypt, in 2012, the victory of Islamist-aligned parties in legislative elections and 
the election of a member of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Presidency touched a core fissure 
in Egyptian society regarding the character of the Egyptian state and its place in the region. 
‘The Triumph of Hassan al-Banna’ wrote one commentator (Sadiki 2012), referring to the man 
who established the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s, referencing a long shadow of the past. 
Similarly, in Tunisia, an electoral win for an Islamist party, Ennahda, in legislative elections in 
2011, stirred divisions in Tunisian society between Islamists and non-Islamists. As noted by 
Mansouri and Armillei (2016, 159) ‘since the early stages of the (post-2010) uprising a gulf of 
mistrust has characterised the relationship between Islamist and secular factions’. Hamid 
(2014, 19) observes that ‘a debate raged among Egyptians and Tunisians on the very nature 
of their societies’.  
In Libya, post-transition civil conflict quickly broke out between governance forces 
based in the west and in the east of the country, harking back to provisional rivalry that 
characterised the monarchical period of the nineteenth century (Anderson 1986, 252-255). 
By 2014, Libya encompassed rival governance centers in Tripoli in the west and in Tobruk in 
the east effectively fracturing state unity (Toaldo and Fitzgerald 2016). In Iraq, the post-2003 
reconstruction years deepened and inflamed sectarian tensions that trace back to the 
formation of an Iraqi state in the early 1920s (Haddad 2011).  
 In order to understand the salient communal division that characterised institution-
building during political transition, this chapter examines the formation of communal 
identities in the twentieth century, in the context of states struggling to define themselves 
against western colonial forces and a rapidly shifting regional and international environment. 
The next section outlines the consolidation of the salient communal cleavage in each country 
during a period of colonial occupation and (where relevant) a colonial-backed monarchical 
period, up until the declaration of an independent republic in the 1950s or 1960s. Section 4.2 
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examines the inclusion and exclusion of key communal groups during the period of an 
independent republic. In each country one communal group captured governance 
frameworks, to the exclusion of others. Section 4.3 gives an overview of political contestation 
preceding authoritarian breakdown, with a focus on the extent of electoral competition and 
constitutional law in each country. A division is drawn between Egypt and Tunisia, on the one 
hand, where a level of political contestation was tolerated by the regime, and Iraq and Libya, 
on the other, where personalist regimes almost completely eliminated open political contest. 
Section 4.4 offers some concluding remarks regarding the continued relevance of the salient 
communal division in each state during the period of political transition under investigation. 
 4.1	 The	colonial	period:	consolidation	of	a	salient	communal	cleavage	
In order to understand the development of the salient communal cleavage in each country, it 
is informative to briefly survey the period of colonial administration and colonial-backed 
monarchy that preceded the declaration of an independent republic in each of the selected 
countries.1 This period laid the foundations for a state identity fractured along communal 
lines. Table 4.1 shows the time-period of European colonial administration in each of the four 
countries, and the period of European-backed monarchical rule in Egypt, Iraq, and Libya. This 
was followed by the declaration of an independent republic in all four countries in the 1950s 
and 1960s, effectively establishing an authoritarian regime that held power up until the 
period of political transition examined in this study.  
Whilst this chapter identifies a salient communal cleavage in each country, it is 
important to note that each state contains other communal groups, as well as a range of 
positions within each identified communal group. States in the MENA region encompass ‘very 
distinctive and complex communities and societies’ (Bowker 1996, 23). In Egypt, there is a 
substantial Coptic Christian minority, estimated at approximately 10 percent of the 
population (Hulsman 2012), constituting the largest Christian minority in the region 
(Henderson 2005). In addition, within Islamist and non-Islamist groups in Egypt there is a 
diversity of positions. Regarding Islamists, there is a key distinction between Salafi-Islamists, 
who tend to be conservative in advocating strict adherence to the ‘practices of the Prophet 
                                                        
1 Tunisia alone did not undergo a period of colonial-backed monarchical rule preceding the declaration of an 
independent republic but remained a French protectorate up until an independent republic was established in 
1956.  
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Mohammed and his companions’ (Bowker 2010, 117), and Muslim Brotherhood Islamists that 
range from militant to pragmatic (Bowker 2010, 117-118; Osman 2013, chap. 3; Pargeter 
2013). Within non-Islamist groups there is a distinction between socialists, communists, and 
liberal-democratic groups (Shehata 2010, 51–81; Masoud 2014, chap. 2). Nevertheless, the 
broad cleavage between Islamist-aligned and non-Islamist-aligned Egyptians held political 
relevance throughout the twentieth century and remains relevant today.  
In Egypt, an additional key political player is the military establishment. Since the 
overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in 1952, military actors have controlled political 
governance institutions (Abul-Magd 2017). Throughout its modern history the military in 
Egypt has been ‘widely respected by the general populace’ and ‘deeply interwoven into the 
domestic economy’ (Anderson 2011, 4). Notwithstanding the fact that political opposition to 
the regime existed across the ideological spectrum, the military can be considered closer to a 
non-Islamist-alignment than an Islamist-alignment (Harb 2003; Hashim 2011). Whilst the 
governing regime has at times courted Islamist groups, a deep suspicion of Islamist groups as 
potential anti-system elements has characterised every Egyptian government since 1952.  
 
Table 4.1 Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Tunisia: colonial administration, monarchy, and independent republic 
 Administration by a 
European power 
European-backed 
monarchical rule 
Declaration of independent 
republic (to political transition) 
Egypt British: 1882-1922 1922-1952 1953-2011 
 
Iraq British: 1914-1921 1921-1958 1958-2003 
 
Libya Italian: 1911-1947* 
 
1951-1969 1969-2011 
Tunisia French: 1881-1956 N/A 1956-2011 
 
*1947-1951 under British and French administration  
Source: see text for a detailed discussion of sources  
 
In Iraq, whilst the salient communal division is an ethno-sectarian one between Sunni-
Arabs, Shia-Arabs, and Kurds, Iraq also contains several other religious and ethnic minority 
groups, as well as competition within communal groups and intersection between them. 
There is on-going tension in Iraq amongst Muslim groups regarding the relationship between 
religion and the state. Iraq is also home to Assyrian, Turkmen, and Yazidi minorities (Hanish 
2009). In addition, intra-group competition has characterised Kurdish relations in the 
twentieth century, with two main groups competing for authority in the majority-Kurd region 
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of North Iraq (Stansfield 2007, 67–69). Similarly, Shia-Arab and Sunni-Arab groups are not 
only internally fractured between tribal groupings (C. Myers 2013), but have also at times 
enjoyed good inter-group relations and practiced intermarriage (Smyth and Gershman 2005). 
However, for all its nuances and complexities, the ethno-sectarian cleavage has nevertheless 
defined one of the major challenges to state-formation and post-transition reconstruction (C. 
Tripp 2007, 59–63).  
In Libya, the regional division between Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania is 
underpinned by multiple tribal groupings within each of the three provinces (C. Myers 2013, 
6). In addition, Libya has an ethnic cleavage between the Berber population that constitute 
between eight and 25 percent of Libyans, and those of Arab ethnicity, as well as encompassing 
other minority ethnic groups, notably the Tuareg and the Tebu (Kohl 2014, 425-426). In 
addition, Libya contains an Islamist – non-Islamist division. Whilst some Islamist groups have 
increased in strength in Libya post-2011 (Wehrey 2017), this cleavage has been less salient 
than the tribal-regional one throughout Libya’s modern political history (Lesch 2014, 71; 
Mokhefi 2011). The tribal groupings that fracture Libya’s political landscape (C. Myers 2013) 
are encompassed within the broader regional cleavage, that posed the key threat to state 
formation and national cohesion in Libya (Vandewalle 2006, chap. 3).  
Alongside the Islamist – non-Islamist cleavage in Tunisia, there is also an ethnic 
cleavage between Arab and Berber, with Berber languages still spoken in some villages. 
However, it has been found that almost all Tunisians identify as Arab.2 Tunisia also contains a 
regional cleavage between the wealthier coastal regions and the less-wealthy interior of the 
country (Koehler and Warkotsch 2014). In addition, within Islamist and non-Islamist groups 
there is a diversity of positions. First, there is a spectrum of Islamist groups from moderate-
reformist to hardline (Louden 2015). Second, non-Islamists groups encompass diverse actors 
including the powerful labor union (the UGTT), liberal groups, and socialists (C. Tripp 2007, 
chap. 7). Nevertheless, opposition parties preceding transition could be broadly divided into 
the Islamist Ennahda Party on one side, and various opposition parties all with a ‘vaguely 
socialist ideology’ on the other (Haugbolle and Cavatorta 2011, 330), with mutual suspicion 
between the two camps. The Islamist – non-Islamist cleavage is the one that has been most 
                                                        
2 See: tunisianberber.ws.gc.cuny.edu  
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divisive politically, and underpinned contention regarding the values that shape Tunisian 
national identity. 
The roots of the modern political history of the four selected countries traces back to 
the birth of Islam on the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century and the subsequent 
conquest of the MENA region by Islamic forces. Following the death of the Prophet 
Mohammed in the seventh century, Islamic forces spread out from the Arabian Peninsula, 
conquering territory held by the Persian and Byzantine Empires (Hoyland 2015). The land that 
now constitutes the four selected countries was conquered and subsequently ruled by an 
Arabic-speaking, Islamic elite; over time Arabic became the primary language and Islam the 
primary religion (Alexander 2012, 11; Stansfield 2007, chap. 1). From the seventh to the 
thirteenth century the Islamic civilisation rose to prominence under the Umayyad and 
Abbasid dynasties before entering a period of decline and being conquered by Mamluks and 
Moguls in the thirteenth century (Egger 2018). 
During the 1500s the four selected countries were incorporated into the rising 
Ottoman Empire, before coming under colonial administration by European powers in the 
late 1800s or early 1900s (Alexander 2012, 11; Cetinsaya 2006, 8). From the late 1700s 
onward the Ottoman Empire entered a period of decline, concurrent to the increased 
industrial and political sophistication of European powers (Palmer 1992). During the 1800s, 
European powers increasingly engaged in direct military, economic, and infrastructural 
penetration of Ottoman territory, simultaneous to Ottoman decline and the stirrings of 
indigenous-Arab resistance to both Ottoman and European control, culminating in the late 
1800s or early 1900s with the colonial occupation or administration of the four selected 
countries by European powers (Anderson 1986, 65; Owen 1992, 8–9).  
During the following period of European occupation and European-backed monarchy 
in each of the selected countries, as Egypt and Tunisia grappled with forming a national 
identity within the constraints of colonial dominance, foundations were laid for a cleavage 
that would later threaten state cohesion between those that supported an Islamist agenda 
and those that did not. In each country competing visions for the nation were proffered by 
charismatic leaders discontent with colonial rule: one vision was for a nation based on Islamic-
values and Islamic law, and the other was for a modernised nation that could rival European 
powers (Osman 2013, chap. 2 and 3; Wolf 2017, 22–26).  
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The two competing visions for Egypt advanced during this period both strove to 
reclaim an Egyptian identity based on strength, leadership and self-determination. In the 
1920s, during British occupation, Hassan al-Banna advanced a vision for Egyptians to regain 
their dignity as a nation by grounding their lives in Islamic values and practice. al-Banna 
responded to British control and Western influence in Egypt by advocating a return to the 
fundamental tenets of Islam; he envisioned an Egypt where Koranic teachings and the 
practices of the Prophet Mohammed formed the basis for Egypt’s political, social, and 
economic life (Kramer 2010). al-Banna created a network of Muslim Brotherhood associations 
that promoted Islamic values and became increasingly influential during this period, 
remaining a powerful political force up to, and beyond, the declaration of an independent 
republic in 1952 (Pargeter 2013).  
An alternative vision for Egypt emerged at the end of this period, promoted by Gamal 
Abd al-Nasser, focused on building a powerful, modernised, republican Egypt that would be 
a leader in the region. Preceding Nasser, the Egyptian nationalist movement was led by the 
Wafd party which sought to exert sustained pressure for independence on the British and the 
British-backed monarchy (Goldschmidt 2004, chap. 6). However, the venality of the Wafd 
leadership, its incapacity to overcome British influence, as well as popular reaction to the 
humiliations suffered by the Arab states in the Israeli-Palestinian context, caused the Wafd to 
lose much of its previous legitimacy3 (Kedourie 1994, 65–70). The vision for a strong, 
independent Egypt was taken up by Nasser, a military officer deeply affected by the Egyptian 
military defeat by Israel in 1948. Nasser viewed the defeat as symbolic of Western 
technological and military dominance over Arab states. In 1952, he was a key architect of the 
Free Officers’ coup that ended the monarchy and declared, in 1953, an independent Egyptian 
republic, with the goal of restoring Egyptian national dignity through strong regional 
leadership, underpinned by economic and social reforms and the strengthening of Egyptian 
military capability (Gordon 2006). Initially sidelining, and later crushing those with an Islamist 
vision for Egypt, Nasser laid the foundation for a non-Islamist vision for the Egyptian nation 
that has remained central to the military’s approach to political leadership.  
                                                        
3 This was despite powerful nationalist sentiment enhanced by popular frustration with the continuing British 
military presence along the Suez Canal under a treaty concluded with the United Kingdom in 1936. 
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In Tunisia, in the lead-up to the declaration of a republic in 1956, Habib Bourguiba 
promoted a vision for an independent Tunisia that would be a modern, socio-economically 
advanced nation that would look to Europe to ensure economic prosperity. Bourguiba 
founded the Neo Destour party in 1934, to provide a cohesive, unified voice to the nationalist 
movement and represent a broad cross-section of the population, led by middle-class, 
provincial technocrats from traditional families (Owen 1992, 255). Bourguiba succeeded to 
appeal to the rural peasant populace, as well as to students, middle class professionals, 
business people, organized labor and religious authorities (Alexander 2012, 26–30; Anderson 
1986, 173–77). This broad support base gave the Neo Destour leverage to exert sustained 
pressure on French occupiers for independence (Alexander 2012, 29–30).  
At the same time, a split emerged within the Neo Destour party, driven by a competing 
vision for Tunisia offered by Salah Ben Youssef; this was a vision for Tunisia as a nation 
underpinned by an Arab-Islamic identity, whose governance would be based on Islamic values 
and laws. The struggle between Bourguiba and Ben Yousef to set the agenda for the 
independence movement and its vision for Tunisia continued from the late 1940s up until 
independence (Wolf 2017, 22–26). In January 1956 Bourguiba’s faction prevailed, Ben Youssef 
fled Tunisia, and in March Bourguiba declared Tunisia’s full independence (Alexander 2012, 
33–34). The political triumph of Bourguiba’s vision for Tunisia over that of the Youssefists, set 
the stage for the pro-modernisation, pro-development regime that was to follow, winning 
out over a vision for Tunisia that emphasised Islamic values as the basis for Tunisian national 
identity (Perkins 2014, 120–37). 
Similar to Egypt and Tunisia, in Iraq and Libya the foundations were also laid during 
the colonial and monarchical period for the salience of a key communal cleavage in each 
country. In both countries, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia (Anderson 1986, 59–61; Osman 2013, 
24–27), colonial incursions were accompanied by violent conflict and the destruction of 
existing governance structures (Anderson 1986, 181–82; Yaphe 2004, 24–26). At the outset 
of the colonial period the areas of modern-day Iraq and Libya consisted of three separate 
provinces (Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul in Iraq; Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and Tripolitania in Libya) 
(Vandewalle 2006, 22; Yaphe 2004, 19) that had not been administratively unified under 
Ottoman rule (Anderson 1986, 73–74). These factors meant that colonial administrators 
relied to a large extent on local notables and tribal leaders to assist with tax collection and 
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dispute resolution (Simon 2004, 43; Stansfield 2007, 37–38; Vandewalle 2006, 31). In Iraq, 
this furthered a state fractured along ethno-sectarian lines, and in Libya along regional lines. 
In Iraq, the monarchical period institutionalised an ethno-sectarian imbalance in the 
structures of political power, and violent coercion as a key strategy to ensure cooperation 
with the regime. The British-backed Iraqi monarchy was led by a Sunni-Arab monarch and 
privileged the minority Sunni-Arab population in administrative and military positions over 
the Shia-Muslims, Kurds, and other non-Arab and non-Muslim minority groups (Stansfield 
2007, 51–83; C. Tripp 2007, 75–82). Both Shia and Kurdish groups bid unsuccessfully for 
territorial independence during this period (C. O’Leary 2002; Wimmer 2003, 116). Partly as a 
reaction, during the 1930s and 1940s, the Iraqi military engaged in repressive military action 
against Kurdish resistance groups in northern Iraq, and revolting Shia tribal groups, as well as 
Yazidi and Assyrian minorities (Stansfield 2007, 82–87; C. Tripp 2007, 77–90). In July 1958 the 
Free Officers, a military faction, mounted a bloody coup, executing the King, the royal family, 
and the prime minister, and declaring Iraq an independent republic (Romero 2011). This 
consolidated governance through force under a predominantly Sunni-Arab political 
leadership. 
In Libya, the European-backed monarchical period reinforced a regional cleavage by 
institutionalising regionally-devolved political power as a framework for the Libyan state. The 
monarchy was installed under a Cyrenaican monarch who ‘made no secret of his attachment 
to Cyrenaica, and his dislike for Tripolitania and the prospect of responsibility there’ 
(Anderson 1986, 254). The King was largely unconcerned with building a unified Libyan nation 
(252-256). The monarchy operated under a federal framework designed to accommodate 
provincial differences, leaving substantial political power in the hands of provincial 
governments and designating two capital cities, one in Cyrenaica and the other in Tripolitania 
(Paoletti 2011; Vandewalle 2006, 46–67). Resistance to the monarchy was never unified in a 
mass movement with a clear concept of Libyan national identity (Lobban and Dalton 2014, 
51). In 1969, a military coup overthrew the monarchy and declared Libya an independent 
republic, led by the 27-year-old Muammar al-Gadhafi, from Sirte in the province of 
Tripolitania. Gaddafi, virtually unknown to the people of Libya at the time of the coup, was 
inspired by pan-Arab and anti-Western rhetoric, but was not associated with an 
institutionalised resistance movement (St John 2017, chap. 6). 
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The colonial and monarchical periods ended with the declaration of an independent 
republic in each one of the selected countries, effectively ending Western administrative 
influence and control. In each country, the independent authoritarian republic was formed in 
the context of a state grappling with its national identity and with fractures along communal 
lines that continued to dominate the political landscape up until the period of political 
transition examined in this study. The next section examines the inclusion and exclusion of 
key communal groups in political governance following the establishment of an independent 
republic. 
 4.2	 The	independent	republic:	governance	by	exclusion		
Following the declaration of an independent republic in each country, one communal group 
captured governance structures, whilst other groups were excluded, and were at times 
systematically oppressed, shown in table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and Tunisia: exclusion of communal groups from governance structures under an 
independent republic  
 Egypt Iraq Libya Tunisia 
Dominated 
governance 
structures 
Non-Islamist Sunni-Arab Tripolitania 
(key tribes)  
Non-Islamist 
 
Excluded from 
central 
governance  
 
Islamist 
 
 
Shia-Arab 
Kurds  
 
 
Cyrenaica 
Fezzan 
(key tribes) 
 
Islamist 
 
Source: see text for a detailed discussion of sources 
 
In Egypt governance structures were captured by non-Islamist, military actors. It 
became quickly apparent that Nasser’s vision for Egypt as a powerful regional leader, 
predicated on military prowess, did not include an Islamist narrative. Whilst Nasser’s 
popularity gained momentum with social and economic reforms and the nationalisation of 
the Suez Canal (Cook 2012, 69–71), a failed project to create a United Arab Republic 
(Jankowski 2002), a failed intervention in Yemen in 1962 and Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Six 
Day War with Israel shattered his vision (Cook 2012, 91–100). Anwar al-Sadat succeeded 
Nasser on his death in 1970 (Gordon 2006); Sadat gained legitimacy by restoring Egyptian 
regional leadership in the 1973 war with Israel, viewed as a victory for Egypt (Tignor 2016, 
85–120). However, Sadat’s bilateral peace with Israel in 1979 and the distaste many 
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Egyptians, and especially Islamists, felt for his perceived identification with western interests, 
the corruption and inequalities associated with his attempts to open the Egyptian economy 
and his increasingly arbitrary treatment of his critics (Bowker, 1996, 31-32) was seen to 
compromise Egypt’s strength and dignity, dissatisfaction with Sadat’s signing of a peace treaty 
with Israel in 1979 was seen to lead to his assassination in 1981 (Finklestone 1996). Hosni 
Mubarak assumed the presidency following Sadat’s assassination, but struggled to restore 
Egypt’s earlier leadership in the Arab world. The regime was perceived to be following the 
United States rather than setting the agenda (Amin 2011). In 2011, mass protests led to 
Mubarak’s abdication (Cook 2012, 272–307). 
 During this period, the competing vision, for an Egypt that drew its strength from 
Islamic values and laws, was perpetuated by the Muslim Brotherhood, who constituted a key 
force of opposition to the regime. Islamists believed that strict adherence to the principles 
and practices of Islam was the only framework for a harmonious, ethical society that would 
be a beacon for the entire Muslim world (Pargeter 2013). In contrast, Nasser’s vision for Egypt 
as a regional leader, was based on an Arab, as opposed to a Muslim, identity. Whilst Egypt’s 
leaders at times made conciliatory gestures towards Islamist groups, most notably under 
Sadat as he sought to curb his leftist and Nasserist critics, all three leaders undertook severe 
crack-downs involving arrests of Islamist leaders and group members, and closure of Islamist 
institutions if these groups seemed to be gaining in political influence. (Osman 2013, chap. 3). 
In response to such repression, an increasingly militant stream of Islamist thinking emerged, 
especially under Sayyid Qutb’s leadership and direction in the 1950s and 1960s (Toth 2013).  
 Non-Islamist opposition groups in Egypt were also restricted within the public arena 
and excluded from governance. However, two points distinguish this from the regime’s 
treatment of Islamist groups. First, in many cases there was a détente relationship between 
non-Islamist groups and the regime (Lust-Okar 2005, 191-202). Second, non-Islamist 
opposition groups were themselves deeply suspicious of Islamist groups (Shehata 2010). This 
fracture along ideological lines became evident in the aftermath of Mubarak’s abdication, 
when non-Islamists were more inclined to trust the military council than the freely-elected 
Islamist-dominated legislative assembly, or the freely-elected Islamist president (Kirkpatrick 
2012a; Volkel 2017, 604). 
In Tunisia, at the outset of the republic, Bourguiba installed a secular authoritarian 
regime predicated on modernisation and economic development, to the exclusion of the 
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Islamist vision for a Tunisian state based on Islamic values and laws (Alexander 2012, 30–34; 
Perkins 2014, 120–37). Bourguiba, and Ben Ali after him, emphasised advances in health, 
education, women’s rights, and a diversified Tunisian economy. Whilst both were careful to 
claim that they did not reject Islam or Islamic values, neither succeeded in reconciling this 
cleavage. Similar to Egypt, Tunisia’s leaders at times courted Islamist groups, offering political 
concessions, and then periodically carried out campaigns of political oppression (Alexander 
2012, 52–67; Perkins 2014, 202–29). ‘From independence until 2011, the Tunisian state 
tightly controlled religious institutions, suppressed religious movements and limited the role 
of Islam in public life’ (Bali and Lerner 2016, 276). As in Egypt, opposition to the governing 
regime in Tunisia during this time encompassed non-Islamist groups. However, these groups 
were wary of Islamists, preferring at times to cooperate with the ruling regime rather than 
with the Islamist opposition (Perkins 2014, chap. 7).  
In Iraq, during this period, Sunni-Arab political actors captured governance structures 
and consolidated the political dominance of this ethno-sectarian group, to the exclusion of 
Shia-Arabs, Kurds, and other minority groups. In particular, Saddam Hussein consolidated the 
structural privilege of Sunni-Arabs in the state apparatus and the military forces. Saddam 
maintained national unity in a fractured ethno-sectarian context through violent engagement 
with the Iraqi population (Stansfield 2007, 97; C. Tripp 2007, 206–75). Brutal military 
campaigns were carried out against Kurdish groups that were bidding for increased 
autonomy, including the notorious use of chemical weapons in the late 1980s (C. O’Leary 
2002; Stansfield 2007, 119–35). Shia resistance groups were also met with violent repression 
including widespread arrests, imprisonment, and the assassination of key leaders (C. Tripp 
2007, 196–244). This further entrenched the salience of the ethno-sectarian cleavage 
established in the previous period.  
In Libya, the rise of Gaddafi to power meant the privileging of tribes in the Tripolitania 
region, over those in Cyrenaica and Fezzan. Gaddafi displayed partisanship ‘over years, 
towards the tribes in the Tripoli region, to the detriment of the eastern [Cyrenaican] tribes’ 
(Mokhefi 2011, 3). Gaddafi purported to align Libyan national identity with an honorable, self-
ruling Libyan citizen, exemplified by his radical form of direct democracy, that supposedly 
gave Libyan citizens direct administrative and adjudicative control over their own lives, 
without the oppressive intervention of state structures (Vandewalle 2006, 103). In fact, 
Gaddafi failed to devolve real political power, relying on a network of regionally-based tribal 
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structures and an extensive security apparatus to maintain control (Mokhefi 2011; C. Myers 
2013). Gaddafi’s ‘direct democracy’ framework served to perpetuate, rather than ameliorate, 
regional divisions. State structures were weakly institutionalised, with service delivery and 
arbitration devolved to the local level, strengthening regional allegiances (Vandewalle 2006, 
104–5).  
It is important to note that in both Iraq and Libya during this period, the oppression of 
societal groups was facilitated by significant oil revenue. Saddam’s violent engagement with 
the Iraqi population, lack of accountability, and cavalier military ventures (notably, the Iran-
Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait) were made possible by revenue from Iraq’s substantial 
oil reserves. The regime relied on the distribution of state patronage and a sophisticated 
network of state security agencies in order to survive (Stansfield 2007, 97; C. Tripp 2007, 206–
14). Similarly, Gaddafi’s radical political and economic approach was assisted by oil revenue 
that served to undermine accountability. Weak central institutions were combined with 
resource distribution and an extensive security network to ensure cooperation with the 
regime (Anderson 1986, 268; Paoletti 2011, 318–19).  
 4.3	 Political	contestation:	constitutions	and	elections		
The level of political contestation under authoritarian governance varied in the four selected 
countries, with the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia permitting greater political contestation, 
whilst the regimes in Iraq and Libya were characterised by a highly restricted political arena 
(Stansfield 2007; Vandewalle 2006). In Egypt and Tunisia, when leadership change took place 
from Nasser to Assad, and then to Mubarak, and in Tunisia from Bourguiba to Ben Ali, the 
incoming leader adopted a language of political and civil reform, whilst not tolerating any 
political challenges that might threaten the regime’s hold on power (Cook 2012, chap. 5; 
Perkins 2014, chap. 7).  
In all four countries, the independent republic was ostensibly established within the 
constraints of a constitutional framework. In Egypt and Tunisia whilst the judiciary did not 
operate independently from the regime, it did constitute an arena of political contest that at 
times tested the boundaries of the permissible. This was not the case in Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein and Libya under Gaddafi where regimes were highly personalised and constitutional 
law was either revoked (Libya) or disregarded (Iraq). This is evidenced by the extent of new 
and interim constitutions and constitutional amendments in each country, as shown in Figure 
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4.1. Libya had one constitutional amendment during the 42-year period under Gaddafi. In 
1975, Gaddafi replaced Libya’s constitution with his ‘Green Book’ intended to provide a 
guiding framework for social and political behaviour. Similarly, in Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein’s 24-year reign, only one interim constitution was enacted, with no constitutional 
amendments and no forthcoming new constitution document. Conversely, Egypt enacted 
four constitutional amendments, two interim constitutions, and one new constitution under 
Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. In Tunisia, 15 constitutional amendments were enacted under 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali.   
 
Figure 4.1 New and interim constitutions, and constitutional amendments 
  
Source: Comparative Constitutions Project, available at: comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology; see 
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2009).  
 
However, notwithstanding this constitutional variation between Egypt and Tunisia on 
the one hand, and Iraq and Libya on the other, in all four countries constitutional law failed 
to prevent the repression of groups excluded from governance structures. In fact, in Egypt 
and Tunisia, legal frameworks were at times employed to dissuade or exclude Islamist groups 
from participation in the political arena. In Egypt, Nasser’s 1956 constitution ostensibly 
guaranteed an array of political rights including ‘the right to set up associations’, with Sadat’s 
1971 constitution also providing for multi-party electoral contest (Feuille 2011, 239–42). 
However, constitutional law operated under political uncertainty and periodic arrests of 
opposition figures (Egyptian State 1971, 241–42; Feuille 2011, 240–42; Osman 2013, chap. 6). 
In particular, Islamists were targeted by the regime, notably members of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood, the largest and most institutionalised Islamist association, and were frequently 
harassed and imprisoned, alongside more militant Islamist groups (Brown and Dunne 2007; 
Feuille 2011, 243–45). Egypt’s constitutions did nothing to guarantee political inclusion for 
those excluded from central governance structures; rather, the atmosphere of political 
uncertainty increased inter-communal suspicion without resolving this divide.  
Similarly, in Tunisia, the regime under Bourguiba (1956-1989) and Ben Ali (1989-2011) 
ostensibly operated under constitutional law, underpinned by the constitution approved by 
Bourguiba in 1959 and amended by Ben Ali after he took power (Ware 1988). However, whilst 
the constitution guaranteed the political rights of citizens and acknowledged Islam as a key 
influence (Tunisian State 1959), in practice, it was used to institutionalise repressive, 
authoritarian practices, and did not prevent periodic state crackdowns on opposition groups. 
In particular, Islamist associations and actors were systematically arrested and repressed 
(Alexander 2012, chap. 2, 3). The constitution did not serve to reduce political uncertainty for 
excluded communal groups or reconcile the key communal fracture in the country.  
In Libya, Gaddafi enacted a new constitution in 1969, replaced in 1975 with Gaddafi’s 
‘Green Book’ (Gaddafi 1975). The Green Book declared that constitutional guarantees of 
individual rights are suspect and should be replaced with direct democracy through the 
establishment of local popular congresses. However, real political power remained in 
Gaddafi’s hands. The popular congresses, that existed in various forms throughout the 
remainder of Gaddafi’s rule (Kjaerum et al. 2013), served only to reinforce divisions at the 
local and regional level, rather than providing institutionalised governance at the national 
level (Anderson 2001).  
In Iraq, whilst a new constitution was proclaimed after the declaration of an 
independent republic in 1958, no representative political institutions were established and 
power was concentrated in the hands of a few political actors. In 1989, 10 years after Saddam 
came to power, he proposed the creation of a new constitution, however this never 
transpired (C. Tripp 2007, chap. 5). The constitution in Iraq was a toothless document and 
political practice continued to exacerbate communal divisions. The Iraqi constitution did not 
guarantee political inclusion for all communal groups.   
In terms of electoral contestation, a similar distinction can be made between electoral 
competition under authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, as opposed to a dearth of 
competitive elections in Iraq and Libya, as shown in Figure 4.2. All four countries operated 
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under a presidential system. Egypt and Tunisia had an almost identical amount of presidential 
and lower-house legislative elections pre-transition, whilst Egypt held additional upper house 
elections and referenda. Iraq had very few presidential and legislative elections during this 
time, and Libya had no elections or referenda on a national scale. However, in no country did 
electoral politics further real political inclusion of excluded communal groups.  
 
Figure 4.2 National elections and referenda under authoritarian rule 
 
Sources: Inter-Parliamentary-Union PARLINE database on national parliaments: archive.ipu.org/parline-
e/parlinesearch.asp; additional data for Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia taken from the data handbook on elections in 
Africa, see Ries (1999), Mattes (1999), and Pereira (1999); additional data for Iraq taken from the data handbook 
on elections in the Middle East, see Axtmann (2001).    
 
Egypt and Tunisia ostensibly had multi-party systems, however these were 
consistently dominated by the ruling party. In Egypt, under Sadat and Mubarak, and in Tunisia 
under Ben Ali, approved opposition parties could participate in elections, although the ruling 
party consistently won almost all of the seats. Presidential ‘elections’ were typically referenda 
on the ruling president, where an unchallenged incumbent won over 99 percent support. 
Legislative elections typically served to provide an opportunity to gain access to state 
resources and services rather than decision making power, reinforcing a political system of 
competitive clientelism, with the ruling party consistently gaining at least a majority of seats 
(Diamond 2010; Lust-Okar 2009, 227–38; Owen 1992, 223–53; Posusney 2002). The regimes 
oscillated between granting small political openings, and disqualifying opposition parties or 
cracking down on opposition actors.  
In both Egypt and Tunisia, the regimes were particularly wary of Islamist opposition 
parties due to their substantial popular support and frequently backtracked on promised 
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electoral freedom for Islamist parties, imposing restrictions and arrests (Alexander 2012, 
chap. 2, 3; Cook 2012, 108–209). This served to further the political exclusion of Islamists, 
rather than ameliorating the Islamist – non-Islamist cleavage. In Libya, political parties were 
banned under Gaddafi; the national legislature composed of local representatives was devoid 
of any real political power (Kjaerum et al. 2013). Iraq under Saddam Hussein had a single-
party national legislature that did not constitute real political contest (Cordesman and Hashim 
1997, chap. 4). 
 4.4	 Conclusion	
This chapter has sought to show that in the four selected countries communal cleavages 
gained in relevance during the colonial and monarchical periods and were institutionalised in 
the period of the authoritarian republic with the capturing of governance structures by one 
key communal group, to the exclusion of others. That situation had a significant impact on 
institution-building that occurred in each country following authoritarian breakdown. 
In Egypt, whilst there was brief unity in resistance in early 2011 amongst Islamist and 
non-Islamist groups calling for increased political freedoms, the central divisive issue that 
framed institution-building in the transition period, was fear of Islamist political leadership 
from non-Islamists, and fear of ‘diluted’ Islamist values on behalf of Islamists. This rift 
overrode all other issues to the extent that by mid-July 2013, some liberal-secular non-
Islamists called for the return of military rule to prevent Islamist groups from holding political 
power (Stepan 2012b). In Tunisia, mutual suspicion between Islamist and non-Islamist groups 
was prevalent in the post-2011 transition period, bringing constitution-making to complete 
breakdown and the country to the brink of civil violence in mid-2013 (Guellali 2013). In the 
2014 legislative elections a party led by a prominent member of the ancien regime gained a 
plurality of seats with its leader, Beij Caid Essebsi, becoming president, preferred by many 
non-Islamists to the main Islamist party, despite his strong ties to the previous regime 
(Lefevre 2015).  
 In Iraq, whilst at the time of transition most Iraqis reported a strong sense of Iraqi 
identity (in 2004, 77 percent of Iraqis reported feeling ‘very proud’ of being Iraqi, and 17 
percent as feeling ‘quite proud’),4 ethno-sectarian divisions nevertheless overshadowed 
                                                        
4 World Values Survey Wave 4, question V216, see Appendix A for survey methodology.  
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institution-building post-2003. Whilst at the outset of the transition there was goodwill 
amongst Iraqis from across ethno-sectarian groups to create a new political system (Diamond 
2005; Morrow 2005), underlying tension and antagonism quickly resurfaced, exacerbated by 
blunders on behalf of the CPA, and intentional inciting of sectarian tensions by the imported 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq group (Dobbins et al. 2009; Fishman 2006). Whilst tensions regarding the 
place of religion in the state also exist, the central axis of division during this time was ethno-
sectarian. The potential for political mistrust amongst ethno-sectarian groups that had its 
roots in the colonial and post-independence periods was soon realised.  
Similarly, in Libya, the persistence of the regional cleavage and sub-regional tribal 
divisions shaped institution-building post-2011. As noted by Mokhefi (2011, 3) ‘the eastern 
part of Libya was the very first area to proclaim the revolution… Their first criticism of Gaddafi 
was the partisanship that he had displayed, over years, towards the tribes in the Tripoli 
region, to the detriment of the eastern tribes’. The inability to overcome this division during 
the transition was quickly evidenced by the devolution of power to tribal groupings and the 
emergence of competing centers of political power in Tripolitania and in Cyrenaica (Murray 
2015), echoing the monarchical period.    
 Against the background of communal cleavage in each country, the study now turns 
to an examination of whether, following authoritarian breakdown, the inclusion of communal 
groups in institution-building created support from those groups for the new political system. 
The following three chapters examine the involvement of key communal groups in electoral 
system design and constitution-making in the selected countries, investigating whether de 
jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of both was sufficient to build support 
from all groups for the political system. Chapter 5 will examine negotiations to determine an 
electoral system, and whether inclusion in this institution-building moment created support 
for elections.
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Chapter	Five Negotiating	electoral	system	design	
 
In the aftermath of the removal of the authoritarian leaders in Iraq in 2003, and in Egypt, 
Libya and Tunisia in 2011, an immediate task was to design an electoral system for legislative 
elections that were to take place as soon as feasible in each country. In Iraq, an electoral 
system was decided as ‘a result of long consultations with Iraqis both inside and outside of 
the Governing Council, both in Baghdad and in many cities around the country’ (Perelli 2004). 
Conversely, whilst in Libya the draft electoral law ‘was distributed via the media for public 
debate’, no official consultations were held (Kjaerum et al. 2013, 11). In Egypt, electoral 
system design was described by an electoral expert as ‘one of the most closed cases that I’ve 
been involved with and my colleagues had been involved with’ (Reynolds 2015), and in 
Tunisia, there was no public consultation regarding the choice of electoral system (The Carter 
Center 2012a, 14-16). If we expect inclusion to create political confidence, then of the four 
countries, we might expect to observe support for elections in Iraq, and not in Egypt, Libya, 
or Tunisia. And yet, it was in Iraq that groups urged a boycott of the elections, suggesting a 
dearth of support, whilst in the other countries there was full electoral participation. How can 
we account for this apparent discrepancy?    
This chapter examines the involvement of communal groups in negotiating an 
electoral system in the four selected countries, with the goal of better understanding the 
mechanism through which inclusion creates support. Three hypotheses are examined that 
test whether either de jure inclusion or de facto inclusion are alone sufficient to build support 
for elections, or whether a combination of both leads to support. The findings suggest that 
de jure inclusion is not sufficient to build support, whilst de facto inclusion may be sufficient.  
The next section outlines the importance of the decision-making process to determine 
an electoral system, and presents the hypotheses investigated. Section 5.2 outlines the 
observation of de jure inclusion and de facto inclusion in negotiating an electoral system in 
each country. Section 5.3 presents observations for the dependent variable, support for 
elections, and discusses whether these observations support or refute the hypotheses under 
investigation. The final section discusses the implications of the chapter’s findings and makes 
some concluding remarks.  
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85 5.1	 Background	and	hypotheses	
In the uncertain context of a political transition, choosing an electoral system for transitional 
elections is sharply contested and carries significance for the distribution of power amongst 
groups in the important institution-building period (Andrews and Jackman 2005; Luong 2002). 
In all of the four countries under examination, transitional elections proceeded constitution-
making. In Egypt and Iraq representatives were elected to parliament who would appoint 
members to a constituent body. In Tunisia a constituent legislative assembly was elected 
tasked with constitution-making as well as legislative duties. In Libya, a constituent body was 
to be elected at a later date. The potential to influence constitution-making raised the stakes 
of first transitional elections in each country. In turn, this meant that negotiations to 
determine an electoral system for transitional elections was a disputed arena of inter-
communal contest.  
Electoral system design as a discrete and important institution-building event during 
a political transition has been acknowledged by scholars in recent decades (Andrew and 
Jackman 2005; Benoit 2004; Shvetsova 2003). An extensive literature exists on electoral 
reform in established political systems (Dunleavy and Margetts 1995; Rahat and Hazan 2011; 
Remmer 2008). However, such changes are usually moderate and infrequent (Boix 1999; 
Norris 1995), with a few notable exceptions. For example, electoral reform in Japan, New 
Zealand, and Italy in the 1990s was remarkable for two reasons. First, they constituted 
substantial electoral change in established western democracies; a rare event. Second, the 
changes were towards more proportional electoral systems that could be expected to 
disadvantage incumbents (Sakamoto 1999). During transition, where the legitimacy of 
previous structures of political power are called into question, there is often enthusiasm for 
a complete overhaul of a previously used electoral system (Benoit and Schiemann 2001).  
Scholarly literature acknowledges the importance of decisions on electoral system 
design during political transition (Luong 2002). Substantial scholarly attention has been paid 
to electoral system choice as an outcome of actors’ preferences (Boix 1999). It is somewhat 
surprising, however, that little consideration has been given to the quality of this decision-
making process in terms of the involvement of key groups, and whether such inclusion 
impacts support for elections amongst those groups. Literature on institution-building in 
other areas, notably scholarship on designing a new constitution, emphasises the importance 
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of inclusion of all groups in order to build support and enhance the perceived legitimacy of 
political institutions. I assert that the expectation that involvement of all groups will create 
political confidence, should apply equally to decision-making on electoral system design, as it 
does for other institution-building events.  
In Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia an electoral system was negotiated within the first 
year of the political transition, and just months before the transitional legislative elections 
were held. In each country, whilst the political transition was not disconnected from the 
electoral context of the previous regime, there was a willingness—ranging from enthusiasm 
in Tunisia (Murphy 2013) to reluctant willingness in Egypt (International Crisis Group 2012)—
to make a break with the past in terms of designing a new electoral system for transitional 
elections. The willingness to entertain new electoral options in each country is evidenced by 
the choice of a different electoral system to the one used under the previous regime. Table 
5.1 shows that in Iraq and Libya no candidates were elected using a system employed under 
the previous regime. In Egypt and Tunisia a small proportion, one-third and one-fifth, 
respectively, used the same system as one used under the previous regime.  
 
Table 5.1 Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia: previous and new electoral system  
 Electoral system under 
previous regime  
New electoral system  Seats elected using 
same system as 
previous regime (%) 
Egypt Majoritarian with two-
member districts  
Mixed-member-parallel: Two-thirds of 
seats using proportional-representation; 
One third of seats using majoritarian two-
member districts  
 
33 
Iraq Single-non-transferable-vote Proportional-representation  0 
 
Libya No national elections held Mixed-member-parallel: 120 seats using 
Single-non-transferable-vote and single-
member-district; 80 seats using 
proportional representation  
 
0 
Tunisia Mixed-member-parallel  
80 percent of seats: bloc-vote 
20 percent of seats:  
proportional-representation  
Proportional-representation  20 
Sources: Faris (2012) on Egypt; C. Tripp (2007) on Iraq; Alexander (2012) on Tunisia; and Kjaerum et al. (2013) 
on Libya  
  
In each country the interim authority played an important role in determining the 
negotiations framework to decide on a new electoral system, exerting influence over the 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
87 
involvement of key communal groups in this institutional design moment (the role of the 
interim authority is returned to in the conclusion). In each country multiple actors had an 
interest in electoral system design and were eager to influence the outcome. Compared with 
the lack of toleration for political contestation under the previous regime, relative political 
and civil freedom during transition was evidenced by an unprecedented level of public debate 
and engagement with institutional design (Diamond 2005, chap. 5; Kjaerum et al. 2013; 
National Democratic Institute 2011; The Carter Center 2012b). Each interim authority stated 
an objective to facilitate a political system that would include all communal groups, with 
freely elected political leaders through competitive multi-party elections (Coalition 
Provisional Authority 2003; Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 2011; Temehu 2016; The 
President of the Tunisian Republic by Interim 2011). However, this sentiment did not extend 
equally in each country to the process of deciding on an electoral system for these elections.  
Table 5.2 shows the hypotheses examined in this chapter based on variation on the 
independent variables in institution-building in each country. In Tunisia both de jure and de 
facto inclusion were present, so hypothesis two is examined. Hypothesis three is examined in 
Iraq where de jure inclusion was observed without de facto in negotiations on electoral 
system design. In both Egypt and Libya there was de facto inclusion without de jure, enabling 
an investigation of hypothesis four. The final column in Table 5.2 shows the predicted 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable according to the 
hypothesis under examination.  
 
Table 5.2 Hypotheses examined at the negotiations stage of electoral system design 
 De jure inclusion 
(independent 
variable) 
De facto inclusion 
(independent 
variable) 
Country where  
independent variables 
are observed 
Expected observation  
of support  
(dependent variable) 
H1 - - not tested in this chapter - 
H2 x x Tunisia y 
H3 x - Iraq y 
H4 - x Egypt, Libya y 
 
De jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, and support for elections are operationalised 
according to the indices reviewed in Table 5.3. The first two indicators of de jure inclusion 
pertain to a public focus on inclusion in determining an electoral system. The next two 
indicators concern public consultations on the choice of electoral system, and approval of the 
electoral system by an inclusive body. The first two indicators of de facto inclusion examine 
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whether representatives of all communal groups were in fact consulted on electoral system 
design, and whether these consultations continued up until an electoral system was chosen. 
The final indicators of de facto inclusion measure whether there is demonstrated evidence 
that representatives of all communal groups had an opportunity to impact electoral system 
design, running along both an elite and a mass public dimension. Support for elections is 
distinguished by behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional support. Behavioural support is 
measured as an absence of election-related violence. Attitudinal support for elections is 
measured according to individual-level perceptions of electoral legitimacy. Constitutional 
support is assessed according to the absence of an election boycott, and absence of low 
turnout (33 percent or below), overall or on behalf of one communal group.   
 
Table 5.3 Operationalisation of variables 
De jure inclusion (IV) 
Index 0-4 
De facto inclusion (IV) 
Index 0-4 
Support for elections (DV) 
Index 0-4 
Inclusion of communal groups in 
design body 
1. Public focus from transitional 
authority on inclusion in 
determining an electoral system  
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Members of design body include 
all key communal groups 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
Inclusion of communal groups in 
consultations on / approval of 
institutional design 
1. Official policy of public 
consultation on electoral system 
design (surveys, open forums, focus 
groups) (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Electoral system design approved 
by body inclusive of all communal 
groups (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
Actual inclusion of all communal 
groups in consultation 
1. Actual consultation with 
representatives of all key communal 
groups on electoral system design 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Demonstrated evidence 
consultation with all key communal 
groups continued up until electoral 
system design was determined 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
All communal groups have an 
opportunity to impact the 
institutional design outcome 
1. Demonstrated evidence that 
representatives from all key 
communal groups had opportunity to 
impact electoral system design 
(through official negotiations or 
unofficial channels such as political 
pressure) (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Demonstrated evidence mass 
public had opportunity to impact 
electoral system design (through 
official consultations or unofficial 
channels such as public protest) 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
Behavioural 
1. Absence of election-related 
violence (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
Attitudinal 
1. Perceptions of legitimacy: 
intention to vote in elections 
(<50 percent) 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
Constitutional 
1. Absence of a boycott of 
elections by political actors 
associated with a key 
communal group  
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Absence of low turnout 
overall or on behalf of one 
communal group (£33 
percent) (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
 
 
 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
89 
Data sources to measure the independent and dependent variables are shown in 
Table 5.4. De jure and de facto inclusion are measured using expert interviews, and 
independent reports from election monitoring bodies and other political analysis institutes. 
Behavioural support (the absence of electoral violence) is measured using reports from 
independent election monitoring bodies. Attitudinal support (perceived legitimacy) is 
measured using individual-level survey data in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia. In Libya, due to a 
dearth of public opinion survey data, this indicator is measured using a report from IFES on 
individual-level perceptions of legitimacy in post-election focus-groups (IFES 2013b). For 
constitutional support, the absence of an election boycott is measured using independent 
reports from election monitoring bodies and corroborated with interviews and news media, 
turnout is measured using data from IFES election guide country profiles, and independent 
reports or survey data to disaggregate per communal group.  
 
Table 5.4 Data sources  
 De jure 
inclusion 
De facto 
inclusion 
Support for 
elections 
Six expert interviews  
 
Ö Ö Ö 
Communique from transitional authority  
 
Ö   
Reports from independent election monitoring and 
political analysis bodies 
 
Ö Ö Ö 
Public opinion surveys: Arab Democracy Barometer 
Wave II and Wave III; World Values Survey Wave 4  
  Ö 
 
IFES election guide country profiles 
www.electionguide.org/countries 
   
Ö 
Source: for more detail on data sources see Table 3.13 	5.2	 Inclusion	in	negotiating	electoral	system	design	
Both Iraq and Tunisia began negotiations on electoral system design with formal inclusion of 
key communal groups in this process, whilst in Egypt and Libya de jure inclusion was not 
present in decision-making to determine an electoral system. Each country’s score on the de 
jure inclusion index is shown in Table 5.5; each indicator is discussed in detail below. In Egypt, 
none of the four indicators was observed, so Egypt scored a zero on the index and is evaluated 
as having no de jure inclusion in negotiations on electoral system design. In Libya only the 
third indicator of de jure inclusion was observed.  Therefore, de jure inclusion receives a score 
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of one on the index and is assessed as low. For the purposes of testing the hypotheses a 
country needs to score two or above for de jure inclusion to be considered present, so de jure 
inclusion is not assessed as present in Libya. In both Iraq and Tunisia, three out of the four 
indicators were observed, so de jure inclusion is assessed as high.  
 
Table 5.5 De jure inclusion in electoral system design negotiations  
 
 
Indicator 1 
Public focus on 
inclusion in 
determining 
electoral system 
Indicator 2 
Design body 
members 
included all 
groups  
Indicator 3 
Public 
consultation on 
electoral system 
design 
Indicator 4 
Electoral system 
approved by 
inclusive body   
Index  
(0-4) 
Egypt 0 0 0 0  0 None 
Iraq 1 0 1 1 3 High 
Libya 0 0 1 0 1 Low 
Tunisia 1 1 0 1 3 High 
 
For the first indicator, in Egypt and Libya there was no public focus from the interim 
authority on inclusion in determining electoral system design; however, in Iraq and Tunisia 
this was the case. In Egypt, two days after Mubarak’s abdication on 11 February, The SCAF 
issued a constitutional declaration that appointed an eight-person committee to produce 
constitutional amendments that were put to a referendum in March 2011 and approved. The 
amended constitution did not directly address electoral system design or how this would be 
determined, other than retaining the provision that at least 50 percent of elected members 
of the legislative assembly must be workers or farmers (a legacy of the Nasser-era) (Hassan 
2013, 371). The first direct announcement on electoral system design in Egypt on 30 May 
2011 was the SCAF’s release of a draft proposal for the Law on the People’s Assembly 
(Democracy Reporting International 2011a, 4). There was no public attention on inclusion of 
communal groups in producing an electoral system. 
 In Libya, the NTC issued a constitutional declaration in August 2011 that outlined 
a roadmap for determining electoral system design and holding transitional elections. 
However, the composition of the electoral system design body was unclear (Democracy 
Reporting International 2011e, 2012; Temehu 2016). In November 2011, the NTC selected an 
eight-member election committee tasked with drafting the election law, defining districts, 
and distributing seats amongst districts for the elections (Kjaerum et al. 2013, 10), without a 
public emphasis on inclusion in drafting an electoral system.  
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 In Iraq, the CPA, backed by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), tasked a United 
Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) team, led by Carina Perelli (chief of the UNEAD) 
with proposing an electoral system for the first transitional elections (Perelli 2004; United 
Nations 2004a). Nevertheless, there was a clear emphasis on inclusion in determining an 
electoral system, as outlined in a United Nations communique (United Nations 2004a). Perelli 
(2004, 1) stated in a press briefing that the UNEAD wanted to ‘broaden the consultations’ on 
electoral system design and have ‘open fora for discussion in order to see what type of system 
[Iraqis] want to have’. 
 In Tunisia, the HCFRG publicly communicated that inclusion would underpin the 
process to select an electoral system. An inclusive body was to be set up that would 
encompass representatives from Islamist parties as well as from an array of non-Islamist 
opposition groups (The Carter Center 2012a, 14). As stated in an HCFRG communique of 11 
February 2011: ‘The body will be composed of representatives of the political parties, 
associations, organisations, and bodies undersigned, as well as representatives from the 
opposition, by consensus’ (Gannouchi 2016).  
For the second indicator of de jure inclusion, the body responsible for negotiating a 
new electoral system in Egypt, Iraq, and Libya did not include representatives from all 
communal groups, whilst in Tunisia it did. In Egypt, the SCAF was responsible for electoral 
system design, a body not inclusive of all communal groups. The specific actors that drafted 
the electoral system was not made public (Bassiouni 2017; International Crisis Group 2012). 
As asserted by Reynolds (2015): ‘Egypt is probably one of the most closed cases that I’ve been 
involved with… there were rumors about who was actually drafting the SCAF’s [election] 
system options but it was never clear exactly who was doing it.’ In Iraq, the UNEAD team that 
drafted electoral design options was not inclusive of Iraq’s communal groups (United Nations 
2004a). In Libya, the election design body was appointed by the NTC, who were themselves 
largely from Cyrenaica, in the east. As noted by an expert observer (Vandewalle 2015): ‘you 
have to realise that the leadership, the NTC… was very much from one part of the country, 
from the eastern part of the country’. In November 2011, Libyans were found to be 
dissatisfied with the NTC’s lack of transparency in decision-making (Doherty 2011). In Tunisia, 
however, the 155-member HCFRG included representatives from all major opposition parties, 
former government officials, prominent scholars, and labor union officials, including both 
Islamist and non-Islamist actors (Pickard 2011; Stepan 2012a).  
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 Whilst there were no official avenues of consultation on electoral system design in 
Egypt and Tunisia, there were such channels in Iraq and Libya. In Egypt, as already mentioned, 
there were no official avenues for public consultation on electoral design (Bassiouni 2017, 
chap. 2, 3). Similarly, in Tunisia, no public consultations were held to debate the electoral 
system (The Carter Center 2012a, 15–16). HCFRG orders specified that the deliberating body 
must report its activity to the public, but it did not specify public consultation or public input 
(Gannouchi 2016). In Iraq, by contrast, official consultations with the public on the electoral 
system did take place. As noted in a United Nations communique (2004a): ‘Between March 
and May 2004, the UN undertook wide ranging discussions [on electoral system design] with 
political, academic, religious and social actors throughout Iraq, as well as the Electoral 
Committee of the IGC… Consultations were conducted at meetings or town hall gatherings in 
nine of Iraq 's 18 Governorates: Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Basra, Erbil, Sulamaniya, Hilla, Najaf 
and Nasiryah’. In Libya, whilst there were no official consultations on electoral system design, 
following the release of the first draft of the electoral law on 2 January 2012, the NTC ‘invited 
Libyan citizens to submit comments on the draft election law before [finalising the text]’ 
(Democracy Reporting International 2012, 1). The first draft was distributed via the media for 
public debate between 6 January and 21 January 2012 (Kjaerum et al. 2013, 11). 
The fourth indicator of de jure inclusion, approval of electoral system design by an 
inclusive body, was not present in Egypt and Libya, but was observed in Iraq and Tunisia. In 
Egypt, electoral system design was approved in an opaque process, with no specified approval 
from a body inclusive of all communal groups (Reynolds 2015). Similarly, in Libya, the election 
committee was not set up to be inclusive of all communal groups and there was no other 
specified mechanism of approval by an inclusive body (Kjaerum et al. 2013, 17). Conversely, 
in Iraq, the design of the electoral system needed to be approved by the IGC, a 25-member 
body set-up by the CPA that included Shia-Arab, Sunni-Arab, and Kurdish members according 
to each group’s proportion of the wider population (Al-Ali 2014, 77). The UNEAD team 
presented three options for electoral system design to an electoral committee appointed by 
the IGC. The electoral committee chose one option;1 the IGC then needed to approve this 
option (which it did with 17 votes to four in favour) (United Nations 2004a). The chosen 
                                                        
1 The chosen option was the one strongly preferred by the UNEAD team, suggesting possible influence in the 
presentation of options. However, this does not contradict de jure inclusion. 
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electoral system was then passed into law by the CPA in order number 96 of 7 June 2004 
(Coalition Provisional Authority 2004b). In Tunisia, there was an explicit directive that the 
design of the new electoral system had to be approved by the HCFRG, a body composed of 
representatives from across communal groups (Stepan 2012a).  
De facto inclusion in negotiations on electoral system design varied amongst 
countries. Whilst negotiations on an electoral system in Egypt and Libya did not involve formal 
inclusion of communal groups, in Egypt all groups ended up impacting the choice of electoral 
system, and in Libya all relevant groups were in fact consulted and given an opportunity to 
influence the electoral system. In Tunisia formal inclusion in negotiations on an electoral 
system was complimented with actual inclusion of all groups in consultations on the electoral 
system that culminated in an almost complete consensus on the outcome. In Iraq, however, 
formal participation and inclusion in decision-making around an electoral system did not 
result in sustained consultations with all communal groups, and an opportunity for all groups 
to shape the chosen electoral system. Table 5.6 shows each country’s score on the de facto 
inclusion index; each indicator is discussed in detail below.  
 
Table 5.6 De facto inclusion in electoral system design negotiations  
 
 
Indicator 1 
Actual consultation 
on electoral system 
with representatives 
of all communal 
groups 
Indicator 2 
Consultation 
continued up 
until electoral 
system chosen  
Indicator 3 
Representatives of 
communal groups 
had opportunity to 
impact electoral 
system design 
Indicator 4 
Mass public had 
opportunity to 
impact electoral 
system design  
Index  
(0-4) 
Egypt 1 0 1 1 3 High 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 None 
Libya 1 1 1 1 4 Very high 
Tunisia 1 1 1 0 3 High 
 
The first indicator of de facto inclusion was present in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, but 
not in Iraq. In Egypt, evidence from interviews and other sources suggests that the SCAF 
consulted both liberal-secular and Muslim Brotherhood members during this period on 
electoral timing and electoral system design. A retired Egyptian general asserted in an 
interview with the International Crisis Group in October 2011 (International Crisis Group 
2012, 4) that the SCAF placed elections ahead of a constitution-making process due to 
consulting with advisers that ‘were mostly from the Muslim Brothers… with the Brothers 
being the most organised and numerous group, they [the SCAF] naturally felt it made sense 
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to let them have a critical say’. Additional evidence suggests that, besides consulting Islamist 
actors, during 2011 the SCAF also ‘maintained a revolving door of experts and 
intellectuals¾many associated with the revolution¾who regularly consulted with the 
generals on policy’ (Stepan 2012b). In an interview conducted under the auspices of the Arab 
West in February 2012 with an actor closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
SCAF was reported to be ‘negotiating with all political parties at the time [in 2011]’ (Hulsman 
2015, 4). 
In Libya, following a draft electoral system that designated the distribution of seats 
amongst the three Libyan provinces, multiple unofficial negotiation rounds took place on seat 
distribution with regional representatives, and with representatives of the 13 districts and 73 
sub-districts within the three provinces (Kjaerum et al. 2013, 12–17). Similarly, in Tunisia, 
within the framework of the HCFRG, consultation on electoral system design took place with 
representatives of key communal groups (Islamists and non-Islamists) (Brownlee, Masoud, 
and Reynolds 2015, 128–32). Alfred Stepan asserts that the HCFRG was ‘one of the most 
effective consensus-building bodies in the history of “crafted” democratic transitions’ (Stepan 
2012a, 92).  
In Iraq, on the other hand, whilst there was an emphasis on holding public forums to 
inform the public regarding electoral system design, there were no negotiations on electoral 
system design with representatives of all communal groups, evidenced by the minimal and 
inconsistent consultation with Sunni-Arab actors (Diamond 2015). As observed by the head 
of the International Crisis Group in Amman, the January 2005 elections were pushed through 
despite Sunni exclusion from decision-making and objections to both timing and electoral 
system design (Hiltermann 2006, 38). Sunni actors strongly preferred a PR list system in multi-
member districts2 rather than a single nation-wide district, and wanted to delay the holding 
of elections (Dawisha and Diamond 2006; Pachachi 2005). As noted in an interview (Diamond 
2015): ‘‘The Sunnis feared, I think understandably, and not incorrectly, that they would be 
penalised by this system, because they were going to wind up having a much lower turn-out’. 
However, Sunni-Arab representatives were not directly consulted (Istrabadi 2015).  
                                                        
2 Using PR-list in multi-member districts would have guaranteed a certain proportion of seats to Sunni-majority 
provinces regardless of population and turnout. For further explanation see Al-Ali (2014, 82-83).  
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The second indicator was observed in Libya and Tunisia, but not in Egypt or Iraq. In 
Libya, negotiations on electoral system design continued ‘until consensus was reached on a 
final distribution, which aligned with the 120 individual seats and 80 list-based seats stated in 
the election law’ (Kjaerum et al. 2013, 17). This consensus on the division of seats amongst 
districts was then stipulated in the election law of 12 March 2012 (17). Similarly, in Tunisia, 
inclusive negotiations continued up until an electoral system was agreed upon (Pickard 2011; 
Stepan 2012a, 93–94). In Egypt, whilst there is evidence that some consultation on electoral 
system design took place with representatives of communal groups, there is no clear evidence 
that these consultations continued throughout the duration of the decision-making process 
up until the final electoral system was determined (International Crisis Group 2012, 4). In Iraq, 
given that the first indicator of de facto inclusion (consultation with all groups) was not 
observed, the second indicator was also not present.  
The third and fourth indicators of de facto inclusion, representatives of all communal 
groups and the broader public having an opportunity to impact electoral system design, was 
present in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, but not in Iraq. In Egypt, there is evidence that political 
actors from across communal groups shaped electoral system design. The SCAF’s original 
proposal for electoral system design was moderated three times to accommodate the 
preferences of political actors from across the Islamist – non-Islamist divide following threats 
to boycott the elections (Elyan 2011b). The SCAF’s original proposal was for a two-tier parallel 
system with two-thirds of the seats elected in a majoritarian tier, and one-third by PR-list 
(International Crisis Group 2012). Following waves of widespread mass protest and threats to 
boycott the elections from both Islamist and non-Islamist political actors, the SCAF adjusted 
this ratio on 19 July 2011 to 50 percent elected in each tier (Democracy Reporting 
International 2011b, 1; Hassan 2013, 370), and again on 25 September to one-third of seats 
elected in the majoritarian tier and two-thirds in the PR-list tier (Democracy Reporting 
International 2011a; Hassan 2013; IFES 2011, 2013a). A final modification to the electoral law 
was made on 8 October 2011, allowing members of political parties to run in both tiers (rather 
than just in the PR-list tier) (IFES 2013a, 4). This demonstrated that political actors from across 
the Islamist – non-Islamist divide influenced the design of the electoral system. 
In Libya, political representatives from all regions influenced electoral system design. 
The original system distributed seats amongst provinces according to population size. 
However, following opposition from representatives of Fezzan and Cyrenaica, seats were re-
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distributed amongst the three provinces taking into account geographic size as well as 
population. In addition, each province had an influence over the exact distribution of seats. 
The final allocation of seats in each tier was only determined following extensive negotiations 
with provincial and local leaders that continued until agreement was reached (Kjaerum et al. 
2013, 12-17). In Tunisia, there is evidence that both Islamist and non-Islamist actors had an 
opportunity to influence the final electoral system design outcome. Where disagreements 
arose on timing or electoral system choice these were discussed by all members until 
agreement was reached and the final system was voted on by all members of the HCFRG 
(Koehler and Warkotsch 2014, 20-21; Stepan 2012a, 93–94; The Carter Center 2012a, 16).  
In contrast to the other three countries, in Iraq there is no evidence that 
representatives of key communal groups had an opportunity to influence electoral system 
design (Al-Ali 2014, 82-83; HiIltermann 2006). Diamond (2015) evidences the lack of inclusion 
of actors outside the UNEAD in determining the proposed electoral system: ‘the United 
Nations came in, and the United Nations team led by Carina Perelli basically dispensed with 
the idea [of PR-list in multi-member districts], about which there had been a good deal of 
writing and analysis… So, the UN, led by her, decided to just have this system of one nation-
wide district with no boundaries’. The UN cited timing and logistical pressures in opting for a 
single nation-wide district (Perelli 2004), nevertheless consultation with all communal groups 
was not present.  
The fourth indicator, evidence that the broader public impacted electoral system 
design through organised consultations or through mass protest, was evidenced in Egypt and 
Libya, but not in Iraq or Tunisia. In Egypt, as discussed above, electoral system design was 
adjusted following mass protests and public agitation from across Islamist – non-Islamist 
groups (Bradley 2011; Democracy Reporting International 2011b). As asserted by an expert 
analyst: ‘the SCAF ultimately were pushed… to reform the system and build in elements of 
proportionality and lists’ (Reynolds 2015). Similarly, in Libya, there is demonstrated evidence 
that preferences of the broader public had an opportunity to influence electoral system 
design. When the initial draft of the electoral system was publicly released, there was protest, 
primarily from political parties and civil society groups, objecting to a single-tier majoritarian 
system (Zargoun and Holmes 2016). Following this, the NTC adjusted electoral system design 
to incorporate a two-tiered system with 120 candidate-based seats elected using a 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
97 
majoritarian system, and 80 party-based seats elected using PR-list (Kjaerum et al. 2013, 4; 
Democracy Reporting International 2012).  
Conversely, in Iraq and Tunisia, the fourth indicator of de facto inclusion was not 
observed. In Iraq, whilst Carina Perelli asserted that extensive consultations with the public 
on electoral system design took place, there is no evidence to suggest that there was a real 
opportunity to shape the choice of electoral system design proposed by the UN and adopted 
by the IGC and the CPA; in fact there is evidence to the contrary. First, none of the cities in 
which consultations were carried out (see United Nations [2004a]) were in Sunni-majority 
governorates, meaning that members of this communal group did not have an opportunity 
to impact election system design. Second, the election system chosen was one personally 
preferred by the UNEAD team from the outset due to its administrative simplicity and high 
proportionality (Diamond 2015; Istrabadi 2015).  
In Tunisia, the fourth indicator of de facto inclusion was not observed. Whilst 
members of the HCFRG may have indirectly represented public opinion, there is no evidence 
to suggest that mass public preferences had an opportunity to influence the electoral system, 
either through channels of official consultation or through applying other political pressure 
such as mass protest. Whilst protest did occur sporadically during this time, these were not 
directly linked to electoral system design and there is no evidence that they influenced the 
electoral system determined by the HCFRG (Carey, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015; Stepan 
2012a).  	5.3	 Support	for	elections		
Confidence in elections was found to be high in three of the countries examined, only in Iraq 
there was no support for elections. Each country’s score on the support for elections index is 
shown in Table 5.7; each indicator is discussed in detail below.  
 
Table 5.7 Support for elections  
 Indicator 1  
Behavioural 
Absence of 
electoral violence 
Indicator 2  
Attitudinal  
Perceptions of 
legitimacy 
Indicator 3  
Constitutional  
Absence of 
boycott  
Indicator 4  
Constitutional 
Absence of low 
turnout 
Index  
(0-4) 
Egypt 0 1 1 1 3 High 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 None 
Libya 0 1 1 1 3 High 
Tunisia 1 1 1 1 4 Very high 
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Behavioural support for elections was not observed in Egypt, Iraq, or Libya, but was 
present in Tunisia. In Egypt, there were isolated violent incidents directly related to polling on 
election day, and there was protest and violence focused on electoral issues in the weeks 
leading up to the start of polling for transitional legislative elections on 28 November 2011; 
this continued during the period of polling that lasted until early January 2012 (Electoral 
Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa 2012, 71; The Carter Center 2012b). Similarly, in 
Libya, there were several incidences of election-related violence in the lead-up to and on the 
day of the 7 July elections in 2012 (Kirkpatrick 2012b; B. Smith 2012; The Carter Center 2013, 
37). Violence or threats of violence led to the closure of an estimated 35 polling stations on 
the day of the election (European Union Election Assessment Team 2012, 32–33; The Carter 
Center 2013, 38). Whilst these did not appear to affect the willingness or capacity of voters 
to vote, and confidence and optimism remained high (IFES 2013b; B. Smith 2012), violence 
was nevertheless observed.  
In Iraq, violence on election day disrupted polling stations and compromised the 
ability of the population in some governorates to vote. The key independent election 
monitoring body in Iraq, the International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE), reported that 
elections were free and fair despite ‘extremely difficult security conditions’ (IMIE 2005). 
Twenty-eight polling stations could not open due to security concerns, which was indicative 
of a broader threat of electoral violence, primarily in Sunni-majority provinces (IMIE 2005). 
On election day, 16 attacks were recorded killing at least 25 people (IPU Parline 2005). The 
threat of electoral violence is evidenced by the fact that the IMIE (composed primarily of 
international mission members) ‘monitored’ the elections from Jordan due to security 
concerns. Election monitoring missions from the United States Congress, the European Union, 
and the Carter Center refrained from sending a monitoring team citing security concerns (Pan 
2005).  
In Tunisia, however, the election took place without any incidents of electoral violence 
on the day of the elections. Neither the Carter Center (2012a) nor the National Democratic 
Institute (2011), that carried out election observation missions in the country, reported 
incidences of election-related violence on election day. In the period following Ben Ali’s 
abdication in January 2011, intermittent public protest did take place accompanied by 
occasional acts of violence, leading to some anxiety as to whether there would be violence 
on election day. However, this protest was not specifically election-related and on election 
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day itself violence did not eventuate; all polling stations operated as planned and in a peaceful 
atmosphere (The Carter Center 2012a, 42–46).  
In Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia attitudinal support, perceived legitimacy, is operationalised 
as intention to vote in legislative elections using individual-level survey data, and as perceived 
legitimacy of elections in Libya using an IFES report. The World Values Survey Wave 4 was 
conducted in Iraq between six and 10 weeks months before elections and asked 
respondents:3 ‘If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party would you vote?’4 
The Arab Democracy Barometer Wave II was carried out in Egypt5 five months before the first 
transitional elections and in Tunisia6 two to four weeks before elections, asked participants 
whether they would vote in the next parliamentary elections. Figure 5.1 shows the percent 
of respondents in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia that indicated that they were planning to vote, not 
planning to vote, or did not know. In Iraq, participants planning to vote was far below 50 
percent at 35 percent, and so is assessed as low. In both Egypt and Tunisia, the percent of 
participants that reported ‘planning to vote’ was similar at a little above 80 percent, whilst 
those not planning to vote was around 15 percent.  
Given a lack of survey data in Libya7 this indicator is assessed using an IFES report. 
Eight focus-group discussions carried out by IFES in November and December 2012 with 84 
Libyans found perceptions of electoral legitimacy to be consistently high across the three 
provinces.8 Two focus groups were carried out in a key city in each of the three Libyan 
provinces, with similar positive findings of perceived electoral legitimacy, suggesting that 
perceived legitimacy was high amongst all three communal groups9 (IFES 2013b). ‘Participants 
were generally positive about election day, expressing a sense of pride about the election 
                                                        
3 Question V220 
4 Whilst the wording of this question is different to the question asked in Egypt and Tunisia, respondents 
nevertheless indicated whether or not they intended to vote; the fact that ‘I will not vote’ was not a suggested 
option, and yet was offered by 35 percent of respondents, reinforces the lack of intention to vote in Iraq, as 
opposed to Egypt and Tunisia. 
5 Question eg302 
6 Question t302 
7 The World Values Survey and the Arab Democracy Barometer did not carry out surveys in Libya until 2014, two 
years after the first transitional elections.  
8 Eight focus groups were held from 25 November to 13 December, 2012 with eight to 14 participants in each 
group and 84 participants all together. Focus groups were conducted in major cities in Libya’s three provinces.  
Participants were selected to represent demographically diverse segments of the Libyan population (IFES 
2013b).  
9 Sebha in Fezzan (19 participants), Benghazi in Cyrenaica (24 participants), and Tripoli in Tripolitania (21 
participants) 
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process and the ability of the Libyan people to turn a new page’ (IFES 2013b, 11). This is 
corroborated by a political analyst who stated that at the time of the transitional elections in 
2012 there ‘was really a euphoria, just even at the polling stations and so on, people were 
just ecstatic with what was happening… the expectations were extremely high’ (Vandewalle 
2015). 
 
Figure 5.1 Tunisia, Egypt, and Iraq: intention to vote (percent respondents) 
 
Sources: Iraq - World Values Survey Wave 4. Egypt and Tunisia - Arab Democracy Barometer Wave II. See 
Appendix A for survey methodology; see text for full wording of questions used.   
 
 The first indicator of constitutional support was present in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, 
but was not observed in Iraq. In Egypt, whilst at certain stages political actors threatened to 
boycott (Bradley 2011; Elyan 2011a; Mady 2011), in the end no political actors publicly 
boycotted the elections (Kirkpatrick 2011; Tayel 2011). Similarly, in Libya whilst there were 
some threats of a boycott from Cyrenaican actors at some stages, no political actors 
boycotted (The Carter Center 2013). In Tunisia no political groups called for or supported a 
boycott of the elections (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 132–37; Little 2011). In Iraq, 
however, Sunni actors, objecting to both electoral system design and timing, publicly declared 
a boycott of the elections (Allawi 2007, 389–90; Beaumont, McCarthy, and Harris 2005; 
Howard 2004; IPU Parline 2005). 
 The second indicator of constitutional support, absence of low turnout (overall or on 
behalf of one communal group), was observed in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, but not in Iraq. In 
Egypt, turnout was 45 percent averaged over three stages of voting and three rounds of run-
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off voting for the majoritarian tier.10 In some stages turnout was above 60 percent (Alsannoos 
2012) and in others it was a little above 40 percent (Abdel Ghani 2011). Given that the 
communal cleavage in Egypt does not run along regional lines, there are no official turnout 
figures disaggregated per communal group. However, survey data from the Arab Democracy 
Barometer Wave III, conducted after the elections, was used to gauge whether self-reported 
voting varied amongst Islamist and non-Islamist survey participants. Islamist and non-Islamist 
respondents were identified with the question:11 ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following principle in the enactment of your country’s laws and regulations? The 
government and parliament should enact penal laws in accordance with Islamic law.’ Those 
that answered ‘strongly agree’ were assessed as Islamist, whilst a response of ‘strongly 
disagree’ was assessed as non-Islamist. A question12 that asked whether respondents voted 
in the last parliamentary elections was used to assess self-reported voting. Figure 5.2 shows 
that self-reported voting was comparably high across communal groups in Egypt: 77 percent 
of Islamists reported voting and 22 percent reported not voting, as compared to 72 percent 
of non-Islamists that voted and 28 percent that did not.  
 
Figure 5.2 Egypt and Tunisia: voter turnout per key communal group (percent respondents) 
 
Source: Arab Democracy Barometer Wave III, see Appendix A for survey methodology; see text for full wording 
of questions used.  
 
                                                        
10 IFES election guide country profile for Egypt, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/65 
11 Question 6054 
12 Question 301 
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In Iraq, overall turnout in the election was 58 percent;13 however, if turnout is 
disaggregated for the majority-Sunni-Arab, majority-Shia, and majority-Kurd governorates 
there are significant differences between the three groups. Table 5.8 shows that average 
turnout was only 21 percent in majority-Sunni-Arab governorates, as opposed to an average 
turnout of 70 percent in majority-Shia governorates, and 82 percent in majority-Kurd 
governorates. In Libya, turnout was 62 percent,14 and disaggregated turnout per province 
shows comparably high turnout amongst the three provinces, with an average turnout of 60 
percent in Cyrenaica, 58 percent in Fezzan, and 63 percent in Tripolitania (European Union 
Election Assessment Team 2012, 34).  
 
Table 5.8 Iraq: average turnout in elections per communal group 
Governorate Turnout (%) Majority-communal group 
Babil 73 Shia 
Basrah 72 Shia 
Karbala 75 Shia 
Misan 61 Shia 
Muthanna 65 Shia 
Najaf 75 Shia 
Qadissiya 71 Shia 
Theqar 69 Shia 
Wasit 71 Shia 
Average 70  
Anbar 2 Sunni 
Diyala 33 Sunni 
Ninewa 17 Sunni 
Salahaddin 29 Sunni 
Average 20  
Dohuk 93 Kurd 
Erbil 84 Kurd 
Suleimaniya 82 Kurd 
Taamin 70 Kurd 
Average 82  
*Baghdad has a mixed population and is not designated to any majority-communal group, turnout was 52 
percent 
Source: Mozaffar (2006)  
 
In Tunisia, overall turnout was 52 percent (IPU Parline 2013). In line with Egypt, the 
key communal cleavage is not a regional one so there is no official turnout data reported for 
the various communal groups. However, Arab Democracy Barometer Wave III survey data 
was used to gauge comparability of self-reported voting by Islamist and non-Islamist 
                                                        
13 IFES election guide country profile for Iraq, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/104 
14 IFES election guide country profile for Libya, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/123 
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participants, using the same questions as used in Egypt to assess self-reported voting among 
Islamist and non-Islamist respondents. As shown in Figure 5.2, voting did not appear to vary 
between the two groups: 60 percent of both groups claimed to have voted in the transitional 
elections, whilst 39 percent of Islamists and 40 percent of non-Islamists reported that they 
did not vote.  
An examination of de jure and de facto inclusion in negotiations on an electoral system 
in each country shows that in some cases the expected relationship with support for the 
political system was confirmed, whilst in other cases it was not, shown in Table 5.9. In Tunisia 
the expectation that institution-building that contains both de jure and de facto inclusion will 
build support for elections was confirmed, suggesting that these two elements of inclusion 
may be jointly sufficient to create confidence in a political system. However, another way to 
interpret this finding is that either de jure or de facto inclusion may be alone sufficient. In 
Iraq, where negotiations on an electoral system involved only de jure inclusion and no de 
facto inclusion, the expected relationship between inclusion and support was not confirmed. 
This contradicts hypothesis three and suggests that de jure inclusion is not sufficient to build 
confidence in a political system. In Egypt and Libya, where there was no or low de jure 
inclusion alongside high or very high de facto inclusion, high support was present in each case, 
confirming the relationship expected by hypothesis four. The findings for all three hypotheses 
investigated in the chapter suggest that de jure inclusion is not sufficient to create confidence 
in a political system, whilst de facto inclusion may be sufficient. This finding will be further 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Table 5.9 Findings for hypotheses two, three, and four 
Hypothesis Country De jure 
inclusion 
De facto 
inclusion 
Expected 
support 
Observed 
support for 
elections 
Hypothesis 
supported 
H2 Tunisia 3 High  
x 
3 High  
x 
H2: Support 
y 
 
Very high 
4 
YES 
H3 Iraq 3 High  
x 
0 None  
- 
H1: Support  
y 
 
None 
0 
NO 
H4 Egypt 0 None  
- 
3 High  
x 
H3: Support 
y 
 
High 
3 
YES 
H4 Libya 1 Low  
- 
4 Very high  
x 
H3: Support 
y 
High 
3 
YES 
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104 5.4	 Conclusion	
Inclusion of communal groups in determining an electoral system is understudied but is 
expected to be important for building support amongst all groups for first transitional 
elections. As noted by Mansfield and Snyder (2005) elections that do not enjoy the confidence 
of all societal groups can raise the chances of civil violence and state breakdown. The Kenyan 
presidential election of 2017 demonstrated the risk of civil violence posed by low confidence 
in elections (Moore 2017). This chapter investigated whether involvement of communal 
groups in choosing an electoral system is important to build confidence in elections. The 
chapter found that whilst de jure inclusion was not sufficient to create support, de facto 
inclusion may be sufficient. This latter finding suggests that persistent consultation with all 
communal groups on choosing an electoral system and an opportunity for all groups to shape 
the electoral system chosen may be central to building confidence in elections during political 
transition.  
The findings hold implications for the literature on negotiations to determine an 
electoral system. As mentioned earlier, the literature on the process of designing electoral 
systems places key emphasis on preference aggregation under uncertainty (Benoit and 
Shiemann 2001, Luong 2002, Shvetsova 2003). This chapter suggests that the involvement of 
all societal groups in determining electoral design for transitional elections may be an 
important factor to create the foundations for broad political support, this is particularly 
important when elections are held early in a transition and before the process of constitution-
making has begun.  
 This chapter’s findings could be criticised on the grounds that confidence in elections 
is in fact determined by whether or not a group’s preferences for electoral system design are 
met, and not by involvement in decision-making. It is expected that each stakeholder will 
preference an electoral system that is expected to maximise their electoral gains (Boix 1999). 
However, evidence from the four cases analysed here refutes this criticism. Whilst in Iraq and 
Libya it is not possible to separate the fulfillment of groups’ preferences for electoral system 
design from confidence in elections, in Egypt and in Tunisia this is not the case. In Iraq, support 
for elections was not observed from one communal group, the Sunni-Arabs. The electoral 
system that was eventually chosen was expected to disadvantage this group in elections, so 
a lack of support cannot be separated from this group’s self-interest (as opposed to exclusion 
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from negotiations on the electoral system). Similarly, in Libya, support for elections was high 
following extensive negotiations that met the preferences of all key communal groups for 
electoral system design.  
In Egypt and Tunisia the claim that confidence in elections was only a reflection of 
preference satisfaction holds less well than in the other two countries. In Egypt, support for 
elections was high despite the fact that opposition groups did not achieve their first 
preference (a single-tier PR-list system). In Tunisia, there was high confidence in elections 
from all communal groups, despite the fact that the key Islamist party, Ennahda, was in fact 
disadvantaged by the choice of electoral system. They would have been advantaged by (and 
preferred) a majoritarian rather than a PR-list system (Carey, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). 
As noted by Stepan (2012a, 93) ‘had a Westminster-style “first-past-the-post” system of 
plurality elections in single-member districts been chosen, Ennahda would have swept almost 
nine of every 10 seats, instead of the slightly more than four in 10 it was able to win under 
PR’. And, indeed, during negotiations, Ennahda preferred a less proportional electoral system 
(Carey, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). As noted by Masmoudi (2016) ‘Ennahda realized that 
the law that was proposed would hurt it at the ballot box’. This supports the assertion that 
support for elections was not driven purely by satisfaction of each group’s preference of 
electoral system.  
 A second important institution-building event during political transition, besides 
electoral system design, is the process of determining a constitution that will underpin the 
new political system. In a contested state, constitution-making is often fraught with inter-
communal tension and building support for the new constitution can be central to ensuring a 
stable transition. The next chapter extends and deepens the investigation of the research 
question with an examination of the impact of de jure and de facto inclusion in constitution-
making on support for a new constitution. This is investigated in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia. Libya 
is not considered given that, whilst a Constitution Drafting Assembly did produce a draft 
constitution in mid-2017, as of writing, the constitution has not been ratified amidst political 
contention regarding the trajectory of Libya’s transition.  
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Chapter	Six		Negotiating	a	new	constitution		
 
The constitution-making processes in Egypt and Tunisia that began in 2011 and 2012, 
respectively, were classified at the outset as ‘highly representative and inclusive’ (Bali and 
Lerner 2016, 297). Yet, in Egypt, the referendum that approved the constitution in December 
2012 was ‘marred by low turnout… and bitter recrimination on all sides’ (M. Lynch 2012b) 
whilst the approval of the Tunisian constitution in January 2014 was accompanied by 
celebrations in the street, with one observer commenting: ‘It is the first time we have been 
so united since the revolution’ (Amara 2014). In Egypt, the impact of ‘constitutional debates 
over state-religion relations… was the deepening of religious divisions in the country’ (Bali 
and Lerner 2016, 255). Bowker asserted in 2013 (582) that ‘among the most significant 
consequences of the events of the past two years has been an almost irredeemable 
polarization within Egypt between Islamists… and those who eschew being identified in that 
manner’. Conversely, in Tunisia, a person directly involved in designing the constitution 
commented that ‘the conflicts we have gone through have enabled us to get to know and 
accept one another… I remember the mutual distrust that separated us at the beginning… the 
conflicts and the ensuing reconciliations brought us closer together’ (Mahjoub 2016, 4). What 
where the components that differentiated the way in which initially-inclusive deliberations 
transpired in Egypt, as opposed to in Tunisia?  
 In light of these contrasting cases, this chapter asks: what is the mechanism through 
which inclusion in constitution-making builds support for a new constitution? To address this 
question, the chapter examines the development of new constitutions in Egypt (2012), Iraq 
(2005), and Tunisia (2011-2014), that ended with approval of a new constitution in each 
country1 (Libya, as of 2018, has not approved a new constitution since the interim constitution 
of 2012).2 The next section situates constitution-making in each country against the 
background of the identified salient communal cleavage, and presents the hypotheses 
                                                        
1 See here for a chronology of new constitutions approved in each country: 
http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/chronology 
2 Libya is excluded from this analysis as it did not undergo constitution-making during political transition. Whilst 
in 2017 certain political groups in Libya did produce a draft constitution, as of writing this has not yet been 
ratified, for a detailed report see Toaldo (2017). 
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examined in the chapter. Section 6.2 provides evidence for the assessment of de jure and de 
facto inclusion in each case. This is followed in section 6.3 by a presentation of the findings 
for support for a new constitution in each country, and a discussion of whether this supports 
or contradicts expectations according to the hypotheses under examination. The final section 
discusses alternative explanations for the findings, and how this chapter’s findings build on 
those from Chapter 5.  
 6.1	 Background	and	hypotheses	
The purpose of a constitution is to ‘establish a system of government, [and] define the powers 
and functions of its institutions’ (Galligan and Versteeg 2013b, 6). A new constitution, as 
opposed to constitutional amendments, typically occurs at times of state formation or regime 
change and is a relatively rare event. Nevertheless, in the twentieth century a steady 
progression of constitutions was approved as having a written constitution became ‘standard 
practice across the nations of the world, with just a few exceptions’ (Galligan and Versteeg 
2013b, 6). Figure 6.1 shows the rise in new constitutions from the late seventeenth century 
to the early twenty-first century. Concentration in the 1900s suggests that written 
constitutions have ‘become a norm for new countries’ (Ginsburg 2015). Constitutions 
underpin regimes across the political spectrum, from closed, authoritarian regimes such as 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to liberal democratic regimes such as Canada or France. This is no 
different in the MENA region, where all states have a written constitution, despite a very small 
number of democratic regimes.3 This situates the constitution-making processes examined in 
this study as part of a broader trend of increased constitution-making across the globe. 
Understanding constitution-making in the countries examined may provide broader lessons 
and insights for other countries undergoing a similar process.  
Whilst devising a constitution can fulfil several functions (Galligan and Versteeg 
2013b), one key role is to express the ‘core and constitutive political commitments of the 
community’ (King 2013, 73). In all three countries examined in this chapter—Egypt, Iraq, and 
Tunisia—a core dispute amongst communal groups regarding the character of the state 
shaped the constitutional deliberations and underpinned the most contentious and 
intractable issues that arose. In Egypt and Tunisia, with an Islamist – non-Islamist cleavage, 
                                                        
3 See world constitutions and constitutions for each MENA state here: https://www.constituteproject.org 
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the status of religious law in the constitution was a central issue of debate (Bali and Lerner 
2016, 233). In Iraq, where ethno-sectarian groups are broadly concentrated in separate 
geographic areas, a key obstacle to any agreement, besides the status of religious law, was 
the distribution of central versus federal powers of governance (Diamond 2005, chap. 5). A 
key point of disagreement was Sunni-Arab objections to ‘the regional federalist model for Iraq 
and, in particular, the prospect of a southern, pre-dominantly Shia, federal region’ (Morrow 
2005, 8).    
 
Figure 6.1 Approval of new constitutions 1789-2006 
 
Source: Comparative constitutions project, data available at: http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org; see 
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2009). 
 
The involvement of all communal groups in constitutional deliberations is expected to 
build support for the new constitution. Such deliberation is expected to facilitate discussion 
of contentious issues in a way that incorporates all communal groups into the framework of 
the new political system. As noted by Widner (2005, 506) ‘process influences a sense of 
inclusion and trust (social capital). The tone of proceedings shapes whether political elites 
and ordinary citizens feel included or excluded, forward-thinking or vengeful’. Following a 
‘successful’ process ‘the people most able to cause violence accept the basic terms and are 
willing to process disagreements in constitutional ways’ (Widner 2008, 1515). This captures 
the view that participation of all groups enhances the legitimacy of a constitution.   
This chapter investigates whether inclusion in terms of selection of the constituent 
assembly, consultations on constitutional design, and in approval of the constitution builds 
confidence in a new constitution. The chapter tests whether inclusive deliberations need to 
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be sustained up until a constitution document is finalised, and all groups provided an 
opportunity to influence the final document, in order to build confidence in the new 
constitution. Two hypotheses are tested in this chapter that investigate whether a 
combination of de jure and de facto inclusion builds support, or whether de jure inclusion 
alone is sufficient, shown in Table 6.1. Constitution-making in Tunisia comprised both de jure 
and de facto inclusion, so hypothesis two is investigated in this case. In both Egypt and Iraq 
de jure inclusion was present in constitution-making without de facto, enabling an 
examination of hypothesis three. The final column in the table shows whether or not support 
for the new constitution is expected in each case, according to the hypothesis under 
examination. Hypotheses one and four are not examined in this chapter. 
 
Table 6.1 Hypotheses examined at the negotiations stage of constitution-making  
 De jure 
inclusion 
(independent 
variable) 
De facto 
inclusion 
(independent 
variable) 
Country where  
independent variables are 
observed 
Expected observation  
of support  
(dependent variable) 
H1 - - not examined in this chapter - 
H2 x x Tunisia y 
H3 x - Egypt, Iraq  y 
H4 - x not examined in this chapter y 	
The measurement of de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, and support for a 
constitution is reviewed in Table 6.2. The first two indicators of de jure inclusion concern the 
selection of the constituent body. The third and fourth indicators of de jure inclusion refer to 
inclusion in terms of public consultations on constitutional design, and approval of the 
constitution by referendum. De facto inclusion consists of two sets of indicators. The first set 
measures whether there was deliberation with representatives from all communal groups on 
constitution-making, and, if yes, whether it persisted up until a constitution document was 
determined. The second set of indicators concern whether all groups had a reasonable 
opportunity to influence the final constitution document, along both an elite and a mass 
public dimension.  
Behavioural support is measured according to the absence of violence on the day of 
promulgation of the constitution, or violence in the immediate period preceding approval 
that is directly inspired by the debate over the appropriate form of constitution for the 
country. Attitudinal support refers to perceived legitimacy and is measured by the absence of 
a high ‘no’ vote (above 50 percent) in a constitutional referendum or in a constituent body, 
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either overall or on behalf of one communal group. Constitutional support is defined as 
cooperation with political procedures and institutions. This is measured by the absence of 
political boycott and an absence of low turnout (33 percent or below) on approval of the 
constitution.  
 
Table 6.2 Operationalisation of variables 
De jure inclusion (IV) 
Index 0-4 
De facto inclusion (IV) 
Index 0-4 
Support for constitution (DV) 
Index 0-4 
Inclusion of communal 
groups in design body 
1. Nationally elected 
constituent body or 
nationally elected 
representatives tasked with 
appointing such a body  
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Public focus on inclusion 
of all key communal groups 
in composition of 
constituent body members 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
Inclusion in consultations on 
/ approval of institutional 
design 
1. Official channels of public 
consultation on constitution-
making (surveys, open 
forums, focus groups) 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Referendum to approve 
the constitution  
(Yes=1, No=0) 
Persistent inclusion of all communal 
groups in consultation  
1. Actual consultation with 
representatives of all key communal 
groups on constitution-making  
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Demonstrated evidence consultation 
with representatives of all key communal 
groups continued up until constitution 
document determined 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
All communal groups have an 
opportunity to impact the institutional 
design outcome 
1. Demonstrated evidence that 
representatives from all key communal 
groups impacted final constitution 
document (through official negotiations 
or unofficial channels such as political 
pressure) (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Demonstrated evidence mass public 
had opportunity to impact constitution 
document (through official consultations 
or unofficial channels such as public 
protest) (Yes=1, No=0) 
Behavioural 
1. Absence of violence and mass 
protest against new constitution 
in the lead-up to and on the day 
of referendum OR in the lead-up 
to and on the day of 
promulgation by constituent 
assembly (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
Attitudinal  
1. Absence of high NO vote for 
new constitution in referendum 
or constituent assembly overall 
or on behalf of one communal 
group (>50 percent) 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
Constitutional 
1. Absence of boycott of 
referendum OR of constituent 
assembly (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Absence of low turnout in 
constitutional referendum OR 
absence of abstentions on 
approval in constituent body 
(£33 percent) 
(Yes = 1, No = 0) 
 
Table 6.3 shows data used to measure the independent and dependent variables in 
this chapter. De jure and de facto inclusion were measured using interim constitutions 
declared in each country, as well as reports from independent bodies on constitution-making. 
Support for the new constitution was measured using independent reports; the IFES election 
guide, and public opinion surveys. The next section details the findings for whether there was 
de jure and de facto inclusion in the constitution-making process in the three examined 
countries.  
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Table 6.3 Data sources 
 De jure 
inclusion 
De facto 
inclusion 
Support for 
constitution 
Interim constitutions retrieved from International IDEA 
ConstitutionNet: http://www.constitutionnet.org 
 
Ö   
Reports from independent bodies on constitution-making (see 
Table 3.13 for details) 
 
Ö Ö Ö 
Public opinion surveys: PEW Global Attitudes and Trends 2013 
(see Appendix A for survey methodology) 
 
  Ö 
IFES election guide country profiles 
www.electionguide.org/countries 
  Ö 
Source: for more detail on data sources see Table 3.13 	6.2	 Inclusion	in	negotiating	a	new	constitution	
The process of designing a new constitution in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia was set up to be highly 
participatory. Involvement of all key political groups was considered important to produce a 
constitution that would enjoy widespread confidence from both elites and the broader 
populace. Therefore, each country placed explicit emphasis on deigning an inclusive 
framework for the constitution design process. Table 6.4 shows that there was high or very 
high de jure inclusion in each country. Each indicator is discussed in detail below.  
 
Table 6.4 De jure inclusion in constitution-making  
 
 
Indicator 1 
National elections 
select constituent 
body or its 
appointers 
Indicator 2 
Inclusion of key 
communal groups 
in constituent body  
Indicator 3 
Public 
consultation on 
constitution-
making 
Indicator 4 
Referendum 
to approve 
constitution 
Index (0-4) 
Egypt 1 1 1 1 4 Very high 
Iraq 1 1 1 1 4 Very high 
Tunisia 1 1 1 0 3 High 
 
The first indicator of de jure inclusion was observed in all three countries. Each country 
held national elections either to elect the members of the constituent assembly, or to elect 
actors that would appoint these members. In Egypt, article 60 of the interim constitution that 
provided the governing framework for the transition period (Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces 2011), stipulated that elected representatives would appoint a 100-member 
constituent body. This took place on 24 March 2012 (Bassiouni 2017, 91). In Iraq, article 60 of 
the Transitional Administrative Law, the interim constitution that was in effect in Iraq during 
the transition period, stated that: ‘the National Assembly shall write a draft of the permanent 
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constitution of Iraq’ (Coalition Provisional Authority 2004a). The Transitional National 
Assembly was elected in late January 2005, appointing a constitution design body from 
amongst its members (Democracy Reporting International 2011c, 6). In Tunisia, as per Rule 
103 of the Rules of Procedure that governed the transition period (National Constituent 
Assembly 2011), the elected Constituent National Assembly established a joint committee for 
coordination and drafting of a new constitution (National Democratic Institute 2011).  
The second indicator of de jure inclusion was also present in all three countries; in 
each country there was an intervention on behalf of an interim authority to ensure that 
members of all communal groups would be adequately represented in the constitution-
making body. In Egypt, the success of Islamist parties (mainly the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the salafist al-Nour party) in parliamentary elections meant that the 100-member constitution 
design body appointed following elections, over-represented Islamists. Subsequent protest 
from non-Islamists, prompted the SCAF to intervene and facilitate negotiations between 
Islamist and non-Islamist parties to reach agreement over the selection of a constituent body 
that would be representative of both groups. Agreement was reached in early June 2012, that 
the constituent body would be composed of 50 Islamist members and 50 non-Islamist 
members (Bassiouni 2017, 90–92; Serodio and Casper 2013, 35).   
In Iraq, the elected Transitional National Authority, responsible for appointing a 
constituent assembly from its members, deeply under-represented Sunni-Arabs, one of Iraq’s 
key communal groups. Indeed, the 55-member constituent body appointed in May 2005 had 
only one Sunni-Arab member (meaning less than two percent representation for a group that 
constitutes a little below 20 percent of Iraq’s population). Consequently, following US 
pressure, an additional 15 Sunni-Arab members were included in the constituent body on 16 
June 2005 (Al-Ali 2014, 84–102; Democracy Reporting International 2011c, 6). This change 
occurred about three weeks after the drafting process began, with two months of discussions 
still remaining. 
In Tunisia, all communal groups were represented in the constituent body that 
determined the constitution. The constitution design process began in the Constituent 
National Assembly, however the opposition accused the Islamist-led government of 
dominating the drafting process. Tensions ran high and by late July 2013 the process had 
completely broken down, stemming from increasing polarisation between an Islamist-led 
government and its secular opponents, accompanied by widespread public protest and two 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
113 
political assassinations (Kraetzschmar 2015). In early October 2013 a National Dialogue body 
was orchestrated by a coalition of civil society actors (called the Quartet) that intentionally 
included a balanced composition of Islamist and non-Islamist groups (Haugbolle et al. 2017).  
Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia all provided official channels for public consultation on the 
constitution, constituting the third indicator of de jure inclusion. In Egypt, the constituent 
assembly launched a website for the public to review the proposed constitutional drafts and 
express their preference by voting on specific articles online and providing suggestions 
(Maboudi and Nadi 2016, 716). More than 68,000 Egyptians participated in the online forum 
and provided over 650,000 online votes and suggestions (717). In Iraq, article 60 of Iraq’s 
Transitional Administrative Law stipulated that the body responsible for constitution-making 
‘shall carry out this responsibility in part by encouraging debate on the constitution through 
regular general public meetings in all parts of Iraq and through the media, and receiving 
proposals from the citizens of Iraq as it writes the constitution’ (Coalition Provisional 
Authority 2004a). In pursuit of this directive, an Outreach Unit was established in early June 
2005 to conduct a public survey on citizens’ constitution design preferences, collate the 
feedback, and report to the constituent body. Running efficiently by late July 2005, the 
Outreach Unit had received over 150,000 survey submissions from the public by mid-August 
2005 (Morrow 2005, 18–20).  
In Tunisia, in September 2012, a website was set up to allow Tunisian citizens to 
comment on the constitution design process. This was complimented by national public 
consultations on constitutional design took place from December 2012 to February 2013. 
These sessions were always attended by members of the constituent assembly, including a 
member of the drafting committee, so that citizen input could be noted. These public sessions 
were held in Tunisia’s 24 governorates and involved about 6,000 citizens over a 3-month 
period (The Carter Center 2014, 69–70). Civil society organisations also convened discussion 
sessions and workshops on constitutional design (prominently, the Center for the Study of 
Islam and Democracy) (Badawi 2016; Haugbolle et al. 2017; Masmoudi 2016; The Carter 
Center 2014).  
The fourth indicator of de jure inclusion, approval of the constitution by referendum, 
was present in Egypt and Iraq, but not in Tunisia. In Egypt, article 60 of the interim constitution 
stipulated that ‘the draft constitution will be presented within 15 days of its preparation to 
the people who will vote in a referendum on the matter. The constitution will take effect from 
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the date on which the people approve the referendum’ (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
2011). And, indeed, a national referendum was held to approve the constitution in December 
2012.4 In Iraq, the Transitional Administrative Law stipulated that: ‘the draft permanent 
constitution shall be presented to the Iraqi people for approval in a general referendum to be 
held no later than 15 October 2005’ (Coalition Provisional Authority 2004a). A national 
constitutional referendum was held in Iraq on that date (Al-Ali 2014, 90). However, in Tunisia, 
as specified in Article Three of Rule 95 of the interim law (National Constituent Assembly 
2011), the final constitutional draft was approved by the constituent body itself and was not 
put to a national referendum for approval (Haugbolle et al. 2017, 37–38).  
 Despite the overt focus on a participatory constitutional design process in each 
country, only in Tunisia was involvement of all groups sustained up until a final constitution 
draft was determined. Whilst constitution-making began in each country with a de jure 
inclusive process, only in Tunisia was high de facto inclusion also present, shown in Table 6.5. 
In Egypt and Iraq only one of four indicators of de facto inclusion was observed, resulting in 
an assessment of low de facto inclusion, meaning that de facto inclusion is assessed as not 
present. Each indicator is discussed in detail below.  
 
Table 6.5 De facto inclusion in constitution-making  
 
 
Indicator 1 
Consultation on 
constitution-making 
with representatives 
of all communal 
groups 
Indicator 2 
Consultation 
continued up 
until 
constitution 
determined 
Indicator 3 
Representatives of 
communal groups 
had opportunity to 
influence 
constitution 
Indicator 4 
Mass public 
had 
opportunity to 
influence 
constitution  
Index  
(0-4) 
Egypt 1 0 0 0 1 Low 
Iraq 1 0 0 0 1 Low 
Tunisia 1 1 1 0 3 High 
 
The first indicator of de facto inclusion, consultation on constitution-making with 
representatives of all key communal groups, was present in all three countries. In Egypt, the 
final constituent body responsible for determining the constitution began with 50/50 parity 
of Islamists to non-Islamists. Deliberation on the constitution commenced in this body 
amongst representatives from both key communal groups (Serodio and Casper 2013, 35). In 
Iraq, after the addition of 15 Sunni-Arab members to the constituent body, representatives 
                                                        
4 IFES election guide country profile for Egypt, available at: www.electionguide.org/elections/id/201 
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from all key communal groups engaged in deliberation on constitution-making. From 8 July 
2005, when these members joined the committee, to 15 August when deliberation ceased, 
there was discussion on constitution-making that included representatives from all 
communal groups (Ghai and Cottrell 2005; Morrow 2005).  Similarly, in Tunisia, the National 
Constituent Assembly that began negotiations on a constitution in 2011, and the National 
Dialogue body that was set up in September 2013 and deliberated on constitution-making 
from October, included representatives from all key communal groups (Haugbolle et al. 2017, 
33–38).  
 The second indicator of de facto inclusion was not observed in Egypt or Iraq, but was 
present in Tunisia. In Egypt, whilst there was parity between Islamists and non-Islamists in 
the constituent body that commenced negotiations on the constitution in mid-June 2012, by 
the time the final constitution draft was being drafted in mid-November 2012, the constituent 
body had reached a state of crisis and no longer represented non-Islamists (Brown 2012). 
Allegations of dominance and intransigence on behalf of Islamist members, led to the bulk of 
non-Islamist members withdrawing from or boycotting the constituent body (more than 30 
of the 50 non-Islamists-members of the 100-member constituent body withdrew or 
boycotted) (Serodio and Casper 2013, 43). Islamist members replaced withdrawn actors with 
substitute members, without attention to the 50/50 parity amongst Islamists and non-
Islamists that had been agreed upon. This left a constituent assembly composed of 84 percent 
Islamist-identified members to draft the final constitution document (44). This unbalanced 
constituent assembly pushed ahead with finalising the constitution, undertaking a marathon 
18-hour session on 29 November that ended with approval of a draft constitution that was 
put to referendum (Hussein 2012a).  
In Iraq, the addition of 15 Sunni-Arab members to the constituent body led to 
representatives of all key communal groups being present in deliberations, however this did 
not continue up until the final constitution was determined. In line with the tight timeline 
specified in the transitional law to approve a constitution and put it to a referendum, the 
constituent body’s activity was suspended on 15 August 2005. However, unofficial 
negotiations continued up until the final draft constitution was publicly made available at the 
end of August. These unofficial negotiations included US Embassy personnel, Shia political 
leaders, and Kurdish leaders, but excluded Sunni-Arab political actors. The unofficial 
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negotiations were the ones that determined the final constitution draft that was put to a 
referendum on 15 October 2005 (Al-Ali 2014, 84–102; Aldouri 2017; Morrow 2005).  
In Tunisia, in contrast, deliberation on the constitution continued amongst 
representatives from all key communal groups up until a final constitution was approved. 
Months of lengthy negotiations on the details of the constitution took place amongst Islamists 
and non-Islamists in the National Dialogue body. There was an emphasis on deliberation and 
consultation between representatives of both Islamist and non-Islamist groups to reach 
agreement on the most challenging issues (Mahjoub 2016; Fedke 2014, 17). Deliberation 
continued up until agreement was reached and a constitution was approved on 26 January 
2014, with 200 members in favour, 12 opposed, and four abstentions (Haugbolle et al. 2017, 
38).  
The third indicator of de facto inclusion, evidence that political representatives of all 
key communal groups had an opportunity to influence the final constitution document, was 
not observed in Egypt and Iraq, but was present in Tunisia. In Egypt, following the withdrawal 
or boycott of most non-Islamists members from the constituent body, Islamist members 
pushed ahead with drafting a constitution to be put to referendum. Non-Islamist political 
actors and civic groups were publicly distressed by their lack of involvement in constitution-
making and lack of capacity to impact the constitution document, and were deeply 
dissatisfied with the final constitution that was put to referendum (Albrecht 2013; Black 2012; 
Blair and Werr 2012; Hussein and Borger 2012; M. Lynch 2012c; Lyon and Elyan 2012). As a 
political observer commented: ‘As the Islamists dominated all elections in the transition, they 
translated this success into control over the constitutional writing process… non-Islamists, 
however, reject[ed] the final text as unrepresentative of Egyptian society in its entirety. 
Instead, they [saw] it as the victory of a narrow political interest’ (Serodio and Casper 2013, 
40).  
Similarly, in Iraq, one key communal group, Sunni-Arab Iraqis, did not have an 
opportunity to influence the final constitution document. This is demonstrated by the fact 
that Sunni-Arab actors were not involved in the final negotiations on the constitution 
document and their preferences were not reflected in the document (Carroll 2005; Istrabadi 
2009; Roberts 2005). Following suspension of the constituent body ‘many of the draft’s most 
important sections were completely overhauled, behind closed doors, by unrepresentative 
officials’ (Al-Ali 2014, 87). ‘After about a month, [Sunni-Arab drafters] were presented with a 
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document to which they had barely contributed, certainly its key provisions’ (Hiltermann 
2006, 39). As noted by a legal advisor involved in Iraqi reconstruction: ‘At the end of the day, 
when there was an impasse on the issue of federalism, the elected representatives who were 
Shias and Kurds, principally, indeed almost exclusively, simply shut the door and left the 
unelected representatives [Sunni-Arabs] out, and the end result was a deal between the Shia 
and the Kurds’ (Istrabadi 2015).  
 In Tunisia, on the other hand, both Islamists and non-Islamists had an opportunity to 
influence the final constitution draft, voting on each constitutional article and reaching 
consensus on the content of the constitution. The draft constitution was adjusted and 
amended during the final months of deliberation under the auspices of the National Dialogue 
process (Bockenforde 2015; Bousbih and Yaalaoui 2015; Gannouchi 2016), and heated debate 
took place between Islamist and non-Islamist members of the constituent body until 
consensus agreement could be reached (Fedke 2014, 17; Haugbolle et al. 2017; United 
Nations Development Program 2014).  
In none of the three countries was there demonstrated evidence that the mass public 
had an opportunity to influence the final constitution draft, meaning that the fourth indicator 
of de facto inclusion was not present. In Egypt, whilst there were official channels for public 
input, there is evidence that this did not influence the final constitution document. A 
statistical analysis of the constituent body’s sensitivity to the public input into the 
constitution, found that whilst the constituent assembly was sensitive to citizen input in the 
initial stages of the constitution design process, later in the process, when the final 
constitution document was actually determined, the constituent assembly became 
completely insensitive to public input (Maboudi and Nadi 2016). The final constitution 
document was negotiated and drafted in an intensive, protracted, closed session without 
consideration of public suggestions (Serodio and Casper 2013).  
In Iraq, whilst the Outreach Unit collated over 150,000 survey responses that reflected 
public preferences on constitution-making, there was insufficient time for this input to be 
reported to the constituent assembly and therefore there was no opportunity for it to 
influence constitution-making. The first report from the Outreach Unit to the constituent 
body was on 13 August, just two days before the constituent assembly officially suspended 
its activity on 15 August. And indeed, according to independent reports, public preferences 
collected and reported by the Outreach Unit on 13 August, did not shape the final constitution 
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draft that was put to referendum (Ghai and Cottrell 2005; Morrow 2005, 2–3, 18–20), as ‘no 
procedure existed to actually incorporate the opinions and viewpoints of the public in the 
deliberations and drafting of the constitution’ (Democracy Reporting International 2011c, 7).  
In Tunisia, whilst there were official channels for citizen input into constitutional 
design, these took place almost a year before a final constitution was approved. The National 
Dialogue body that was formed in October 2013, and reached agreement on constitutional 
design in January 2014, did not solicit or incorporate public input into constitution-making 
(Haugbolle et al. 2017). As noted by independent observers: ‘whilst Tunisia’s National 
Dialogue is generally heralded as a success, it is important to note that it… did not provide 
opportunities for public participation’ (Stigant and Murray 2015, 2) and ‘there was little 
opportunity for members of the general public or civil society organisations to give 
substantive input’ (Fedke 2014, 17).  
 6.3		 Support	for	the	constitution		
Where a new constitution enjoys widespread confidence, its promulgation can be expected 
to be accompanied by celebrations and expressions of national pride. The enthusiasm and 
extent of public and elite participation in the approval of a constitution is an indication of the 
constitution’s wider legitimacy. Alternatively, protest against a new constitution, political 
objections, and rejection at the ballot box, are all indicators that the new constitution lacks 
support of a country’s populace. Confidence in the new constitution diverged amongst Egypt, 
Iraq, and Tunisia, shown in Table 6.6. Very high confidence was observed in Tunisia, whist no 
support was observed in Egypt, and low support in Iraq. Each indicator is discussed in detail 
below.  
 
Table 6.6 Support for the constitution  
 Indicator 1  
Behavioural 
Absence of 
violence and 
mass protest  
Indicator 2 
Attitudinal  
Absence of 
high ‘no’ vote 
(>50 percent) 
Indicator 3 
Constitutional  
Absence of 
boycott 
Indicator 4 
Constitutional 
Absence of low turnout 
OR absence of abstentions 
(£33 percent) 
Index 
(0-4) 
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 None 
Iraq 0 0 0 1 1 Low 
Tunisia 1 1 1 1 4 Very high 
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Behavioural support for the new constitution was measured by the absence of 
violence and mass protest directed at the constitution and its ratification. This was not 
present in Egypt and Iraq, but was observed in Tunisia. In Egypt, violence and mass protest 
objecting to the new constitution marred the lead-up to the constitutional referendum that 
went ahead ‘despite persistent street clashes’ (The Economist 2012), taking place in an 
atmosphere of polarised tension (M. Lynch 2012c). Violence between Islamist and non-
Islamist groups in the three weeks preceding the referendum included at least seven dead 
and hundreds injured (Elgood 2012), as well as the burning of several party buildings 
belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice party, and violent clashes of rival 
factions in city streets (Hussein 2012b; Serodio and Casper 2013, 53). The constitution was 
adopted ‘amid intense political contestation and deep rifts between Islamists and liberal 
political forces’ (Albrecht 2013, 1).  
In Iraq, there were incidents of violence and mass protest objecting to the new 
constitution and the constitutional referendum. In the lead-up to the referendum, party 
offices were attacked and violence was threatened on referendum-day (Al Jazeera 2005a). In 
addition, there were large-scale civil protests by Sunni-Arab groups protesting the 
constitution and the referendum (Worth 2005). A senior military US official reported 19 
attacks on polling stations (United States Department of Defense 2005), and there were a 
number of violent incidents including a bombing, and shootings on the day of the referendum 
(Al Jazeera 2005b).  
In Tunisia, no incidents of violence and mass protest were observed in the lead-up to 
and on the day of approval of the constitution. During Tunisia’s political transition, mass 
protest was a frequent means of expressing public dissatisfaction with the transition process, 
so the absence of protest was striking; public and civil society groups appeared supportive of 
the constitution (United Nations Development Program 2014). At the signing of the 
constitution, celebrations took place on Tunisian streets (Amara 2014). A political observer in 
Tunis noted: ‘There was a sense of joy, pride and relief inside the assembly, when it became 
clear that the new constitution had been adopted with an overwhelming majority… Members 
of the public and the assembly gasped first, and then embraced each other, while they sang 
the national anthem’ (Kottoor 2014, 1). Public support for the constitution in Tunisia was 
confirmed by an International Republican Institute opinion poll conducted between 12 and 
22 February, just a few weeks after the constitution was approved. The poll found 62 percent 
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of respondents were ‘very satisfied’ or ‘somewhat satisfied’ with the constitution, and only 
10 percent ‘not very satisfied’ or ‘not satisfied at all’, with the remainder ‘unsure’ 
(International Republican Institute 2014).  
Attitudinal support, which is defined as the absence of a high ‘no’ vote either in a 
constitutional referendum or in a constituent body that approves the constitution, was not 
present in Egypt and Iraq, but was observed in Tunisia. A high ‘no’ vote is measured as a 
majority (above 50 percent) against the constitution, overall or on behalf of one key 
communal group. In Egypt, there was a solid majority in support in Egypt’s constitutional 
referendum, with 64 percent in favour and 36 percent opposed (IFES 2012). Whilst there is 
no official referendum data that disaggregates the votes according to Egypt’s key communal 
groups, public opinion survey data is used to gauge support for the constitution along 
communal lines. The PEW Global Attitudes and Trends Survey of 2013 assessed individual-
level perceptions of legitimacy of the new constitution using a nationally representative 
sample.  
In order to evaluate Islamist-aligned and non-Islamist-aligned respondents in Egypt 
using PEW 2013, a question was used5 that asked participants whether their own view is 
closer to the statement that laws should: ‘1. strictly follow the teachings of the Quran; 2. 
follow the values of Islam but not strictly follow the teachings of the Quran; 3. not be 
influenced by the teachings of the Quran?’ A respondent that chose the first option was 
assessed as Islamist, whilst respondents who chose option two or three were assessed as non-
Islamist. Perceived legitimacy of the constitution was assessed using a question6 that asked 
respondents whether they favour or oppose the constitution. A participant that answered 
‘favor’ was assessed as supportive of the constitution; whilst those that answered ‘oppose’ 
were assessed as not supportive. Figure 6.2 shows that whilst 62 percent of Islamists reported 
that they support the constitution, only 31 percent of non-Islamists claimed the same; 62 
percent of non-Islamists reported that they oppose the constitution, as opposed to 33 
percent of Islamists. Whilst this is not a direct measure of referendum voting it is evidence 
that there was an absence of perceived legitimacy amongst non-Islamists.  
                                                        
5 Question 37 
6 Question 126  
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The Iraqi constitution passed in the October referendum with an impressive super-
majority of 79 percent in favour and 21 percent opposed.7 However, if voting is disaggregated 
according to majority-Sunni-Arab, majority-Shia, and majority-Kurd governorates, Table 6.7 
shows that there was a high ‘no’ vote in majority-Sunni-Arab governorates. In fact, the ‘no’ 
vote was so high in these governorates that the constitution was close to being rejected on 
the basis of a super-majority ‘no’ in three governorates.8 The average ‘no’ vote in majority-
Sunni-Arab governorates was 71 percent, as compared to three percent in majority-Shia 
governorates, and two percent in majority-Kurd governorates.  
 
Figure 6.2 Egypt: support for constitution per communal group (percent respondents) 
 
Source: PEW Global Attitudes and Trends Survey 2013; see Appendix A for survey methodology; see text for 
full wording of questions used.  
 
In Tunisia, the constitution was approved by a super-majority in the ratifying body. In 
the constituent body tasked with approving the constitution, 92 percent of members voted 
in favour (200 out of 217 members), 12 were opposed (six percent), four abstained, and one 
member was absent (Haugbolle et al. 2017, 38). Given that the constituent body included 89 
Islamist members and an even larger number of non-Islamist members (see Appendix B), even 
if all 12 votes in opposition were from Islamists this would only constitute 13 percent of these 
members. Therefore, no communal group voted above 50 percent against the new 
constitution.   
                                                        
7 IFES election guide country profile for Iraq, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/104 
8 Article 60c of the Transitional Administrative Law states that: ‘The general referendum will be successful and 
the draft constitution ratified if a majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in three 
or more governorates do not reject it.’ Two majority Sunni-Arab-governorates rejected the constitution by a 
super-majority, but a third only by a simple majority. So, the constitution was approved.  
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The first indicator of constitutional support, absence of a boycott of the constitutional 
referendum or of the approval vote in a constituent body, was not observed in Egypt or Iraq, 
but was observed in Tunisia. In Egypt there were strong objections to the constitution on 
behalf of non-Islamist actors. Non-Islamist political parties and other political elites called for 
a boycott of the constitutional referendum (Elgood 2012; Hussein and Borger 2012; Lyon and 
Elyan 2012). According to a political analyst ‘large parts of the opposition boycotted’ (Brown 
2013, 49), with at least two prominent non-Islamist parties calling for a boycott, whilst others 
campaigned for a ‘no’ vote (Hill 2012, 38). In Iraq, there were calls from Sunni-Arab-led 
political parties to boycott the constitutional referendum held on 15 October 2005. Whilst a 
majority of Sunni-Arab parties urged a ‘no’ vote in the referendum rather than a boycott, 10 
days before the referendum Sunni-Arab political leaders called for a boycott (CNN 
international 2005), and Sunni-Arab actors declared that they would stay home to 
demonstrate disapproval (Achcar 2005; Beehner 2005).  
 
Table 6.7 Iraq: constitutional referendum outcome per communal group 
Governorate Yes No Majority-communal group 
Babil 95 5 Shia 
Basrah 96 4 Shia 
Karbala 97 3 Shia 
Misan 98 2 Shia 
Muthanna 99 1 Shia 
Najaf 96 4 Shia 
Qadissiya 97 3 Shia 
Theqar 97 3 Shia 
Wasit 96 4 Shia 
Average 97 3  
Anbar 3 97 Sunni 
Diyala 51 49 Sunni 
Ninewa 45 55 Sunni 
Salahaddin 18 82 Sunni 
Average 29 71  
Dohuk 99 1 Kurd 
Erbil 99 1 Kurd 
Suleimaniya 99 1 Kurd 
Taamin 96 4 Kurd 
Average 98 2  
*Baghdad has a mixed population and is not designated to any majority-communal group, the ‘yes’ vote in 
Baghdad was 78 percent, to a 22 percent ‘no’ vote.  
Source: Al Jazeera (2005b) 
 
In Tunisia, on the other hand, there were no calls from political parties involved to 
boycott the National Dialogue process that was responsible for determining constitution-
making. Twenty-three political parties agreed to join the National Dialogue body, including 
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Islamist and non-Islamist actors, and remained consistently engaged in deliberations up until 
a constitution was approved in the constituent assembly in late January 2014 without 
withdrawals or boycotts. Only one of the 217 members was absent from the vote to approve 
the constitution, constituting less than one percent of members (Haugbolle et al. 2017).  
 The second indicator of constitutional support was not observed in Egypt, but was 
present in Iraq and in Tunisia. In Egypt turnout for the constitutional referendum was low at 
33 percent.9 In Iraq, however, turnout was high overall at 65 percent.10 Similarly, when 
average turnout is calculated for majority-Shia governorates (63 percent), majority-Sunni-
Arab governorates (59 percent), and majority-Kurd governorates (79 percent), it is shown to 
be high across communal groups, seen in Table 6.8. In Tunisia, there were only four 
abstentions from the final approval of the constitution document, out of a 217 member body 
(Haugbolle et al. 2017, 33–36; The Carter Center 2014, 43; United Nations Development 
Program 2014). Less than two percent of members abstained, so abstentions were very low.  
 
Table 6.8 Iraq: constitutional referendum turnout per communal group 
Governorate Turnout Majority-communal group 
Babil 73 Shia 
Basrah 63 Shia 
Karbala 60 Shia 
Misan 59 Shia 
Muthanna 54 Shia 
Najaf 57 Shia 
Qadissiya 90 Shia 
Theqar 57 Shia 
Wasit 54 Shia 
Average 63  
Anbar 38 Sunni 
Diyala 67 Sunni 
Ninewa 57 Sunni 
Salahaddin 75 Sunni 
Average 59  
Dohuk 85 Kurd 
Erbil 95 Kurd 
Suleimaniya 78 Kurd 
Taamin 58 Kurd 
Average 79  
*Baghdad has a mixed population and is not designated to any majority-communal group, turnout in Baghdad 
was 55 percent 
Source: Fisher (2005) 
 
                                                        
9 IFES election guide Egypt country profile, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/65 
10 IFES election guide Iraq country profile, available at: http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/104 
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Returning to the central research question, evidence from constitution-making In 
Egypt, Iraq and Tunisia examined in this chapter suggests that, despite a focus on involvement 
of all groups in selection of the constituent body, official consultations, and approval of a 
constitution, de jure inclusion is not sufficient to build confidence in a new constitution. Table 
6.9 shows the findings for the two hypotheses that were tested in this chapter. In Tunisia, 
there was both de jure and de facto inclusion and the expected relationship was observed: 
confidence was created for the new constitution. However, in Egypt and Iraq where the 
constitution design process began with high participation, but did not involve persistent 
involvement up until a constitution was determined, confidence in the new constitution was 
lacking. This suggests that de jure inclusion is not a sufficient mechanism to build support for 
a new political system, whilst de facto inclusion may be a sufficient mechanism.  
 
Table 6.9 Findings for hypotheses two and three 
Hypothesis Country De jure 
inclusion 
De facto 
inclusion 
Expected 
support 
Observed 
support for 
constitution 
Hypothesis 
supported 
H2 Tunisia 3 High  
x 
3 High  
x 
H2: Support 
y 
 
High 
3 
YES 
H3 Egypt 4 Very high 
x 
1 Very low  
- 
H4: Support 
y 
 
None 
0 
NO 
H3 Iraq 4 Very high  
x 
1 Very low 
- 
H4: Support 
y 
None 
0 
NO 
 
This section investigated whether support for a new constitution was present upon 
promulgation of the constitution in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia. It was found that strong support 
was only garnered in Tunisia, whilst the constitutional design processes in Egypt and Iraq 
failed to ‘convert the spoilers’ (Widner 2008, 1515). This is somewhat surprising given that all 
three countries began with an inclusive framework for constitution-making. However, the 
separation of de jure and de facto inclusion provides a possible answer to this puzzle. An 
investigation of the two hypotheses tested in this chapter show that only in Tunisia, where 
inclusion was sustained up until a final constitution draft was decided upon, was confidence 
created in the constitution.  			
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125 6.4	 Conclusion		
A highly participatory constitution design process is considered important to create 
confidence in a new constitution. Such participation is typically considered in terms of the 
selection of the constituent body, consultations on the constitution, and an inclusive 
mechanism of constitutional approval. However, this chapter suggests that sustained and 
persistent inclusion of all groups up until a final constitution is determined may be a key 
element to achieve the objective of a constitution with high perceived legitimacy. This 
suggests that, rather than inclusion being unimportant, a focus on participatory and 
representative frameworks does not go far enough in terms of tracking the inclusion of 
communal groups throughout the duration of constitution-making up until a constitution 
document is approved.   
A criticism that could be levelled against this chapter’s findings is that Tunisia, where 
de facto inclusion was present and support was created, was simply better disposed than 
Egypt and Iraq to build support for the new constitution. This argument would suggest that 
in Tunisia the communal cleavage is simply less salient than in Egypt or Iraq and therefore 
Tunisia was more likely from the outset to build confidence in the new constitution. It is 
certainly true that in Egypt, as opposed to Tunisia, there was a strong Salafi presence in the 
legislative assembly that appointed the constituent assembly, requiring the Muslim 
Brotherhood to navigate between this more conservative cohort, and secular-liberal 
members (Project on Middle East Political Science 2013). In addition, Islamist-leaning parties 
in Egypt won a super-majority of seats in the elections that preceded constitution-making, 
whereas in Tunisia Islamist candidates won a plurality of seats, compelling Islamists to form a 
coalition government with non-Islamist-aligned parties.11 In Iraq, Shia-aligned parties won a 
super-majority of seats in the elections preceding constitution-making, and ethno-sectarian 
tensions were rapidly deteriorating in 2005, when constitution-making took place 
(Hiltermann 2006).  
 However, notwithstanding these differences, inter-communal relations in Tunisia did 
reach an advanced stage of escalating tension and seeming intractability during constitution-
making. Journalists and leading non-Islamists interviewed in Tunisia in March 2011 (Stepan 
2012a, 95) were ‘extremely frightened by the prospect of free elections and the expected 
                                                        
11 See Appendix B for full breakdown of seats 
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appeal of Islamists’. The transition reached complete breakdown by August 2013 fueled by 
Islamist – non-Islamist tensions, and Tunisia appeared to face a real prospect of a descent 
into violent conflict and civil war (Amara 2013; Bali and Lerner 2016, 278; Beaumont 2013; 
Guellali 2013; Lefevre 2015). As observed by a member of a political party: ‘there was 
complete political deadlock and the country was heading into the unknown’ (Mahjoub 2016, 
4).  
Despite these concerns, however, in Tunisia, actors engaged directly with one another 
during this tense period, up until the constitution document was determined. As deputy 
speaker of parliament, Islamist-aligned Meherzia Labidi, commented: ‘legally, yes, we could 
have pushed through the constitution at the time, but what are we going to choose? Are we 
going to cling to our electoral legitimacy and say “we have two thirds of the parliament, we 
will push through the constitution” or are we going to enter this dialogue, not only to save 
the voting of the constitution, but to save the process in general’ (Haugbolle et al. 2017, 30). 
This direct engagement contributed to de facto inclusion in Tunisia.  
Contrast this with Egypt, where, following non-Islamists members’ withdrawal from 
the constituent assembly, Islamists pushed ahead with hastily approving a constitution 
document to put to referendum. The Islamist secretary-general of the constituent body 
commented on withdrawals of non-Islamists members, saying that these members were 
‘doing something completely against democracy: they wanted to impose their opinion as a 
minority’ (Serodio 2013, 51). When confronted with inter-communal discord, this lack of 
direct engagement amongst key communal groups in Egypt meant that de facto inclusion was 
not present and the constitution lacked support from non-Islamists.   
In Iraq, differences between communal groups were not as irreconcilable as they 
appeared to many observers. Morrow (2005, 11) notes in Iraq that extending the constitution-
making process would likely have succeeded to create support from all groups and that 
‘several indicators suggest that Sunni Arab positions had not hardened against federalism, 
and were not as intractable as some have suggested’. However, when difficult issues arose 
amongst communal groups, instead of persisting with direct engagement ‘discussion of the 
knottiest issues was moved from the committee to an informal grouping of political party 
leaders, who tended to gather at party headquarters or leaders’ homes, often without inviting 
Sunni Arab drafters. For all practical purposes, therefore, the latter were re-excluded from 
the drafting process’ (Hiltermann 2006, 39).   
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
127 
A second criticism that could be directed at the findings is that support for the 
constitution can be attributed to whether or not the constitution document reflected the 
preferences of a specific communal group and not to involvement in constitution-making. 
Inclusion in negotiations on institutional design is likely to increase a group’s chance to 
influence the institutional outcome, so the two are not entirely distinct. However the 
outcome arrived at in Tunisia, the only case where support was created for the new 
constitution, supports the assertion that it was de facto inclusion, rather than just the 
reflection of preferences in the constitution document, that created support for the 
constitution.  
In Egypt and in Iraq exclusion of a group’s preferences from the constitution document 
existed concurrent to their exclusion from constitution-making, so the two cannot be 
separated. However, in Tunisia, both Islamists and non-Islamists compromised on their 
preferred option in terms of the constitution document. The final constitutional provisions 
were based less on Islam than Islamists would have liked, and yet more on Islam than 
preferred by non-Islamists (Bockenforde 2015; Kuhn 2015; Mahjoub 2016; Stepan 2012a; 
United Nations Development Program 2014). Following extended and persistent debate on 
the constitution, both groups supported it, reinforcing the assertion that de facto inclusion 
was the mechanism that created confidence in the constitution. 
This chapter has extended and reinforced the findings from Chapter 5 that, at the 
negotiations stage of electoral system design, de jure inclusion in institutional design is not a 
sufficient mechanism to create confidence in elections, whilst de facto inclusion may be 
sufficient. This chapter’s findings support this assertion. In Egypt and Iraq, where de jure 
inclusion was present without de facto, the constitution lacked support. Constitution-making 
in the only case where there was confidence from all groups in the constitution, Tunisia, 
involved de facto inclusion. Chapter 7 investigates inclusion in first transitional elections, and 
support for the elected assembly.  
    
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
Chapter	Seven		Holding	transitional	elections	
 
In Iraq, the first post-2003 elections were held in January 2005. The UNEAD team tasked with 
developing options for electoral system design had at its disposal the accumulated electoral 
expertise of international non-government bodies such as International IDEA and IFES, 
electoral experts, and the UN’s electoral division itself. A UN communique stressed the 
importance of inclusivity, stating that ‘it is crucial for the legitimacy and success of the 
constitutional exercise that the national assembly represents a broad and diverse cross-
section of Iraqi society as possible. The electoral process must therefore seek to gain the 
greatest inclusiveness and transparency as possible’ (United Nations 2004a). 
Despite the clear intention to facilitate a representative political assembly, the 
electoral outcome was an overwhelming victory for Shia-aligned and Kurd-aligned parties, to 
the exclusion of Sunni-Arab candidates (Hiltermann 2006, 38). Rather than provide a turning 
point in building widespread support for Iraq’s new political system, the elections 
consolidated a pattern of sectarian violence (Thurber 2011, 3). Despite extensive knowledge 
of electoral system design, why did the Iraqi electoral system fail to fulfil the expectation that 
it would facilitate an inclusive political assembly and create confidence in the elected body?  
 To address this question, this chapter investigates the importance of de jure inclusion 
and de facto inclusion in transitional legislative elections in building support for the elected 
assembly. Transitional elections in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia are examined.1 The next section 
discusses the background to first transitional elections in each country and the hypotheses 
that are examined. Section 7.2 outlines de jure and de facto inclusion in the implementation 
of elections in each country. Section 7.3 presents the findings for support for the elected 
assembly, and whether this confirms or rejects the hypotheses that are tested. The final 
section discusses how the findings build on those from previous chapters, and the 
                                                        
1 Libya is not examined at the implementation stage of electoral system design given that the key communal 
cleavage in Libya is regional, and the regional distribution of seats in the elected assembly was pre-determined 
as part of negotiations on electoral system design. This renders meaningless an assessment of the de facto 
inclusion of political actors from the three key regions in the distribution of seats in the political arena. 
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implications for the mechanism through which inclusion builds confidence in a political 
system.  
  7.1	 Background	and	hypotheses		
Before examining the first transitional elections in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia, it is informative to 
briefly survey the context in which they took place. Elections were held in each of the three 
countries following the removal of a long-term authoritarian leader, under the auspices of a 
transition to a regime that would guarantee political and civil freedom. Founding elections 
held during a period of political transition are typically events that involve not only high 
tension but also great enthusiasm from the populace for the opportunity to freely elect 
political representatives, often for the first time (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004). Since the 
1970s, electoral politics became common across the MENA region, but elections typically took 
place in the context of a repressive political environment with a predictable incumbent victory 
(Koehler and Warkotsch 2014, 10-11; Lust-Okar 2009; Posusney 2002). The transitional 
legislative elections that took place in each country examined in this study constituted the 
first time since the declaration of an independent republic that free and fair elections were 
held under conditions where there was real uncertainty regarding the electoral outcome. As 
Brown (2014, 4) puts it, ‘In the first parliamentary elections in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, the 
electoral performance of some parties surprised even their leaders’.  
 In Egypt, the elections presented to multiple stakeholders both an opportunity and 
the possibility of great political risk (International Crisis Group 2012). The intention of first 
elections in Egypt was to select a legislative assembly that would appoint a constituent body. 
Therefore, Islamist groups, non-Islamist groups, and the SCAF themselves were watching the 
elections closely and with great interest in, and concern for, the outcome. While Egyptians 
were proud that their nation was determining its own destiny, mutual suspicion amongst 
communal groups characterised the context in which elections took place (M. Lynch 2011).  
In Iraq, whilst the CPA officially ceded control over Iraq in 2004, US military forces 
were still embedded in Iraq at the time of the first elections in January 2005, with no clear 
withdrawal plan in place. These elections in Iraq represented a major step toward the transfer 
of power from the occupying US force to elected representatives, and the withdrawal of US 
troops. The prominent Shia actor, Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani, had argued for free elections to 
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transfer power to Iraqis (Diamond 2005). The Kurds were also keen for elections to be held. 
Sunni-Arabs, on the other hand, were resistant to elections, feeling marginalised and 
discriminated against (Hiltermann 2006). Their objections to the electoral system had not 
been heeded (see Chapter 5), and they were unsure of what the political trajectory in Iraq 
would mean for Iraq’s Sunni population.   
Tunisia was not only the country in which the Arab Uprisings began, but was also the 
first of these countries to hold national elections (Stepan 2012a). The catch-cry of the 
revolution—‘bread, justice, freedom’—was present in people’s minds, and the elections 
seemed to herald the fulfilment of the last of these demands. Whilst in Tunisia the elections 
marked a break with the past, they also represented continuity in terms of existing societal 
tensions and communal cleavages. As noted in political analysis: ‘The elections pitted Islamist 
Ennahda Party against a number of non-religious parties and the question of Ennahda’s 
position on political democracy and social questions such as women’s rights structured the 
debate’ (Koehler and Warkotsch 2014, 20).  
Placed in the context of the raised expectations and political uncertainty that often 
characterise transitional elections, the management and execution of elections is of high 
importance. Holding national elections is a massive logistical task and requires competent 
management. ‘The administration of elections during a transition from an authoritarian… 
regime is fraught with challenges’ (International IDEA 2012, 1). An electoral management 
body is typically tasked with overseeing the procedures of ensuring voter rolls are accurate 
and up-to-date, setting up and manning electoral booths, transporting votes, and vote 
tallying. Public trust in the result of an election can be contingent on perceptions of the 
competency and independence of the electoral authority in transporting and counting votes 
after they have been cast (Boyko and Herron 2015; Elklit and Reynolds 2002). In each one of 
the countries examined here, an independent electoral management body oversaw first 
transitional elections and was assessed as competent and impartial by an independent 
monitoring body.2  
 This chapter examines de jure inclusion and de facto inclusion in the holding of 
transitional legislative elections, as well as confidence in the elected assembly. Three 
                                                        
2 For an assessment of Iraq see IMIE (2005), regarding Tunisia see National Democratic Institute (2011), and 
concerning Egypt and Libya see The Carter Center (2012b) and (2013), respectively. 
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hypotheses are examined based on variation in the independent variable in Egypt, Iraq, and 
Tunisia. These hypotheses are shown in Table 7.1. In Egypt, where neither de jure nor de facto 
inclusion were present in the implementation of elections, hypothesis one is examined. In 
Tunisia both de jure and de facto inclusion were present, enabling an investigation of 
hypothesis two. Lastly, In Iraq, de jure inclusion was present without de facto inclusion; 
accordingly, hypothesis three is examined. 
 
Table 7.1 Hypotheses examined at the implementation stage of electoral system design 
 De jure inclusion 
(independent 
variable) 
De facto inclusion 
(independent 
variable) 
Country where  
independent variables are 
observed 
Expected observation  
of support  
(dependent variable) 
H1 - - Egypt - 
H2 x x Tunisia y 
H3 x - Iraq y 
H4 x - Not examined in this chapter y 
Source: see text for a detailed discussion of sources   
 
The operationalisation of de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, and support for the 
elected assembly is reviewed in Table 7.2. In implementing an electoral system, de jure 
inclusion refers primarily to the choice of electoral system, whilst de facto inclusion refers to 
the representation of all communal groups in the elected arena. The two indicators of de jure 
inclusion are, first, whether inclusion was a stated objective in the choice of electoral system 
and, second, whether a proportional formula was chosen (with average district magnitude of 
three or above and a legal electoral threshold of three percent or below). The first indicator 
of de facto inclusion is the accuracy of correspondence between the proportion of seats won 
by political actors from each communal group, and the proportion of that group in the 
broader population. The second indicator of de facto inclusion is the absence of one 
communal group winning a supermajority of seats in the legislative assembly. Political 
support is operationalised according to two indicators that capture behavioural and 
attitudinal support. The first indicator is an absence of political violence and other anti-system 
activity to undermine the assembly in the three months post-elections. The second indicator 
is an absence of low support for the elected assembly. Unlike the indices used at the 
negotiations stage of institutional design, the index for each variable in this chapter is based 
on two indicators and ranges from zero to two, with zero indicating an absence of inclusion 
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or support, one indicating medium, and two indicating high inclusion, or support for the 
elected assembly.  
 
Table 7.2 Operationalisation of variables 
De jure inclusion  
Index 0-2 
De facto inclusion  
Index 0-2 
Support for elected assembly  
Index 0-2 
1. Stated objective of inclusion 
in choice of electoral system 
design (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Proportional electoral 
formula: with av. district 
magnitude ³3 and electoral 
threshold £3% (Yes = 1, no =0) 
 
 
1. Seat-share of communal 
groups is proportional to 
population-share 
(discrepancy £15 percent) 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
 
2. Absence of one communal 
group winning a 
supermajority (> 66 percent) 
of seats 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
Behavioural  
1. Absence of anti-system behaviour such 
as political violence, mass protest, and 
other activity to undermine the elected 
assembly within three months post-
election (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
Attitudinal 
1. Absence of low support (£33 percent) 
for elected assembly overall or on behalf 
of one communal group (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
Table 7.3 shows the sources of data that were used to measure the independent and 
dependent variables. De jure and de facto inclusion were measured using communique from 
the interim authority or electoral system design body; election reports from independent 
bodies; and information on electoral system design was taken from electoral commission 
websites (where available) and from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Parline database on 
elected assemblies. Behavioural and attitudinal support were measured using reports from 
independent bodies, and public opinion survey data. In Egypt and Tunisia, surveys conducted  
 
Table 7.3 Data sources 
 De jure 
inclusion 
De facto 
inclusion 
Support for 
elected 
assembly 
Communique from transitional authority or body tasked with 
electoral system design  
 
Ö   
Reports from independent election monitoring / political analysis 
bodies 
Ö Ö Ö 
 
Egypt and Tunisia: Public opinion survey PEW Survey of Global 
Attitudes and Trends 2012 (see Appendix A for survey methodology); 
Iraq: Report from the Independent Republican Institute (IRI)  
 
   
  Ö 
IPU Parline parliamentary database 
http://archive.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp 
Ö Ö Ö 
Source: for more detail on data sources see Table 3.13 
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between three and six months after first transitional elections were used to capture 
respondents’ support for the elected assembly. In Iraq, none of the three survey instruments 
used in the study (Arab Democracy Barometer, PEW Global Attitudes and Trends, and World 
Values Survey and) conducted a survey between the first and second transitional elections in 
January and December 2005, respectively. Instead, a poll conducted by an independent 
survey body, the International Republican Institute, is used to measure overall approval for 
the direction of the transition in Iraq, approximately one month after the assembly was 
elected.  
   7.2	 Inclusion	in	first	transitional	elections		 	
In both Iraq and Tunisia a highly inclusive electoral system was used in legislative transitional 
elections, that was expected to facilitate the representation of all communal groups in the 
elected assembly. In Egypt, however, whilst the electoral system included a proportional tier 
of seats, the non-proportional tier was expected to distort the accurate representation of 
communal groups in the parliament. Table 7.4 shows that in Iraq and Tunisia there was high 
de jure inclusion, whilst in Egypt there was none. Each indicator is discussed in detail below.  
 
Table 7.4 De jure inclusion at implementation stage of elections  
 
 
Indicator 1 
Focus on inclusive electoral 
system design 
Indicator 2 
Proportional formula with 
av. district magnitude ³3 and 
legal electoral threshold £ 3% 
Index (0-2) 
Egypt 0 0 0 None 
Iraq 1 1 2 High 
Tunisia 1 1 2 High 
 
In Egypt there was no explicit focus from the SCAF on inclusion in the choice of 
electoral system. The SCAF themselves preferred the electoral system used under the 
previous regime (Hassan 2013; International Crisis Group 2012) that was not expected to 
produce an inclusive outcome (Reynolds 2011; Tavana 2012, 6). On the contrary, political 
observers (and apparently SCAF actors as well) (International Crisis Group 2012, 4, 17; 
Reynolds 2015) anticipated that the previously-used electoral system would 
disproportionately benefit actors from the ancien regime (Faris 2012, 149; Masoud 2014, 
130). Following public pressure, the SCAF did increase the proportion of seats elected in a PR-
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list tier, however, inclusion was not an explicit rationale for the choice of electoral system 
design (International Crisis Group 2012).  
In Iraq, the UNEAD team responsible for electoral system design emphasised inclusion 
as a key reason for the choice of a proportional electoral system (Hooker 2005; Perelli 2004), 
stating that ‘the electoral process must seek to gain the greatest inclusiveness and 
transparency as possible – offering the widest opportunity for Iraqis to participate as voters 
and candidates’ and that ‘the PR system [chosen] is most effective in gaining inclusive 
representation for a range of groups’ (United Nations 2004a). In effect, then, inclusion was a 
clear criterion for the choice of electoral system.   
 In Tunisia, inclusion was emphasised as a basis for the choice of a PR-list electoral 
system in multi-member districts. As recorded by Alfred Stepan (2012a, 93) based on an 
interview with Ben Achour, chairman of the body responsible for electoral system design, 
‘The Commission agreed that the electoral system would be one of pure proportional 
representation. This decision was correctly understood to have crucial antimajoritarian, 
democracy-facilitating, and coalition-encouraging implications’. Political analysts similarly 
suggest that inclusion was an explicit focus in Tunisia. As Reynolds (2015) puts it, ‘I think the 
designers went for a system that they felt would maximise inclusion… they thought that 
inclusion was the first priority of the electoral system as a part of the broader new framework 
of the state’. 
The second indicator of de jure inclusion, use of a proportional electoral formula, was 
not present in Egypt, but was observed in Iraq and Tunisia. Key features of electoral system 
design in each country are shown in Table 7.5. Egypt used a mixed-member-majoritarian 
system (Hassan 2013); whilst this included a tier of seats elected using a proportional electoral 
formula, the disproportionality of the majoritarian tier was not compensated for, so this type 
of system was expected to distort the translation of votes into seats and over-represent large 
parties, and is not considered proportional.  
Iraq, on the other hand, used a single-tier, proportional, closed-list system. Tunisia 
also used a proportional electoral formula, with a closed PR-list system in multi-member 
districts. In Iraq, the election was conducted in one nation-wide district, so district magnitude 
was the entirety of seats elected to the assembly, that is, 275 seats (Coalition Provisional 
Authority 2004b). In Tunisia, the average district magnitude was between six and seven seats. 
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Neither Iraq (United Nations 2004a) nor Tunisia (Carey 2013) imposed a legal electoral 
threshold which the parties were required to meet to secure representation.  
 
Table 7.5 Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia: electoral system design for first transitional elections  
 Egypt Iraq Tunisia 
Assembly title 
 
The People’s Assembly Transitional National 
Assembly 
 
Tunisian 
Constituent 
Assembly 
Date of election 28 Nov 2011 –  
11 Jan 2012 
 
30 Jan 2005 23 Oct 2011 
No. of seats 
 
508 275 217 
Electoral formula  
 
Mixed-Member-Parallel 
332 seats: PR-list 
166 seats: Two-round-system 
10 seats: SCAF appointed 
 
Proportional 
PR-list  
Proportional 
PR-list  
District magnitude Proportional tier: 4-12 
Majoritarian tier: 2 
275 Domestic: 4-10 
Out-of-county: 1-5 
Average: 6-7 
 
Legal electoral 
threshold 
 
0.5% for proportional tier None None 
Ballot structure Categorical 
Closed-list / non-preferential 
 
Categorical 
Closed-list 
Categorical 
Closed-list 
PR list formula Hare quota - largest remainder 
 
Hare quota - largest 
remainder 
 
Hare quota - largest 
remainder 
No. of districts PR list tier: 46 
2RS tier: 83 
 
1 27 in Tunisia 
6 out-of-country 
Quotas / reserved 
seats 
10 seats appointed by SCAF 
1 woman on each party list 
8 seats for minority 
groups 
25% for women 
Zipped lists 
(m/f/m/f) 
 
Sources: information on electoral system design taken from electoral commission websites where available 
(www.elections.eg; Iraq: www.ihec.iq; Tunisia: www.isie.tn) and from IPU Parline database on parliamentary 
electoral systems, available at: archive.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp 
 
Whilst both Iraq and Tunisia chose electoral systems that were expected to facilitate 
the accurate representation of all communal groups in the elected assembly, the countries 
varied in terms of how accurately the distribution of seats amongst candidates reflected the 
population proportion of each group in the broader populace. In Iraq, despite a highly 
inclusive electoral system, Sunni-Arabs were under-represented in the legislative assembly. 
In Tunisia, on the other hand, Islamist and non-Islamist groups were accurately represented 
in the constituent legislative assembly. In Egypt, the electoral outcome in terms of the 
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distribution of seats amongst Islamist and non-Islamist candidates did not accurately reflect 
the proportion of these groups in the population. Islamists were over-represented, whilst 
non-Islamists were under-represented. Table 7.6 shows that both indicators of de facto 
inclusion were observed in Tunisia, whilst neither one was present in Egypt or in Iraq. All 
indicators are discussed in detail below.  
 
Table 7.6 De facto inclusion in electoral outcome  
 
 
Indicator 1 
Seat-share of key communal groups 
proportional to population-share 
Indicator 2 
Absence of supermajority win 
for one key communal group 
Index  
(0-2) 
Egypt 0 0 0 None 
Iraq 0 0 0 None 
Tunisia 1 1 2 High 
 
The first indicator of de facto inclusion, the accurate representation of key communal 
groups in the distribution of seats in the elected assembly, was not observed in Egypt or Iraq. 
Table 7.7 shows the percent of over- and under-representation of the key communal groups 
in each country. This is the difference (expressed as a percentage) between the share of seats 
in the elected assembly won by political parties aligned with a particular communal group, 
and that communal group’s proportion of the population.3 In Egypt, Islamists were over-
represented by 33 percent in the seat-share won by Islamist-aligned political actors in the 
elected assembly, whilst non-Islamists were under-represented by 50 percent. The mean of 
over- and under-representation of communal groups in Egypt was 42 percent and is assessed 
as a lack of de facto inclusion.4    
In Iraq, the Shia-Arab population was over-represented by 10 percent in the elected 
assembly, and the Kurdish communal group by 56 percent, whilst Sunni-Arabs were under-
represented by 35 percent in the proportion of seats won by Sunni-Arab-aligned parties. The 
mean of over- and under-representation was, therefore, 34 percent,5 which constitutes a lack 
of de facto inclusion. In Tunisia, by contrast, there was a low discrepancy between the 
population proportion of each key communal group and their seat share in the elected 
                                                        
3 See Appendix B for details of the assessment of each party’s alignment with a communal group and the 
distribution of seats in the elected assembly in each country. 
4 The lack of accurate representation of key communal groups was also confirmed by political observers, see for 
example The Carter Center (2012b); International Crisis Group (2012); Masoud (2014); and Tavana (2012). 
5 The lack of accurate representation of Sunni-Arabs in Iraq was confirmed by political analysts and election 
observers, see for example Al-Ali (2014, 389–90); Hiltermann (2006); Istrabadi (2015); and Mozaffar (2006). 
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assembly. Islamists were over-represented by 11 percent, and non-Islamists were under-
represented by the same proportion, constituting a mean discrepancy from accurate 
representation of 11 percent.6  
 
Table 7.7 Representation of communal groups in elected assembly  
 Communal group Population 
proportion (%) 
Seat proportion 
(%) 
Discrepancy (%) 
Egypt Islamist 54 72 Over-represented: 33 
 Non-Islamist 46 23 Under-represented: 50 
Mean over- and under-representation of communal groups (%) 42 
 
Iraq Shia-Arab 61 67 Over-represented: 10  
 Kurds 18 28 Over-represented: 56 
 Sunni-Arab 17 6 Under-represented: 35 
Mean over- and under-representation of communal groups (%) 34 
 
Tunisia Islamist 37 41 Over-represented 11  
 Non-Islamist 63 56 Under-represented: 11  
Mean over- and under-representation of communal groups (%) 11 
Source: See Appendix B for sources and detailed description of allocation of political parties per communal 
group 
 
The second indicator of de facto inclusion is the absence of one communal group 
wining a supermajority of seats (above 66 percent) in the elected assembly. In Egypt and Iraq, 
as shown in Table 7.7, one key communal group did win a super-majority of seats. In Egypt, 
Islamist-aligned political representatives won 72 percent of seats in the elected assembly. In 
Iraq, parties aligned with the Shia-Arab communal group won 67 percent of the seats. 
Conversely, in Tunisia, no communal group won a supermajority of seats. Islamist-aligned 
parties won 41 percent of seats, whilst non-Islamist-aligned parties won 56 percent. 
Therefore, no one group won a supermajority of seats. And indeed, in Tunisia, a coalition 
government was formed with the largest Islamist party, Ennahda, and two other non-Islamist 
parties (Al Jazeera 2011a).  
 7.3	 Support	for	the	elected	assembly		
Transitional, legislative elections in Iraq and Egypt divided the country and exacerbated 
tensions along communal lines, whilst in Tunisia, despite mutual suspicion between Islamist 
and non-Islamist groups, there was a willingness in the population to support the elected 
                                                        
6 The accurate representation of communal groups in Tunisia’s elected assembly was confirmed by additional 
research, see, for example Carey (2013); and National Democratic Institute (2011). 
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assembly as they attempted to address the many challenges ahead. In Iraq, first transitional 
elections were described by a political observer as the ‘last clear chance’ (Istrabadi 2015) to 
prevent Iraq’s descent into civil war. However, violence only worsened following the 
elections, and support for the elected assembly in majority-Sunni-Arab governorates was low. 
In Egypt, the elections sharpened distrust in the elected assembly, with perceptions of 
legitimacy low for many non-Islamist groups. In Tunisia, by contrast, whilst there was tension 
between Islamist and non-Islamist groups, this tension was mostly successfully navigated in 
the immediate aftermath of transitional elections, and the populace was largely willing to 
wait and see how the assembly would deal with the multitude challenges of the transition 
period beginning with formation of a government. Table 7.8 shows each country’s score on 
the index of support for the elected assembly. In both Egypt and Iraq, neither indicator was 
present. In Tunisia, however, there was confidence in the elected assembly at this stage. Each 
indicator is discussed in detail below.  
 
Table 7.8 Support for the elected assembly  
 Indicator 1  
Behavioural 
Absence of violence, protest, anti-
system action to undermine elected 
assembly (three months post-elections) 
Indicator 2  
Attitudinal 
Absence of low support for elected 
assembly overall or on behalf of one 
communal group (£33 percent) 
Index  
(0-2) 
Egypt 0 0 0 None 
Iraq 0 0 0 None 
Tunisia 1 1 2 High 
 
Behavioural support for the electoral system is operationalised as an absence of 
political violence, mass protest, or other anti-system activity to undermine the elected 
assembly in the three months post-elections. In Egypt, following elections in which Islamist 
groups won a clear victory, mass protest continued with hundreds injured (Knell 2012). As 
noted by a political observer after the election results were announced: ‘The elected 
Parliament and the… protests in Tahrir [Square] represent two different claims to legitimacy 
in post-Mubarak Egypt. Many activists dismiss the elections as a sham and continue to claim 
revolutionary legitimacy’ (M. Lynch 2012a, 1).  Anti-system activity was also demonstrated in 
Egypt by support amongst some non-Islamists for the dissolution of the elected assembly a 
little over four months after the election (Kirkpatrick 2012a). As noted by Hamid (2012, 25) 
‘many [non-Islamists] welcomed the dissolution of Egypt’s first democratically elected 
parliament, call[ing] on the military to intervene and “safeguard” the civil state’. Similarly, in 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
139 
Iraq, following the election of the political assembly in January 2005, anti-system activity and 
violence, in particular on behalf of Sunni insurgent groups, increased (Al-Ali 2014, 114-115). 
Rather than undergoing a reduction in severity, ‘it was not until 2005 that violence took on a 
decidedly sectarian pattern’ (Thurber 2011, 3).  
In Tunisia, by contrast, in the immediate months following the October 2011 election, 
violent anti-system activity was not observed. A political commentator noted a month after 
the election an atmosphere of ‘jubilation’ and that Tunisians were ‘immensely proud of last 
month’s elections’ (Marks 2011, 1). In Tunisia, despite caution and inter-group suspicion, 
there was no evidence of anti-system sentiment directed towards the elected assembly on 
behalf of political actors in the immediate post-election period. The first task of the assembly 
was to form government, which was accomplished, and the government ‘devised a broadly 
agreed-upon set of rules for its own activities pending presidential and national assembly 
elections’ (Murphy 2013, 231). Whilst political tension persisted throughout the transition, 
and public protest in Tunisia increased in late 2012 and the first half of 2013, largely due to 
frustration with the constitution-making process, anti-system behaviour was not present in 
the months immediately following elections.  
Attitudinal support for the elected assembly was not observed in Egypt or Iraq, but 
was observed in Tunisia. Figure 7.1 shows self-reported support for the respective elected 
assemblies in Egypt and in Tunisia, disaggregated for each communal group and measured 
using the 2012 PEW Global Attitudes and Trends survey. Islamist and non-Islamist 
respondents are measured using the same operationalisation as outlined in Chapter 6 for the 
PEW 2013 survey.7 To measure support for the elected assembly, a question8 was used that 
asks participants to assess the influence of the legislative assembly on a four-point scale. A 
response of very good and somewhat good was coded as support. As shown in Figure 7.1, in 
Egypt support for the People’s Assembly was 69 percent amongst Islamist respondents, and 
only 32 percent amongst non-Islamist respondents. In Tunisia, however, self-reported 
support for the National Constituent Assembly was 45 percent for non-Islamist respondents 
and 47 percent for Islamist respondents. Given that low support is assessed as 33 percent or 
below, non-Islamist confidence in Egypt is evaluated as low.  
                                                        
7 Whilst the relevant question used has exactly the same wording and same choice of responses in both survey 
waves, in PEW 2012 it is question number 39 and in PEW 2013 it is question 37 
8 Question 36 
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Figure 7.1 Egypt and Tunisia: support for elected assembly per communal group (percent respondents) 
 
Source: PEW Global Attitudes and Trends 2012; see Appendix A for survey methodology; see text for questions 
used.  
 
Given a lack of survey data for Iraq from the three survey instruments used in the 
study, attitudinal support is measured using a poll conducted by the International Republican 
Institute a month after the election, between 27 February and 5 March 20059 (International 
Republican Institute 2005). Attitudinal support is assessed with a question that asked 
respondents whether they felt the country was going in ‘the right direction’. Whilst 71 percent 
of respondents from Shia-majority regions and 59 percent of respondents from Kurdish-
majority regions answered that the country was going in the ‘right direction’, a little below 33 
percent of respondents in Sunni-majority areas responded the same (8). The latter constitutes 
low support on behalf of a key communal group.  
The findings for support for the elected assembly in Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia provide 
support for hypothesis one and hypothesis two, but do not support hypothesis three (Table 
7.9). In Egypt, neither de jure nor de facto inclusion was observed. As expected, support for 
the elected assembly was also absent. Whilst this hypothesis does not show that inclusion is 
necessary to build support, it demonstrates that this assertion is not refuted. In Tunisia both 
de jure inclusion and de facto inclusion were observed; congruent with the expectation of 
hypothesis two, support for the elected assembly was observed. In Iraq, however, where de 
jure inclusion was observed without de facto, support for the elected assembly was not 
                                                        
9 The poll was based on 1,967 face-to-face interviews using a nationally representative sample of Iraqis from 
across key communal groups, see International Republican Institute (2005, 2). 
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observed.  This corroborates the finding in Chapters 5 and 6 that de jure inclusion is not 
sufficient to build support for a political system, whilst reinforcing the finding that de facto 
inclusion may be sufficient.  
 
Table 7.9 Findings for hypotheses one, two, and three  
Hypothesis Country De jure 
inclusion 
De facto 
inclusion 
Expected 
support 
Observed 
support for 
elected 
assembly  
Hypothesis 
supported 
H1 Egypt 0 None  
- 
0 None  
- 
H1: No support 
– 
 
None 
0 
YES 
H2 Tunisia 2 High  
x 
2 High  
x 
H2: Support 
y 
 
High 
2 
YES 
H3 Iraq 2 High  
x 
0 None  
- 
H3: Support 
y 
None 
0 
NO 	7.4		 Conclusion		
A comparison of Iraq and Tunisia shows that both countries chose de jure inclusive electoral 
systems for transitional legislative elections, based on the reasoning that representation of 
all groups was of paramount importance at this stage of the political transition. However, only 
in Tunisia were communal groups roughly proportionally represented in the elected 
assembly. In Iraq, political violence increased following transitional elections, whilst in Tunisia 
the period immediately following the election of the assembly was characterised by cautious 
optimism. This suggests that choosing a proportional electoral system is not sufficient to 
create confidence in the elected assembly; Tunisia shows de facto inclusion to be an 
important and possibly sufficient condition to create support for the elected assembly.   
Scholars of electoral systems do not deny the importance of an inclusive electoral 
system producing a representative outcome; this is, after all, its key objective. However, 
large-N studies tend to focus only on the choice of electoral system as the independent 
variable (see, for example Elkins and Sides [2007]; Ishiyama [2000]; Norris [2002]; and 
Saideman et al. [2002]) without examining whether or not a representative outcome was 
achieved. As discussed in Chapter 2, these studies so not provide clear empirical evidence to 
support the assertion that inclusion creates confidence in a political system (see Table 2.1). 
This study suggests that a lack of attention to whether or not a representative outcome was 
in fact produced by an inclusive electoral system, may account for the uneven findings in 
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large-N studies regarding the relationship between inclusive electoral design and confidence 
in a political system.  
A closer examination of the cases studied in this chapter reveals that, unsurprisingly, 
the mechanism through which a proportional electoral system failed to produce a de facto 
inclusive electoral outcome was voter turnout. In Iraq, low turnout in majority-Sunni-Arab 
governorates confounded a representative outcome despite proportional translation of votes 
into seats (Hiltermann 2006). The importance of turnout has been discussed extensively in 
the context of political transitions in post-communist countries (see, for example, Bohrer, 
Pacek, and Radcliff [2000]). Kostadinova (2003) finds that high electoral turnout in post-
communist countries was highest in founding elections, and in elections that used a 
proportional electoral system. Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker (2009) find that a ‘high-stakes’ 
election, that is, an election where ‘there is more at stake’ (475), will foster high turnout. 
However, in Iraq, despite the presence of these identified factors, average turnout in 
majority-Sunni-Arab governorates was very low at 21 percent.  
Chapter 5 claimed that, in Iraq, low turnout in majority Sunni-Arab-regions was a 
reflection of a lack of confidence in elections on behalf of this communal group. Low turnout 
was underpinned by calls for a boycott from Sunni-Arab parties, and protest from Sunni-Arabs 
to electoral timing and the chosen electoral system. Chapter 5 asserted that a lack of 
persistent involvement of Sunni-Arab groups in the process of choosing an electoral system 
for transitional elections, compounded low confidence in elections. This underscores the 
importance of consistent inclusion of all communal groups from the outset of political 
transition, before institutional frameworks are implemented, in order to possibly avoid such 
detrimental outcomes from a lack of support in the new political system.  
Chapter 8, the conclusion, presents the study’s key theoretical contribution and policy 
implications. The seemingly contradictory findings in the literature outlined in Chapter 2, are 
re-examined in light of this study’s key finding. Implications for policy architecture during 
political transitions is discussed, as well as implications for transitions in the MENA region.  
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Chapter	Eight		Conclusion	
 
This thesis began by presenting the challenge of rebuilding a contested state in Iraq following 
the US-led invasion of 2003. I asked under what conditions a contested state can be rebuilt 
with stable institutions that enjoy widespread support from all communal groups. Carina 
Perelli, a UNEAD officer responsible for determining electoral system options in Iraq in 2004, 
declared that ‘At the end of the day, if the citizens do not believe in this process, no matter 
how many technical experts you throw into a process, the process is going to fail’ (Perelli 
2004). And yet, long-running insurgency violence in Iraq post-2003 suggested that political 
confidence was lacking. Diamond (2004, 34) claims that ‘as a result of a long chain of US 
miscalculations, the coalition occupation… left Iraq in far worse shape than it need have and… 
diminished the long-term prospects of democracy there… What went wrong?’  
This study suggests that the CPA’s focus in Iraq on inclusion only in terms of 
institutional frameworks and public consultation, without attention to the persistent 
involvement of all communal groups in institution-building throughout the transition, failed 
to create commitment from all groups to the emerging regime. In Iraq, a highly inclusive 
electoral system was chosen for first transitional elections: PR-list in a single national district. 
The subsequent process of designing a constitution began with an inclusive deliberative body 
and official channels for public input. The stated US objective in Iraq was to create a political 
system that would be inclusive of all of Iraq’s key societal groups. However, the means to 
achieve this goal were at times highly non-inclusive, leaving certain groups out of negotiations 
and making decisions on institutional frameworks despite resistance from key groups. This 
study’s findings suggest that if inclusion is a stated objective, but is not sustained in the way 
that institution-building is carried out, the desired objective of creating stable institutions that 
enjoy widespread confidence from all groups will not be achieved.  
 The next section outlines the study’s key theoretical contribution to current scholarly 
understanding of how inclusive institutional design creates political support. In light of the 
study’s contribution, the contradictory findings in the literature, discussed in Chapter 2, are 
re-examined. Section 8.2 presents two key policy implications from the study for designing 
institutional architecture during a political transition, in order to facilitate de facto inclusion. 
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The final section discusses the study’s implications for political transitions in the MENA region, 
in particular in states with an Islamist – non-Islamist communal cleavage. 	8.1		 Theoretical	contribution	
This study’s key theoretical contribution is to further our understanding of the mechanism 
through which the inclusion of societal groups in institutional design creates support for a 
political system. I argue that a conceptual distinction between de jure inclusion and de facto 
inclusion is key to comprehend this mechanism. Four hypotheses were advanced to test this 
theoretical. The hypotheses were examined in institution-building during political transitions 
in four countries in the MENA region: Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia. The study’s findings 
suggest that de jure inclusion is not sufficient to create political confidence, whilst de facto 
inclusion may be sufficient. 
Table 8.1 summarises the findings for the four hypotheses. Hypothesis one predicted 
that where neither de jure nor de facto inclusion are present, support will also not be 
forthcoming. As expected, this hypothesis was supported. Hypothesis two predicted that 
institution-building that involves both de jure and de facto inclusion, will create political 
support. This hypothesis captured an implicit assumption of the institutional design literature, 
that a combination of both de jure and de facto inclusion is sufficient to build support for the 
political system (Norris 2002, 210). The hypothesis was examined in three institutional design 
moments and was supported in each one, confirming the expectation from the literature. 
However, this finding does not enable a distinction to be made between the separate impact 
of de jure and de facto inclusion.  
 Hypothesis three contended that institutional design that has de jure inclusion, 
without de facto inclusion, will create support for the political system. Whilst the electoral 
system design and constitution-making literature do not explicitly state this expectation, it is 
implicit in studies that examine the impact of de jure inclusion on support for a political 
system, without examining de facto inclusion (see, for example, Widner [2005]). Alonso and 
Ruiz-Rufino (2007, 240) observe that, in the context of electoral system design, some scholars 
‘assume that proportional systems are synonymous of higher levels of parliamentary 
representation’, without verifying whether or not this is the case. However, the hypothesis 
that de jure inclusion alone creates support was refuted in the four institutional design 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
145 
moments in which it was examined. In every case where de jure inclusion was present without 
de facto inclusion, support for the political system was not observed.  
Hypothesis four captured the expectation that de facto inclusion is sufficient to build 
political support. This hypothesis predicted that where institution-building involves de facto 
inclusion, and de jure inclusion is not present, there will be confidence in the political system. 
This hypothesis was confirmed in the two institutional design moments in which it was 
examined.  
Taken together, the findings for hypotheses two, three, and four suggest that de jure 
inclusion is not sufficient to build support for a political system, whilst de facto inclusion may 
be sufficient. This means that designing institutional frameworks that proscribe inclusion is 
not sufficient to create confidence in a political system. However, persistent and on-going 
inclusion throughout the implementation of institutional procedures may be of key 
importance to build such confidence. The reason for this may be because persistent 
engagement itself creates allegiance to the political system and alleviates distrust from 
citizens and political actors towards the new political frameworks, it could also be because 
consistent inclusion is more likely to ensure equitable distribution of political power and 
resources. Ultimately, the findings suggest that if involvement of communal groups is not 
present step-by-step throughout the transition period, inclusive frameworks will not have the 
desired impact on building political support. This is the study’s key theoretical contribution.  
 
Table 8.1 Summary of findings for hypotheses 1-4 
 De jure 
inclusion  
De facto 
inclusion  
Number of 
observations to 
test hypothesis 
Expected 
observation  
of support  
Hypothesis 
supported 
(# obs.) 
Hypothesis 
not supported  
(# obs.) 
H1 - - 1 - 1 0 
H2 x x 3 y 3 0 
H3 x - 4 y 0 4 
H4 - x 2 y 2 0 
 
A criticism that could be levelled at the research is that it examines two different types 
of institution-building events (electoral system design and constitution-making) that are not 
strictly comparable. There are two responses to this criticism. First, comparable indicators of 
de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, and support for the political regime were measured for 
each type of institution. Second, findings were consistent across institution-building events. 
In each empirical chapter, support was only observed where de facto inclusion was present 
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(regardless of institution or institutional stage) and support was never observed where de 
jure inclusion alone was present without de facto inclusion.  
 A second possible criticism concerns the four countries’ structural attributes, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. A distinction was made in that chapter between Iraq and Libya, on the 
one hand, both of which possess significant natural resources, and where the political 
transition was precipitated by foreign intervention; and Egypt and Tunisia, on the other, 
where the political transition occurred due to civil protest, and neither country has significant 
natural resources. A most-similar-systems research design requires selecting a pool of cases 
with maximum similarity in terms of structural conditions; on these grounds a criticism could 
be brought that these two pairs of cases are not comparable to each other. If either of the 
structural factors that differ between the pairs of cases hindered or furthered the building of 
support for the new political system, this could mean that inclusion is a spurious variable. 
Foreign military intervention, for example, to the extent that it is perceived unfavorably by 
the population could negatively impact support for the political system. In addition, 
significant natural resources are often accompanied by weak political institutions at the 
outset of transition and an underdeveloped political – civil culture that could have 
contributed to a lack of confidence in the new political system.   
 However, the structural factors of natural resource wealth and foreign intervention 
do not appear to have been primary determinants of support for the political system in the 
relevant countries. In Libya, despite these factors, support for elections was observed when 
de facto inclusion was present. In Iraq, despite undeniable negative sentiment towards 
occupying US forces, at the outset of the transition there was widespread enthusiasm across 
communal groups to participate in new political institutions and create a new political order. 
As noted by a political expert involved in Iraq post-2003, there was a hunger amongst Iraqis 
to ‘chart their political future and to elect their leaders’ and ‘the yearning for a genuine rule 
of law’ (Diamond 2005, 128). This thesis contends that the lack of support for the political 
system in Iraq on behalf of Sunni-Arab Iraqis was not inevitable, but was rather created during 
the institution-building process by a lack of consistent de facto inclusion of Sunni-Arab actors. 
In Egypt, a country that does not possess significant natural resources and that did not 
undergo foreign intervention, confidence in the political system was created when there was 
de facto inclusion. However, when institutional design did not involve de facto inclusion, 
support was not observed. This suggests that it was not these structural factors, but rather 
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de facto inclusion, that led to confidence in the political system at some stages of Egypt’s 
transition, and not at others.    
The study’s key theoretical contribution sheds new light on the seemingly contradictory 
findings in the existing literature, discussed in Chapter 2 and reviewed in Table 8.2.  The 
finding that de jure inclusion is not sufficient to build support explains why several studies 
listed in the first row of Table 8.2 do not find a relationship between inclusion and support. 
At the same time, this finding suggests that the causal factor in studies that do find a 
relationship between de jure inclusion and support may in fact be de facto inclusion (not 
measured in these studies). Returning to the two prominent large-N studies on the impact of 
inclusive electoral system design (Norris 2002) and inclusive constitution-making (Widner 
2005) on political support, discussed in Chapter 2, the findings of the present study suggest 
that a lack of attention to de facto inclusion in these studies may account for the unclear 
findings regarding the impact of inclusion on creating confidence in a political system.  
 
Table 8.2 Re-examining inconclusive evidence  
 Inclusion Support for political system: 
relationship found  
Support for political system: 
no clear relationship 
Row 1 De jure inclusion  Banducci, Donovan, and Karp (1999) 
Ishiyama (2000)  
Saideman et al. (2002) 
Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) 
 
Aucoin and Brandt (2010) 
Cottrell and Ghai (2007) 
Elkins and Sides (2007) 
Norris (2002) 
Ruiz-Rufino (2013) 
Widner (2005) 
 
Row 2 De facto inclusion Ruiz-Rufino (2013) Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino (2007)  
 
Row 3 De jure and de 
facto inclusion  
Bogaards (2013) 
Carlson (2010) 
Ebrahim and Miller (2010) 
Wallis (2014) 
Moehler (2008)  
 
 
Ruiz-Rufino’s (2013) study (in the second row) is congruent with this study’s 
theoretical contribution, finding that de facto inclusion of minority groups in the political 
arena correlates to support for the political regime. An earlier study by Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 
(2007) appears at first to contradict the finding that de facto inclusion may be sufficient to 
build support. However, a close examination of this study reveals that this is not the case. The 
study in fact argues that parliamentary representation (de facto inclusion) does effect support 
for the political system, but only under certain circumstances. First, the study finds that the 
representation of minority ethnic groups is a less effective mechanism to build support when 
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groups have a violent, secessionist agenda. It could be that in such cases the territory of the 
state is simply an indivisible good, or that de facto inclusion in negotiations on institutional 
design is a necessary precondition to building support for the political system before elections 
take place. Second, the study finds that ‘the ameliorative effect of parliamentary 
representation over conflict is stronger in those legislatures where the ethnic group has 
effective influence over decision making’ (256). This latter finding is in fact an assertion that 
inclusion in terms of representation in a legislature needs to consider political efficacy of 
minority ethnic players, that is, de facto inclusion needs to be taken into account to a greater 
extent. Rather than suggest that de facto inclusion is unimportant, this study argues that 
greater attention should be paid to the degree to which de facto inclusion is present in 
legislative activities.  
The studies in the third row that find a relationship between both de jure and de facto 
inclusion, and support for a political system, are in accordance with this study’s key 
theoretical contribution. Contrastingly, Moehler’s (2008) research appears to contradict the 
current study’s key finding. Moehler examines both de jure and de facto participation in 
constitution-making in Uganda. She compares support for the constitution on behalf of 
citizens that participated in constitution-making consultations with those that did not. She 
does not find a significant difference in the extent of political support between these two 
groups. However, Moehler does find that overall ‘participation appears to have indirectly 
enhanced constitutional support by helping citizens to form opinions about the constitution 
(most of which were positive)’ (3). Moehler also finds that support for democracy overall, (a 
measure of support for the political system), was strengthened. So, Moehler’s study does not 
present a direct contradiction to the current study’s key theoretical contribution.     
The study’s theoretical contribution also speaks to key debates in the electoral system 
design and constitution-making literatures regarding the place of inclusion in building political 
confidence. The electoral system design literature is divided between scholars who advocate 
for widespread participation and representation of all communal groups during a political 
transition (Lijphart 2004; Norris 2009; Reynolds 1995) and scholars that support incentivising 
political actors to hold moderate, centrist positions that have broad appeal (Horowitz 2004; 
Reilly 2001). The findings from this study suggest that, far from being unimportant, the 
inclusion of communal groups has at times been treated in too superficial a manner, and that 
in fact de facto inclusion of communal groups during political transition, starting with 
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decisions to determine an electoral system, may be a key factor in building support for a new 
political system.  
In the constitution-making literature, there is a key division between those who 
advocate highly participatory constitution-making involving widespread consultation with 
political actors and civil society groups (Miller 2010b; Widner 2008), and those that contend 
that an elite-led process will produce a more coherent constitution incorporating guarantees 
of civil and political freedoms (Landau 2013). The findings presented here suggest, first, that 
inclusion needs to follow both a mass public and an elite dimension. Citizen participation, 
such as occurred in Kenya between 2000 and 2005 needs to be accompanied by consistent 
involvement of political actors in order to build confidence in the constitution from all groups. 
A second implication for this literature is that consultations or inclusive frameworks that are 
not accompanied by persistent engagement with all groups that continue until a constitution 
is determined, as well as a real opportunity for all groups to influence the final document, are 
unlikely to build support from all groups for the new constitution.  
As noted in the introductory chapter, the generalisability of the findings from this 
study are constrained by the small-N research design; further verification of the validity of 
the findings would require testing in a large number of cases that span different regions of 
the world. A key challenge to examining de facto inclusion in a large number of cases, is a 
logistical one. A likely reason that de facto inclusion is almost never examined in large-N 
studies, is that it requires a qualitative investigation of each case. Determining whether 
involvement of all key societal groups persisted throughout a process of institutional design, 
and whether all groups had an opportunity to shape the institutional outcome, necessitates 
qualitative research. This exercise is necessarily more time-consuming than examining 
whether, for example, a proportional electoral system was used for transitional elections, a 
constitution design body was selected in a national election, or a referendum was held to 
approve a constitution.  
This study highlights the value of creating a database of cases that includes data on 
both de facto and de jure inclusion in institution-building. One method to create this database 
would be to carry out an expert survey of country specialists on the existence of de jure and 
de facto inclusion in determining electoral system design and/or a constitution document 
during political transitions. A large database could therefore be created which would allow 
for a wider examination of the impact of de jure and de facto inclusion on support for an 
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emerging regime. The use of area experts could also enable a clearer articulation of the 
components of de facto inclusion that constitute the mechanism through which inclusion 
creates support during a political transition. Whilst Widner has compiled the most 
comprehensive database on constitution-making to date1 it does not contain direct measures 
of de facto inclusion.   
It also bears noting that, whilst during a period of political transition it is possible to 
differentiate between de jure and de facto inclusion and assess their separate relationship to 
political support, over the longer term both de jure and de facto inclusion would likely be 
mutually reinforcing if political support is consolidated. De jure inclusion without de facto 
inclusion is unlikely to create perceived legitimacy for a political system, as it will appear non-
substantive. On the other hand, where de facto inclusion exists over a prolonged period of 
governance, this is likely to lead to the institutionalisation of inclusive practices in de jure 
inclusive frameworks. Where this does not take place, reliance on only de facto inclusion, 
without de jure, may erode over time if not institutionalised. 	8.2		 Policy	implications	for	institution-building		
A central factor when addressing policy implications from this research, is understanding the 
conditions that facilitate the presence of de facto inclusion. The key research finding 
highlights the importance of de facto inclusion to build political support, so an important 
question that arises from this for policy and practice during political transitions is: which 
factors contribute to or ensure that de facto inclusion will be present? This section addresses 
this question by extracting the central distinction between Tunisia, where de facto inclusion 
was consistently present, and other countries where this was not the case. The factors 
discussed below provide indications for practitioners and policy-makers of central factors that 
may contribute to facilitating de facto inclusion. If de facto inclusion, as found in this study, is 
important to create political support, then the factors below may form a useful framework 
for the architects of political transition aiming to build such support. However, it would be 
valuable to undertake a more thorough investigation of this question in future research.  
Two key policy implications emerge from the study regarding designing transitional 
architecture to facilitate de facto inclusion. Whilst there was de facto inclusion in negotiations 
                                                        
1 See http://pcwcr.princeton.edu 
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on electoral system design in three out of the four countries covered here, Tunisia was the 
only country in which sustained de facto inclusion was present throughout the transition in 
negotiating an electoral system, holding elections, and constitution-making. Comparing the 
trajectory of the four cases, Tunisia is also the only country that (as of 2018) has sustained a 
path of transition towards a democratic regime that guarantees political and civil freedoms. 
Two elements were present in Tunisia and not in the other countries, that underpinned 
sustained de facto inclusion. First, when faced with contentious communal divisions that 
threatened to derail the transition, the major political actors in Tunisia persisted with direct 
engagement on challenging issues, whilst in other countries the relevant actors chose to 
either withdraw from direct engagement or push ahead with an agenda for institutional 
design without the inclusion of all groups. Second, there was a consistent and on-going focus 
from the Tunisian authorities overseeing institutional design, on reaching agreement 
amongst all key groups as a primary objective.   
For example, during constitution-making in Tunisia, when the process reached total 
breakdown in mid-2013, the political representatives of the main communal groups engaged 
directly with each other on challenging issues (Badawi 2016), and the interim authority 
focused first and foremost on reaching agreement amongst antagonistic groups. As described 
by Rached Gannouchi (2016, 1), the leader of the main Islamist party: ‘Following the second 
crisis after the assassination of member of the Assembly Mohamed Brahmi, we did not opt 
to impose our own view of how the transition should proceed, nor rush through the adoption 
of the Constitution. We were convinced that the aim of being in power in the transitional 
phase was the adoption of the Constitution and leading the country to the second elections, 
both of which required broad consensus and a climate of national unity. We refused that the 
Tunisian Constitution be the constitution of a majority imposed on a minority’.  
Masmoudi (2016) corroborated this factor in Tunisia, stating that both Islamists and 
non-Islamists ‘kept the dialogue going even during the most difficult times, there was never 
a break down in the dialogue, they always kept talking to each other and I think that’s 
important because not only do you build confidence but at least they have a chance to reach 
a consensus’. As noted by Alfred Stepan (2012a, 94) ‘much of Tunisia’s superior record… can 
be credited to Islamic and secular leaders, who have worked to overcome their mutual fears 
and distrust by crafting agreements and credible guarantees in political society’. Intense 
debate brought some Islamist and non-Islamist actors closer: ‘After the vote, in what many 
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saw a symbol of compromise, Mongi Rahoui, a deputy from the assassinated leaders’ party 
[non-Islamist], embraced Habib Louz, an Ennahda hardliner. The two men sparred furiously 
over Islam last week’ (Amara 2014). 
Second, in Tunisia the interim authority placed primary emphasis on reaching 
agreement amongst communal groups, Table 8.3 shows the key focus of the transitional 
authority in each country. First the HCFRG and then the Quartet placed a key emphasis on 
shared national purpose and agreement amongst all key communal groups during 
institutional design. In particular, the Quartet’s explicit focus was on national unity, a shared 
national purpose, and reaching agreement between all relevant communal groups. In the 
words of the Quartet leaders (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 2016, 1): 
‘we noted clear priorities: the national interest came first and that of our organizations 
second’… ‘the Quartet demonstrates the capacity of civil society to transcend its own 
conflicts… to give precedence to the national interest before the particular interest, be it 
partisan or corporate’. The Quartet did not allow the National Dialogue process to proceed 
without agreement from political actors, up until a constitution was determined (Haugbolle 
et al. 2017; Stigant and Murray 2015, 3).  
In Egypt, by contrast, as constitution-making progressed, Islamists were increasingly 
unwilling ‘to compromise or treat [their] political rivals respectfully’ (M. Lynch 2012b, 1). Non-
Islamists largely withdrew from deliberations on the constitution, and became increasingly 
antagonistic calling for mass protest to undermine the legitimacy of the constitution that was 
put to referendum (Brown 2012, 2013, 50–53; Hamid 2012; Hill 2012; Serodio and Casper 
2013). Islamist members responded by increasing the pace at which they worked to produce 
a final constitution document. This led to an escalation of tension amongst Islamists and non-
Islamists (Albrecht 2013, 1) and a lack of non-Islamist support for the new constitution.  
At the same time, the SCAF maintained a focus first and foremost on national stability. 
The SCAF considered themselves ‘the sole actor possessing the experience, maturity and 
wisdom necessary to protect the country from domestic and external threats’ (International 
Crisis Group 2012, i). As noted by a political analyst ‘the key to understanding the SCAF is that 
it has used its expanded power with a single-minded determination to restore the country to 
what it perceives to be stability and return it to normalcy’ (Hanna 2011, 21). The SCAF were 
willing to make concessions and devolve power in order to maintain political stability (M. 
Lynch 2012c). Hanna (2011,21) notes that ‘the instances when public protests have effected 
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change…have… been a function of SCAF fear of public disorder’. Whilst the SCAF may have 
welcomed the opportunity to regain political control in mid-2013, they did not intervene until 
national stability was seriously in doubt and Egypt seemed to be lurching towards political 
breakdown (Housden 2013).  
In Iraq, when challenging issues emerged during constitution-making amongst Sunni, 
Shia and Kurds, in particular regarding federalism, key actors chose to push forward with 
producing a draft constitution in secret negotiations that excluded Sunni actors, rather than 
engage with Sunni actors on contentious issues (Morrow 2005, 11–15). Once the constituent 
body officially suspended its work, Kurd and Shia leaders continued negotiations on the draft 
constitution together with US-personnel (Al-Ali 2014, 84–102). Concurrently, US personnel 
placed a consistent emphasis throughout on achieving specific institutional design outcomes, 
in terms of an inclusive electoral system and a liberal democratic constitution that guaranteed 
political and civil rights. Whilst the US-led CPA officially transferred authority over Iraq to a 
local body in June 2004, US government and embassy personnel maintained political leverage 
throughout the institutional design moments examined in this study. During the drafting of 
the constitution, US actors intervened frequently and insistently whenever their preferences 
for institutional design appeared threatened (Diamond 2005; Morrow 2005, 10). US 
government personnel were involved in actively excluding Sunni-Arab representatives from 
final negotiations on constitution-making. US actors prioritised producing a constitution 
document that would guarantee political and civil freedoms over ensuring agreement 
amongst all communal groups (Morrow 2005, 9–11) ‘based on the mistaken assumption that 
a new constitution would ease tension in the country and lead to an improvement in security’ 
(Al-Ali 2014, 87).  
In Libya, de facto inclusion was present in negotiations on the electoral system. Due 
to the NTC’s role in accommodating the preferences of all communal groups. There was no 
direct engagement amongst stakeholders themselves on contentious issues, and the NTC 
placed primary emphasis on accommodating preferences rather than on reaching agreement 
amongst the main communal groups. The lack of emphasis on communal groups reaching 
agreement amongst themselves is reflected by a political analyst who states that ‘while the 
NTC was in power there was a tendency to put off any difficult or important decisions until 
after elections were held’ (Omar 2014, 78). And, indeed, after the General National Congress 
was elected it quickly fractured into competing factions; there was no persistent engagement 
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amongst communal groups on contentious issues or primary focus on communal groups 
coming to agreement on key issues (Vandewalle 2015).   
 
Table 8.3 Key focus of transitional authority overseeing institutional design  
 Egypt  Iraq  Tunisia  Libya 
Transitional 
authority 
SCAF CPA / 
US government 
personnel 
 
HCFRG / The Quartet  
 
NTC 
Key focus Political / societal 
stability 
Maintaining state 
stability during 
institutional design 
process  
 
Institutional framework 
Reaching specific 
institutional design 
outcome  
Agreement  
Agreement of all 
groups on 
institutional design  
Accommodation 
Accommodation of 
preferences of all 
groups 
Intervention Only intervenes to 
maintain stability 
Constant intervention 
to ensure desired 
institutional design 
Constant 
intervention to 
ensure all groups stay 
focused on common 
national purpose   
 
Bilateral 
negotiations with 
groups to ensure 
accommodation of 
preferences 
Response to 
conflict / 
deadlock 
Tries to ensure that 
demands are met to 
avoid destabilisation  
Ignores conflicting 
demands and pushes 
through own 
institutional design 
agenda  
  
Facilitates 
engagement amongst 
conflicting parties   
Accommodates or 
defers difficult 
issues 
Institutional 
design 
outcome 
 
Group with 
demographic 
majority dominates 
institutional design 
Transitional authority 
agenda dominates 
institutional design 
Widespread 
agreement on 
institutional design 
amongst all key 
groups 
Institutional design 
meets preferences 
of all groups but 
core challenges 
remain unresolved 
Source: see text for discussion of sources  
  
The importance of the de facto inclusion of actors from all of the main communal 
groups implies that a long timeframe may be necessary for institutional design, in particular 
constitution-making, if all societal groups are to engage on the most challenging issues. 
However, whilst de facto inclusion may take time and be difficult to achieve, the findings 
nevertheless suggest that there is unlikely to be a stable outcome with high support for the 
political regime, if de facto inclusion of all key communal groups is not present. As the US 
discovered in Iraq, de jure inclusion alone will not build the requisite widespread confidence 
in a new political system.  
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155 8.3		 Implications	for	transitions	in	the	MENA	region		
The policy implications outlined above indicate a key lesson for transitions in the MENA region 
regarding the importance of de facto inclusion. A challenge to many Arab-majority states in 
the MENA region is the Islamist – non-Islamist communal cleavage, as outlined. The ‘inclusion-
moderation’ hypothesis that asserts that the inclusion of Islamist groups in political 
frameworks will lead to the moderation of behaviour that would exclude non-Islamists from 
the political arena, typically focuses on de jure inclusion in political institutions (Schwedler 
2007). Such inclusion could include the right to form political parties, the right to participate 
in elections, and to hold public office. This study’s finding suggests, however, that this alone 
will not ensure legitimacy of a new political system.  
The findings suggest that the extent to which Islamic values and laws underpin the 
political systems of the Middle East needs to be directly addressed amongst relevant groups 
in states where this division is pertinent. Simply holding elections is on its own unlikely to 
have the expected ‘moderating’ effect without explicit engagement amongst the various 
groups on divisive policy issues. in Libya, for example, there is currently a contention 
regarding the timing and holding of elections. Some external actors advocate holding 
elections expediently in order to progress with a constitution-making process, whilst others 
claim that Libya is not ready to hold elections (Megerisi 2018). Regardless of which position 
is correct, the findings from this study suggest that direct engagement from all communal 
groups on this issue, until a decision is made, is of primary importance. If such elections are 
pushed ahead without such engagement, it is unlikely that there will be support from all 
communal groups for a new political system going forward.  
Tunisia has so far emerged as unique amongst the twenty-first century transitions in 
the MENA region for its sustained trajectory of democratisation. This implies, as noted by 
Mansouri and Armillei (2016, 170), that ‘secularists and Islamists… are not inherently 
incompatible’. This study suggests that it was the existence of de facto inclusion in Tunisia 
that enabled this country to navigate the Islamist – non-Islamist divide more successfully than 
other countries have managed to do. The lesson that emerges most clearly from Tunisia’s 
trajectory is that, at critical moments of tension and negotiations breakdown, challenges 
were confronted through direct inter-group engagement, under a clear directive from the 
authority overseeing institutional design to place primary emphasis on reaching agreement 
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amongst all groups. This enabled consistent de facto inclusion and for Tunisia to achieve 
‘political change while ensuring overall stability’ (174).    
In summary, I find that involvement of communal groups in institution-building that is 
present at every step of the way, and is not discontinued at any point, will be most likely to 
create confidence in the political system. I argue that direct engagement amongst groups on 
difficult issues will increase the likelihood, not only of reaching consensus, but also of building 
support for the new regime. The extent to which the interim authority pursues an explicit goal 
of ensuring agreement amongst all groups, the greater the likelihood that political confidence 
will be created. Taken together, these points imply that rebuilding contested states following 
authoritarian breakdown that does not go faster than the pace of agreement amongst key 
groups, and that does not push ahead without such agreement, is most likely to lead to 
transition to a stable political system.    
   
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
Bibliography	
Abdel Ghani, Karema. 2011. “Full Results of the Second Phase of Elections.” Alahram, 
December 24, 2011. http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/152478.aspx. 
Abdulla, Jamal Jalal. 2012. The Kurds: A Nation on the Way to Statehood. Bloomington: Author 
House. 
Abul-Magd, Zeinab. 2017. Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in 
Egypt. New York and Chichester: Cambridge University Press. 
Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. 2006. “De Facto Political Power and Institutional 
Persistence.” American Economic Review 96 (2): 325–30. 
Achcar, Gilbert. 2005. “On the Sunni Vote in the Constitutional Referendum.” International 
Viewpoint, October 19, 2005. www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article889. 
Al Jazeera. 2005a. “Sunni Party Office Attacked in Iraq.” Al Jazeera, October 14, 2005, sec. 
News. https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/10/20084916141534343.html. 
———. 2005b. “Constitution Approved, Says Iraq Panel,” October 26, 2005, sec. News. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/10/2008491681714131.html. 
———. 2011a. “Tunisia’s Coalition ‘Reaches Agreement.’” Al Jazeera, November 19, 2011. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/11/20111118213914899119.ht
ml. 
———. 2018. “Libya: From Arab Spring to Failed State?” Al Jazeera, February 17, 2018. 
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/2018/02/libya-arab-spring-failed-
state-180217075418204.html. 
Alaaldin, Ranj. 2018. “Can the US Still Rely on Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi?” 
Brookings Institute. 
Al-Ali, Zaid. 2014. The Struggle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and 
Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy. New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press. 
Albrecht, Holger. 2013. “Egypt’s 2012 Constitution: Devil in the Details, Not in Religion.” 
PeaceBrief 139. United States Institute of Peace (USIP). 
Aldouri, Saad. 2017. “Iraq Protests: The Constitutional Roots to the Unrest.” Asfar. 
http://www.asfar.org.uk/iraq-protests-the-constitutional-roots-to-the-unrest/. 
Alexander, Christoph. 2012. Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb. London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Allawi, Ali A. 2007. The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Almond, Gabriel, and Sidney Verba. 1989. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy 
in Five Nations. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. 
Alnasrawi, Abbas. 2001. “Iraq: Economic Sanctions and Consequences, 1990–2000.” Third 
World Quarterly 22 (2): 205–18. 
Alonso, Sonia, and Ruben Ruiz-Rufino. 2007. “Political Representation and Ethnic Conflict in 
New Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 46 (2): 237–67. 
Alsannoos, Muhassin. 2012. “Assembly Elections: 62% Turnout.” Almasry Alyoum, July 1, 
2012. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/141816. 
Amara, Tarek. 2013. “Opposition Leader’s Funeral Brings Day of Reckoning for Tunisia.” 
Reuters, February 7, 2013, sec. World News. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
158 
tunisia-politics/opposition-leaders-funeral-brings-day-of-reckoning-for-tunisia-
idUSBRE9150B820130207. 
———. 2014. “Arab Spring Beacon Tunisia Signs New Constitution.” Reuters, January 27, 
2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-constitution/arab-spring-beacon-
tunisia-signs-new-constitution-idUSBREA0Q0OU20140127. 
Amin, Galal. 2011. Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak: 1981-2011. Cairo and New York: The 
American University in Cairo Press. 
Anckar, Carsten. 2008. “On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most 
Different Systems Design in Comparative Research.” International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology 11 (5): 389–401. 
Anderson, Lisa. 1986. The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
———. 1991. “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East.” Political 
Science Quarterly 106 (1): 1–15. 
———. 2001. “Muammar Al-Qaddafi: The ‘King’ of Libya.” Journal of International Affairs 54 
(2): 515–17. 
 ———. 2011. “Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, 
and Libya.” Foreign Affairs 90 (3): 2–7. 
Andrews, Josephine, and Robert Jackman. 2005. “Strategic Fools: Electoral Rule Choice Under 
Extreme Uncertainty.” Electoral Studies 24: 65–84. 
Aucoin, Louis. 2010. “Introduction.” In Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies 
in Constitution Making, edited by Laurel Miller, xiii–xviii. Washington DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press. 
Aucoin, Louis, and Michelle Brandt. 2010. “East Timor’s Constitutional Passage to 
Independence.” In Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in 
Constitution Making, edited by Laurel Miller, 245–74. Washington DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press. 
Axtmann, Dirk. 2001. “Iraq.” In Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook. Volume I: 
The Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia, edited by Dieter Nohlen, Michael 
Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut, 1:85–108. Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Badawi, Ahmed. 2016. Interview with Ahmed Badawi. Interview by Jessica Genauer. Skype. 
Bahcheli, Tozun, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik, eds. 2004. De Facto States: The Quest 
for Sovereignty. London and New York: Routledge. 
Bali, Asli, and Hanna Lerner. 2016. “Constitutional Design Without Constitutional Moments: 
Lessons from Religiously Divided Societies.” Cornell International Law Journal 49 (2): 
227–308. 
Banducci, Susan, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey Karp. 1999. “Proportional Representation and 
Attitudes about Politics: Results from New Zealand.” Electoral Studies 18 (4): 533–55. 
Baran, Zeyno. 2010. Torn Country: Turkey between Secularism and Islamism. Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press. 
Barany, Zoltan, and Robert Moser, eds. 2009. Is Democracy Exportable? New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Barkan, Joel, Paul Densham, and Gerard Rushton. 2006. “Space Matters: Designing Better 
Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 50 
(4): 926–39. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
159 
Barton, Greg. 2010. “Indonesia: Legitimacy, Secular Democracy, and Islam.” Politics and Policy 
38 (3): 471–96. 
Bassiouni, Cherif. 2017. Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and Its Aftermath: 2011–2016. 
Kindle edition. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bastian, Sunil, and Robin Luckham, eds. 2003. Can Democracy Be Designed? The Politics of 
Institutional Choice in Conflict-Torn Societies. London and New York: Zed Books. 
Beaulieu, Emily, and Susan Hyde. 2009. “In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic 
Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts.” Comparative Political 
Studies 42 (3): 392–415. 
Beaumont, Peter. 2013. “Tunisia: Killing of Leftist Leader Brings Secularists on to the Streets.” 
The Guardian, July 26, 2013, Online edition, sec. Middle East. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/25/tunisia-protests-killing-leader. 
Beaumont, Peter, Rory McCarthy, and Paul Harris. 2005. “End of Iraq’s Nightmare ... or the 
Start.” The Guardian, January 23, 2005. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jan/23/iraq.rorymccarthy. 
Beehner, Lionel. 2005. “Why Sunnis Don’t Support Iraq’s Constitution.” Backgrounder. 
Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/why-sunnis-dont-
support-iraqs-constitution. 
Beetham, David. 2004. “Political Legitimacy.” In The Blackwell Companion to Political 
Sociology, edited by Kate Nash and Alan Scott, 107–16. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
Beinin, Joel, and Frederic Vairel, eds. 2013. Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation 
in the Middle East and North Africa. Second. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Bellin, Eva. 2004. “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in 
Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics 36 (2): 139–57. 
Belmont, Katherine, Scott Mainwaring, and Andrew Reynolds. 2002. “Introduction: 
Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy in Divided Societies.” In 
The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and 
Democracy, edited by Andrew Reynolds, 1–14. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Benoit, Kenneth. 2004. “Models of Electoral System Change.” Electoral Studies 23: 363–89. 
Benoit, Kenneth, and John Schiemann. 2001. “Institutional Choice in New Democracies: 
Bargaining Over Hungary’s 1989 Electoral Law.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 13 (2): 
153–82. 
Benstead, Lindsay. 2013. “Why Do Some Arab Citizens See Democracy as Unsuitable for Their 
Country?” Democratization 22 (7): 1183–1208. 
Berg, Eiki. 2007. “Examining Power-Sharing in Persistent Conflicts: De Facto Pseudo-
Statehood Versus De Jure Quasi-Federalism.” Global Society 21 (2): 199–217. 
Bickerton, Ian, and Carla Klausner. 2016. A History of the Arab–Israeli Conflict. Seventh. Oxon 
and New York: Routledge. 
Birch, Sarah. 2005. “Single-Member District Electoral Systems and Democratic Transition.” 
Electoral Studies 24: 281–301. 
———. 2010. “Perceptions of Electoral Fairness and Voter Turnout.” Comparative Political 
Studies 43 (12): 1601–22. 
Black, Ian. 2012. “Egypt Tense and Polarised Before Referendum on New Constitution.” The 
Guardian, December 15, 2012. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/14/egypt-polarised-referendum-
new-constitution. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
160 
Blair, Edmund, and Patrick Werr. 2012. “Egyptians Protest After Draft Constitution Raced 
Through.” Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-president/egyptians-
protest-after-draft-constitution-raced-through-idUSBRE8AM0DO20121130. 
Blais, Andre, and R. Carty. 1990. “Does Proportional Representation Foster Voter Turnout?” 
European Journal of Political Research 18 (2): 167–81. 
Blount, Justin. 2011. “Participation in Constitutional Design.” In Comparative Constitutional 
Law, edited by Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon, 38–56. Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Bockenforde, Markus. 2015. “The Dynamics of Comprehensive Constitution-Building: Religion 
and the Concept of Twin Tolerations in Tunisia.” In The Tunisian Constitutional 
Process: Main Actors and Key Issues, edited by Mathieu Rousselin and Christopher 
Smith, 24–35. Global Dialogues 7. Duisberg: Kate Hamburger Kolleg / Center for Global 
Cooperation Research. 
Bogaards, Matthijs. 2013. “The Choice for Proportional Representation: Electoral System 
Design in Peace Agreements.” Civil Wars 15 (1): 71–87. 
Bohrer, Robert, Alexander Pacek, and Benjamin Radcliff. 2000. “Electoral Participation, 
Ideology, and Party Politics in Post-Communist Europe.” The Journal of Politics 62 (4): 
1161–72. 
Boix, Carles. 1999. “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in 
Advanced Democracies.” American Political Science Review 93 (3): 609–24. 
Bollier, Sam. 2011. “Who Are Tunisia’s Political Parties?” Al Jazeera, October 28, 2011, Online 
edition. www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/10/201110614579390256.html. 
Bousbih, Elyes, and Abderrahmen Yaalaoui. 2015. “The Interplay of Politics and Religion in the 
New Tunisian Constitution: A Legal Analysis.” In The Tunisian Constitutional Process: 
Main Actors and Key Issues, edited by Mathieu Rousselin and Christopher Smith, 16–
23. Global Dialogues 7. Duisberg: Kate Hamburger Kolleg / Center for Global 
Cooperation Research. 
Bowker, Robert. 1996. Beyond Peace: The Search for Security in the Middle East. Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
———. 2010. Egypt and the Politics of Change in the Arab Middle East. Cheltenham and 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
———. 2013. “Egypt: Diplomacy and the Politics of Change.” The Middle East Journal 67 (4): 
581–91. 
Bowler, Shaun, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey Karp. 2006. “Why Politicians Like Electoral 
Institutions: Self-Interest, Values, or Ideology?” Journal of Politics 68 (2): 434–46. 
Boyko, Nazar, and Erik Herron. 2015. “The Effects of Technical Parties and Partisan Election 
Management Bodies on Voting Outcomes.” Electoral Studies 40: 23–33. 
Bradley, Matt. 2011. “Egyptians Threaten Ballot Boycott.” The Wall Street Journal, September 
30, 2011. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203405504576600822072136368. 
Bratton, Michael, and Robert Mattes. 2001. “Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or 
Instrumental?” British Journal of Political Science 31 (3): 447–74. 
Brody-Barre, Andrea. 2013. “The Impact of Political Parties and Coalition Building on Tunisia’s 
Democratic Future.” The Journal of North African Studies 18 (2): 211–30. 
Brown, Nathan. 2012. “Egypt’s State Constitutes Itself.” POMEPS Briefings. Arab Uprisings: 
The Battle for Egypt’s Constitution. Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS). 
———. 2013. “Egypt’s Failed Transition.” Journal of Democracy 24 (4): 45–58. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
161 
———. 2014. “Introduction: Democratic Beauty and Electoral Ugliness in the Middle East.” In 
Elections and Democratization in the Middle East: The Tenacious Search for Freedom, 
Justice, and Dignity, edited by Mahmoud Hamad and Khalil al-Anani, 1–8. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Brown, Nathan, and Michele Dunne. 2007. “Egypt’s Controversial Constitutional 
Amendments.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf. 
Brownlee, Jason, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. 2015. The Arab Spring: Pathways of 
Repression and Reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burg, Steven, and Paul Shoup. 1999. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and 
International Intervention. New York and London: M. E. Sharpe. 
Call, Charles. 2012. Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil Was Recurrence. 
Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Carey, John. 2009. “Does It Matter How a Constitution Is Created.” In Is Democracy 
Exportable?, edited by Zoltan Barany and Robert Moser, 155–77. Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2013. “Electoral Formula and the Tunisian Constituent Assembly.” Dartmouth 
College. http://sites.dartmouth.edu/jcarey/files/2013/02/Tunisia-Electoral-Formula-
Carey-May-2013-reduced.pdf. 
Carey, John, and Simon Hix. 2011. “The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional 
Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (2): 383–97. 
Carey, John, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. 2015. “Institutions as Causes and Effects: 
North African Electoral Systems During the Arab Spring.” Draft. 
http://sites.dartmouth.edu/jcarey/files/2013/02/CMR-2015-082715-APSA-draft.pdf. 
Carey, John, and Andrew Reynolds. 2011. “The Impact of Election systems.” Journal of 
Democracy 22 (4): 36–47. 
———. 2012. “Getting Elections Wrong.” Journal of Democracy 23 (1): 164–68. 
Carlson, Scott. 2010. “The Drafting Process for the 1998 Albanian Constitution.” In Framing 
the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, edited by Laurel 
Miller, 311–31. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Carroll, Rory. 2005. “Iraq Gamble as Sunnis Left Out of Constitution Deal.” The Guardian, 
August 29, 2005. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/aug/29/iraq.rorycarroll2. 
Catterberg, Gabriela, and Alejandro Moreno. 2006. “The Individual Bases of Political Trust: 
Trends in New and Established Democracies.” Public Opinion Research 18 (1): 31–48. 
Celis, Karen. 2006. “Substantive Representation of Women: The Representation of Women’s 
Interests and the Impact of Descriptive Representation in the Belgian Parliament 
(1900–1979).” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 28 (2): 85–114. 
Cetinsaya, Gokhan. 2006. The Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Chandra, Kanchan. 2005. “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability.” Perspectives on Politics 3 
(2): 235–52. 
Chirot, Daniel. 2009. “Does Democracy Work in Divided Societies?” In Is Democracy 
Exportable, edited by Zoltan Barany and Robert Moser, 85–109. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
162 
Cho, Youngho. 2014. “To Know Democracy Is to Love It: A Cross-National Analysis of 
Democratic Understanding and Political Support for Democracy.” Political Research 
Quarterly 67 (3): 478–88. 
Chu, Yun-Han, Michael Bratton, Marta Lagos, Sandeep Shastri, and Mark Tessler. 2008. 
“Public Opinion and Democratic Legitimacy.” Journal of Democracy 19 (2): 74–87. 
CNN international. 2005. “Five U.S. Troops Killed in Iraq Attacks.” CNN, October 4, 2005, sec. 
World. http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/04/iraq.main/index.html. 
Coalition Provisional Authority. 2003. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1. 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Prov
isional_Authority_.pdf. 
———. 2004a. “Coalition Provisional Authority: Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for 
the Transitional Period 8 March 2004.” International IDEA: ConstitutionNet. 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/interim-constitution-iraq-2004-2005. 
———. 2004b. The Electoral Law. Order 96. 
Colangelo, Anthony. 2009. “De Facto Sovereignty: Boumedience and Beyond.” George 
Washington Law Review 77 (3): 623–76. 
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. 2009. “Beyond Greed and Grievance: 
Feasibility and Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers 61 (1): 1–27. 
Colomer, Josep, ed. 2004. Handbook of Electoral System Choice. Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cook, Steven. 2012. The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Cordell, Karl, and Stefan Wolff, eds. 2016. The Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict. Second. 
Oxon and New York: Routledge. 
Cordesman, Anthony, and Ahmed Hashim. 1997. Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond. New York and 
London: Routledge. 
Cottrell, Jill, and Yash Ghai. 2007. “Constitution Making and Democratization in Kenya (2000–
2005).” Democratization 14 (1): 1–25. 
Daponte, Beth, Joseph Kadane, and Lara Wolson. 1997. “Bayesian Demography: Projecting 
the Iraqi Kurdish Population, 1977-1990.” Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 92 (440): 1256–67. 
Dawisha, Abeed, and Larry Diamond. 2006. “Iraq’s Year of Voting Dangerously.” Journal of 
Democracy 17 (2): 89–103. 
Democracy Reporting International. 2011a. “The Road to Elections in Egypt: Electoral Reforms 
Since January 2011.” Briefing Paper 14. Support to Democratization in Egypt. 
Democracy Reporting International. 
———. 2011b. “Comprehensive Assessment of Egypt’s Electoral Framework - Part II.” 
Democracy Reporting International. 
———. 2011c. “Lessons Learned from Constitution-Making: Processes with Broad-Based 
Political Participation.” Briefing Paper 20. Democracy Reporting International. 
———. 2011d. “Promoting Consensus: Constitution-Making in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya.” Briefing 
Paper 19. Democracy Reporting International. 
———. 2011e. “Libya’s Transition: The Constitutional Declaration: A Basis for Democracy?” 
Briefing Paper 22. Democracy Reporting International. 
———. 2012. “Preliminary Assessment: Libya’s Draft Election Law for the General National 
Congress.” Briefing Paper 24. Libya’s Transition. Democracy Reporting International. 
Diamond, Larry. 2004. “What Went Wrong in Iraq.” Foreign Affairs 83 (5): 34–56. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
163 
———. 2005. Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring 
Democracy to Iraq. New York: Owl Books; Henry Holt and Company. 
———. 2010. “Why Are There No Arab Democracies?” Journal of Democracy 21 (1): 93–112. 
———. 2015. Interview with Larry Diamond. Interview by Jessica Genauer. Skype. 
Dobbins, James, Seth Jones, Benjamin Runkle, and Siddharth Mohandas. 2009. Occupying 
Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Santa Monica, Arlington and 
Pittsburgh: The RAND Corporation. 
Doherty, Megan. 2011. “‘Now We Have Hope’ Citizens Views on Libya’s Political Transition: 
Findings from Focus Groups in Libya.” Washington DC: National Democratic Institute 
(NDI). 
Dowley, Kathleen, and Brian Silver. 2002. “Social Capital, Ethnicity and Support for Democracy 
in the Post-Communist States.” Europe-Asia Studies 54 (4): 505–27. 
Dresch, Paul. 2000. A History of Modern Yemen. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Dunleavy, Patrick, and Helen Margetts. 1995. “Understanding the Dynamics of Electoral 
Reform.” International Political Science Review 16 (1): 9–29. 
Ebbinghaus, Bernhard. 2005. “When Less Is More: Selection Problems in Large-N and Small-
N Cross-National Comparisons.” International Sociology 20 (2): 133–52. 
Ebrahim, Hassan. 1998. The Soul of a Nation: Constitution-Making in South Africa. Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ebrahim, Hassan, and Laurel Miller. 2010. “Creating the Birth Certificate of a New South 
Africa: Constitution Making after Apartheid.” In Framing the State in Times of 
Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, edited by Laurel Miller, 111–57. 
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Egger, Vernon. 2018. A History of the Muslim World to 1750: The Making of a Civilization. 
Second. New York and London: Routledge. 
Egyptian State. 1971. “Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt.” Edited by Gisbert Flanz. 
Oxford Constitutions of the World. 
http://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ocw/law-ocw-cd1048-
H1980.regGroup.1/law-ocw-cd1048-H1980?rskey=fRjti0&result=1&prd=OCW. 
Elbadawi, E, and N Sambanis. 2000. “Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? 
Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict.” Journal of African Economies 9 (3): 
244–69. 
Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa. 2012. “EISA Election Monitoring 
Report Egypt: The People’s Assembly and Shura Council Elections November 2011-
February 2012.” EISA Election Witnessing Mission 43. Electoral Institute for 
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). 
Elgood, Giles. 2012. “Egyptian Opposition Warns of Referendum Violence.” Reuters. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/egypt-politics/egyptian-opposition-warns-of-
referendum-violence-idUSL5E8ND5WI20121213. 
Elkins, Zachary, Tom Ginsburg, and Justin Blount. 2011. “The Citizen as Founder: Public 
Participation in Constitutional Approval.” Temple Law Review 81: 101–21. 
Elkins, Zachary, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton. 2009. The Endurance of National 
Constitutions. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Elkins, Zachary, and John Sides. 2007. “Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?” 
American Political Science Review 101 (4): 693–708. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
164 
Elklit, Jorgen, and Andrew Reynolds. 2002. “The Impact of Election Administration on the 
Legitimacy of Emerging Democracies: A New Comparative Politics Research Agenda.” 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 40 (2): 86–119. 
Elster, Jon. 1995. “Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process.” Duke Law 
Journal 45: 364–96. 
Elyan, Tamim. 2011a. “Egypt Parties Threaten Poll Boycott, Protest Planned.” Reuters, 
September 29, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-
idUSTRE78S1Z820110929. 
———. 2011b. “Egypt Parties Retract Boycott Threat after Army Concessions.” Reuters, 
October 3, 2011. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-vote/egypt-parties-
retract-boycott-threat-after-army-concessions-idUSTRE7910V320111002. 
Ergil, Dogu. 2000. “The Kurdish Question in Turkey.” Journal of Democracy 11 (3): 122–35. 
European Commission United Nations Development Program. 2015. “Joint EC-UNDP Global 
Thematic Workshop Towards Inclusive Electoral Processes: The Role of Electoral 
Stakeholders in Ensuring Enhanced Participation.” EC-UNDP. http://www.ec-undp-
electoralassistance.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=564&t
mpl=component&format=raw&Itemid=&lang=en. 
European Union Election Assessment Team. 2012. “Libya Final Report: General National 
Congress Election 7 July 2012.” European Union Election Assessment Team. 
Evans, Geoffrey, and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. “The Politics and Economics of Democratic 
Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies.” British Journal of 
Political Science 25 (4): 485–514. 
Fair, Christine, and Bryan Shepherd. 2006. “Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from 
Fourteen Muslim Countries.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (1): 51–74. 
Faris, David. 2012. “Constituting Institutions: The Electoral System in Egypt.” Middle East 
Policy 19 (1): 140–54. 
Farrell, David. 2011. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. Second. Hampshire and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fawcett, Louise, ed. 2013. International Relations of the Middle East. Third. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Fearon, James. 2003. “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country.” Journal of Economic Growth 
8 (2): 195–222. 
Fedke, Jorg. 2014. “Comparative Analysis Between the Constitutional Processes in Egypt and 
Tunisia: Lessons Learnt.” In-Depth Analysis. European Parliament: Directorate-
General for External Policies. 
Feuille, James. 2011. “Reforming Egypt’s Constitution: Hope for Egyptian Democracy.” Texas 
International Law Journal 47 (1): 237–60. 
Finklestone, Joseph. 1996. Anwar Sadat: Visionary Who Dared. London and Portland: Frank 
Cass. 
Fish, Steven, and Matthew Kroenig. 2009. The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global 
Survey. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Fisher, Jeff. 2005. “Council of Representatives Election Composite Report: Iraq.” Final Report. 
Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance: International Foundation for 
Election Systems. 
Fishman, Brian. 2006. “After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq.” The 
Washington Quarterly 29 (4): 19–32. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
165 
Foa, Robert, and Yascha Mounk. 2016. “The Democratic Disconnect.” Journal of Democracy 
27 (3): 5–17. 
Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and James Garand. 2004. “Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin 
America, 1980 to 2000.” Comparative Political Studies 37 (8): 909–40. 
Foweraker, Joe, and Todd Landman. 2002. “Constitutional Design and Democratic 
Performance.” Democratization 9 (2): 43–66. 
Fraenkel, Jon, and Bernard Grofman. 2006. “Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in 
Ethnically Divided Societies? The Case of Fiji.” Comaprative Political Studies 39 (5): 
623–51. 
Fuchs-Schundeln, Nicola, and Matthias Schundeln. n.d. “On the Endogeneity of Political 
Preferences: Evidence from Individual Experience with Democracy.” Science 347 
(6226): 2015. 
Gaddafi, Muammar. 1975. The Green Book: The Solution of the Problem of Democracy. e-
book: Leopard Books India. 
Gallagher, Michael, and Paul Mitchell, eds. 2008. The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Galligan, Denis, and Mila Versteeg, eds. 2013a. Social and Political Foundations of 
Constitutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2013b. “Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and Political Foundations of 
Constitutions.” In Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions, edited by Denis 
Galligan and Mila Versteeg, 3–48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gannouchi, Rached. 2016. “The Evolution of Political Islam During the Transition.” 
Constitution of Tunisia: Part 2. United Nations Development Program: Arab States. 
Garrison, Randall. 2005. “The Role of Constitution-Building Processes in Democratization.” 
Democracy-Building & Conflict Management (DCM). Stockholm: International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Gasiorowski, Mark. 2014. “Introduction: Middle Eastern and North African States in 
Comparative Perspective.” In The Government and Politics of the Middle East and 
North Africa, edited by Mark Gasiorowski, Seventh, 1–18. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Gasiorowski, Mark, and Sean Yom, eds. 2017. The Government and Politics of the Middle East 
and North Africa. Eighth. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Gaston, Erica. 2014. “Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue.” Special Report 
342. United States Institute of Peace (USIP). 
Gause, Gregory. 2011. “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of 
Authoritarian Stability.” Foreign Affairs 90 (4): 81–84. 
Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime 
Transitions: A New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics 12 (2): 313–31. 
Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennet. 2004. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge and London: MIT Press. 
Germane, Marina. 2012. “Civic or Ethnic Nation: Two Competing Concepts in Interwar Latvia.” 
Nations and Nationalism 18 (3): 439–60. 
Ghai, Yash, and Jill Cottrell. 2005. “A Review of the Draft Constitution of Iraq.” 
https://law.wisc.edu/gls/arotcoi.pdf. 
Gilley, Bruce. 2006. “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries.” 
European Journal of Political Research 45 (3): 499–525. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
166 
Ginsburg, Tom, ed. 2012. Comparative Constitutional Design. Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2015. “Written Constitutions Around the World.” Insights on Law and Society 15 (3). 
Ginsburg, Tom, Zachary Elkins, and Justin Blount. 2009. “Does the Process of Constitution-
Making Matter.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 5: 201–23. 
Gluck, Jason, and Michelle Brandt. 2015. “Participatory and Inclusive Constitution Making: 
Giving Voice to the Demands of Citizens in the Wake of the Arab Spring.” Peaceworks 
105. United States Institute of Peace. 
Goggin, Malcolm. 1986. “The ‘Too Few Cases/Too Many Variables’ Problem in 
Implementation Research.” Political Research Quarterly 39 (2): 328–47. 
Goldschmidt, Arthur. 2004. Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State. Second. 
Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press. 
Gordon, Joel. 2006. Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation. Makers of the Muslim World. London: 
Oneworld Publications. 
Grofman, Bernard. 2013. “Electoral Rules and Ethnic Representation and Accommodation: 
Combining Social Choice and Electoral System Perspectives.” In Power Sharing in 
Deeply Divided Places, edited by Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary, 67–93. 
Philadelphia: The University of Philadelphia. 
Guelke, Adrian. 2012. Politics in Deeply Divided Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Guellali, Amna. 2013. “Tunisia: Political Crisis and Transition Priorities.” World Policy, August 
12, 2013. https://worldpolicy.org/2013/08/12/tunisia-political-crisis-and-transition-
priorities. 
Guo, Sujian, and Gary Stradiotto. 2014. Democratic Transitions: Modes and Outcomes. Oxon 
and New York: Routledge. 
Gurr, Ted. 2011. Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. Washington DC: 
United States Institute of Peace. 
Haddad, Fanar. 2011. Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity. Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Hafez, Mohammed. 2003. Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic 
World. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Hamamsy, Walid, and Mounira Soliman, eds. 2013. Popular Culture in the Middle East and 
North Africa: A Postcolonial Outlook. New York and Oxon: Routledge. 
Hamid, Shadi. 2012. “Is There an Egyptian Nation?” POMEPS Briefings. Arab Uprisings: The 
Battle for Egypt’s Constitution. Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS). 
———. 2014. Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hammond, Andrew. 2007. Popular Culture in the Arab World: Arts, Politics, and the Media. 
Cairo and New York: The American University in Cairo. 
———. 2014. “Qatar’s Leadership Transition: Like Father Like Son.” Brief 95. European Council 
on Foreign Relations. 
Hanish, Shak. 2009. “Christians, Yazidis, and Mandaeans in Iraq: A Survival Issue.” Digest of 
Middle East Studies 18 (1): 1–16. 
Hanna, Michael. 2011. “The Mind of Egypt’s Military.” POMEPS Briefings 6. Arab Uprisings. 
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS). 
Harb, Imad. 2003. “The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?” The 
Middle East Journal 57 (2): 269–90. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
167 
Hart, Vivien. 2010. “Constitution Making and the Right to Take Part in a Public Affair.” In 
Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, edited 
by Laurel Miller, 20–54. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Hashim, Ahmed. 2011. “The Egyptian Military, Part Two: From Mubarak Onward.” Middle East 
Policy 18 (4): 106–28. 
Hassan, Mazen. 2013. “Elections of the People’s Assembly, Egypt 2011/12.” Electoral Studies 
32: 370–87. 
Hatahet, Sinan. 2017. “The Prospects of a Political Transition in Syria.” Expert Brief: Regional 
Politics. AlSharq Forum. 
Haugbolle, Rikke, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2011. “Will the Real Tunisian Opposition Please 
Stand Up? Opposition Coordination Failures under Authoritarian Constraints.” British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38 (3): 323–41. 
Haugbolle, Rikke, Amine Ghali, Hela Yousfi, Mohamed Limam, and Nina Mollerup. 2017. 
“Tunisia’s 2013 National Dialogue: Political Crisis Management.” National Dialogue 
Handbook Case Study. Berlin: Berghof Foundation. http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other_Resources/NationalDialogu
e/NDH_Tunisia.pdf. 
Hayo, Bernd, and Stefan Voigt. 2007. “Explaining De Facto Judicial Independence.” 
International Review of Law and Economics 27 (3): 269–90. 
Henderson, Randall. 2005. “The Egyptian Coptic Christians: The Conflict Between Identity and 
Equality.” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 16 (2): 155–66. 
Higley, John, and Michael Burton. 2006. Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield. 
Hilal, Leila. 2012. “Charting Transitions in the Middle East: Lessons Learned from Tunisia and 
Egypt.” Insight Turkey 14 (2): 1–12. 
Hill, Evan. 2012. “Beating the Brotherhood.” Arab Uprisings: The Battle for Egypt’s 
Constitution. Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS). 
Hiltermann, Joost. 2006. “Elections and Constitution Writing in Iraq, 2005.” Middle East at the 
Crossroads. Amman: International Crisis Group (ICG). 
Hintjens, Helen. 2008. “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda.” Ethnicities 8 (1): 5–41. 
Hoglund, Kristine. 2009. “Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, 
and Consequences.” Terrorism and Political Violence 21 (3): 412–27. 
Hooker, Gregory. 2005. “Iraq: Outlook for National Elections and Governance.” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 
Horowitz, Donald. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
University of California Press. 
———. 1991. A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
———. 2000. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Second. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University 
of California Press. 
———. 2003. “The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede.” Journal of Democracy 14 (2): 
5–17. 
———. 2004. “The Alternative Vote and Interethnic Moderation: A Reply to Fraenkel and 
Grofman.” Public Choice 121: 507–16. 
———. 2009. “Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes.” In The Architecture of 
Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, edited by 
Andrew Reynolds, 15–36. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
168 
———. 2011. “Writing the New Rules of the Game.” The Wilson Quarterly. Washington DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center. https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/summer-2011-a-
changing-middle-east/writing-the-new-rules-of-the-game. 
———. 2013. Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia. Kindle. Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2014. “Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems.” Journal of Democracy 25 (2): 5–
20. 
Housden, Oliver. 2013. “Egypt: Coup d’Etat or a Revolution Protected?” The RUSI Journal 158 
(5): 72–78. 
Howard, Michael. 2004. “Main Sunni Party Pulls Out of Iraqi Election.” The Guardian, 
December 28, 2004. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/dec/28/iraq.michaelhoward. 
Hoyland, Robert. 2015. In God’s Path: The Arab Conquests and the Creation of an Islamic 
Empire. Kindle. Ancient Warfare and Civilization. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hulsman, Cornelis. 2012. “Discrepancies Between Coptic Statistics in the Egyptian Census and 
Estimates Provided by the Coptic Orthodox Church.” Arab-West Report. 
https://www.arabwestreport.info/sites/default/files/pdfs/AWRpapers/paper52.pdf. 
Hulsman, Cornelis. 2015. “Background Information on Egypt for the Permanent Committee 
on Foreign Affairs.” House of Representatives, Netherlands. 
Hussein, Abdel-Rahman. 2012a. “Egyptian Assembly Passes Draft Constitution Despite 
Protests.” The Guardian, November 30, 2012. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/30/egypt-constitution-morsi. 
———. 2012b. “Egypt Violence Worsens as Five Die in Cairo Clashes.” The Guardian, 
December 7, 2012, Online edition, sec. World News. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/06/egypt-violence-worsens-five-die. 
Hussein, Abdel-Rahman, and Julian Borger. 2012. “Egypt Opposition Group to Boycott 
‘Irresponsible’ Vote on New Constitution.” The Guardian, December 10, 2012. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/09/egypt-opposition-vote-
constitution. 
IFES. 2011. “Elections in Egypt: Analysis of the 2011 Parliamentary Electoral System.” IFES 
Briefing Paper. Washington DC: International Foundation for Election Systems: Middle 
East and North Africa. 
———. 2012. “Egypt Constitution Referendum 2012.” Election Guide: Democracy Assistance 
and Election News. International Foundation for Election systems (IFES). 
http://www.electionguide.org/digest/post/16859/. 
———. 2013a. “Elections in Egypt: The Electoral Framework in Egypt’s Continuing Transition: 
February 2011 – September 2013.” International Foundation for Electoral systems 
(IFES). 
http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/egypt_briefing_paper_sept_2013_final.pdf. 
———. 2013b. “Voters’ Opinions of the Election Process in Libya.” International Foundation 
for Electoral Systems (IFES). 
IMIE. 2005. “Final Report: Assessment of the January 30, 2005, Election Process.” 
International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE). 
Inglehart, Ronald. 2003. “How Solid Is Mass Support for Democracy—And How Can We 
Measure It?” Political Science and Politics 36 (1): 51–57. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
169 
Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change, and 
Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
———. 2006. “Emancipative Values and Democracy.” Studies in Comparative International 
Development 41 (3): 74–94. 
———. 2010. “Changing Mass Priorities: The Link between Modernization and Democracy” 8 
(2): 551–67. 
Ingram, Sue. 2014. “Political Settlements: The History of an Idea in Policy and Theory.” SSGM 
Discussion Paper. Canberra: Australian National University. 
Inman, Robert, and Daniel Rubinfeld. 2013. “Understanding the Democratic Transition in 
South Africa.” American Law and Economics Review 15 (1): 1–38. 
International Crisis Group. 2012. “Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt’s SCAF.” 
Middle East Report 121. International Crisis Group (ICG). 
International IDEA. 2005. Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook. 
Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
———. 2012. “Electoral Management during Transition: Challenges and Opportunities.” 
Policy Paper. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/electoral-management-during-
transition.pdf. 
International Republican Institute. 2005. “Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion, 27 February to 5 
March 2005.” International Republican Institute (IRI). 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2005%20March%2016%20Survey%20of%20Ira
qi%20Public%20Opinion,%20February%2027-March%205,%202005.pdf. 
———. 2014. “Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, February 12-22 2014.” International 
Republican Institute. 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%2023%20Survey%20of%20Tuni
sian%20Public%20Opinion%2C%20February%2012-22%2C%202014.pdf. 
IPU PARLINE. 2005. “Iraq: Elections Held in 2005.” Inter-Parliamentary Union. 
http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151_05.htm. 
IPU Parline. 2013. “Tunisia Al-Majlis Al-Watani Al-Taasisi (National Constituent Assembly): 
Elections in 2011.” Inter-Parliamentary Union. http://archive.ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/arc/2392_11.htm. 
Irfad. 2014. “Iraq Government.” http://www.irfad.org/iraq-government. 
Isakhan, Benjamin, Fethi Mansouri, and Shahram Akbardazeh. 2012. “Introduction: People 
Power and the Arab Revolutions Towards a New Conceptual Framework of Democracy 
in the Middle East.” In The Arab Revolutions in Context: Civil Society and Democracy in 
a Changing Middle East, edited by Benjamin Isakhan, Fethi Mansouri, and Shahram 
Akbardazeh, 1–10. Islamic Studies Series. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 
Ishiyama, John. 2000. “Institutions and Ethnopolitical Conflict in Post-Communist Politics.” 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 6 (3): 51–67. 
Istrabadi, Feisal. 2009. “A Constitution Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on Iraq’s Failed 
Constitutional Process.” Texas Law Review 87: 1627–55. 
———. 2015. Interview with Feisal Istrabadi. Interview by Jessica Genauer. Skype. 
Jankowski, James. 2002. Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic. 
Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
170 
Jenkins, Daisy. 1996. “From Apartheid to Majority Rule: A Glimpse into South Africa’s Journey 
towards Democracy.” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 13: 463–
90. 
Jung, Jai Kwan, and Christopher Deering. 2015. “Constitutional Choices: Uncertainty and 
Institutional Design in Democratizing Nations.” International Political Science Review 
36 (1): 60–77. 
Kadhum, Oula. 2018. “The Transnational Politics of Iraq’s Shia Diaspora.” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 
Kedourie, Elie. 1994. Democracy and Arab Political Culture. London and Portland: Frank Cass. 
King, Jeff. 2013. “Constitutions as Mission Statements.” In Social and Political Foundations of 
Constitutions, edited by Denis Galligan and Mila Versteeg, 73–102. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kirkpatrick, David. 2011. “In a Surprise, Calm Prevails in Egypt’s Elections.” The New York 
Times, November 28, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/world/middleeast/egyptians-vote-in-historic-
election.html. 
———. 2012a. “Blow to Transition as Court Dissolves Egypt’s Parliament.” New York Times, 
June 14, 2012, sec. Middle East. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/middleeast/new-political-showdown-
in-egypt-as-court-invalidates-parliament.html. 
———. 2012b. “Braving Areas of Violence, Voters Try to Reshape Libya.” The New York Times, 
July 7, 2012, sec. Africa. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/world/africa/libyans-
vote-in-first-election-in-more-than-40-years.html. 
———. 2014. “Libyan Militias Seize Control of Capital as Chaos Rises.” The New York Times, 
September 1, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/world/africa/militias-
seize-control-of-libyan-capital.html. 
Kjaerum, Alexander, Ellen Lust-Okar, Line Pedersen, and Jakob Wichman. 2013. “Libyan 
Parliamentary Election Study.” National Democratic Institute. 
Knell, Yolande. 2012. “Egypt’s Police Still in Crisis After Revolution.” BBC News: Middle East, 
March 5, 2012, Online edition. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
17128116. 
Koehler, Kevin, and Jana Warkotsch. 2014. “Tunisia Between Democratization and 
Institutionalizing Uncertainty.” In Elections and Democratization in the Middle East: 
The Tenacious Search for Freedom, Justice, and Dignity, edited by Mahmoud Hamad 
and Khalil al-Anani, 9–34. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kohl, Ines. 2014. “Libya’s ‘Major Minorities’. Berber, Tuareg and Tebu: Multiple Narratives of 
Citizenship, Language and Border Control.” Middle East Critique 23 (4): 423–38. 
Kostadinova, Tatiana. 2003. “Voter Turnout Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe.” European 
Journal of Political Research 42 (6): 741–59. 
Kostadinova, Tatiana, and Timothy Power. 2007. “Does Democratization Depress 
Participation? Voter Turnout in the Latin American and Eastern European Transitional 
Democracies.” Political Research Quarterly 60 (3): 363–77. 
Kottoor, Naveena. 2014. “Tunisia Assembly Passes New Constitution.” British Broadcasting 
Commission, January 27, 2014, Online edition, sec. Africa. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25908340. 
Kraetsch, Mary, and Samantha Constant. 2010. “Taking Stock of the Youth Challenge in the 
Middle East: New Data and New Questions.” Brookings Institute. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
171 
Kraetzschmar, Hendrik. 2015. “How the Tunisian National Dialogue Saved a Country from 
Collapse.” The Conversation. http://theconversation.com/how-the-tunisian-national-
dialogue-saved-a-country-from-collapse-48921. 
Kramer, Gruden. 2010. Hassan Al-Banna. Makers of the Muslim World. New York: Oneworld 
Publications. 
Krook, Mona, and Robert Moser. 2013. “Electoral Rules and Political Inclusion.” Task Force 
Report. Political Science, Electoral Rules, and Democratic Governance. Washington 
DC: American Political Science Association. 
Kuhn, Anthony. 2015. “Framing the Future: Drafting Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution.” Washington 
DC: George Washington University, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The 
Institute for Middle East Studies. 
Kunkler, Mirjam, and Alfred Stepan, eds. 2013. Democracy and Islam in Indonesia. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Kuperman, Alan, ed. 2015. Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa: Preventing Civil 
War through Institutional Design. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Lagos, Marta. 2003. “Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy.” International Journal of 
Public Opinion Research 15 (4): 471–87. 
Landau, David. 2013. “Constitution-Making Gone Wrong.” Alabama Law Review 64 (5): 923–
80. 
Lefevre, Raphael. 2015. “Tunisia: A Fragile Political Transition.” The Journal of North African 
Studies 20 (2): 307–11. 
Lesch, Ann. 2014. “Troubled Political Transitions: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.” Middle East Policy 
21 (1): 62–74. 
Lijphart, Arend. 1969. “Consociational Democracy.” World Politics 21 (2): 207–25. 
———. 1975. “The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research.” Comparative 
Political Studies 8 (2): 158–77. 
———. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press. 
———. 1991. “Constitutional Choices for New Democracies.” Journal of Democracy 2 (1): 72–
84. 
———. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
———. 2002. “The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy.” In The Architecture of Democracy: 
Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy, edited by Andrew 
Reynolds, 37–54. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2004. “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy 15 (2): 96–
109. 
Lindberg, Staffan. 2004. “The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, 
Competition, and Legitimacy in Africa.” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 42 
(1): 61–105. 
———, ed. 2009. Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition. Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press. 
Lindemann, Stefan. 2008. “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for 
Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Crisis States Discussion 
Paper 15. London: Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and 
Political Science. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
172 
Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Kindle edition. 
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 
Lipset, Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy.” The American Political Science Review 53 (1): 69–105. 
Little, Allan. 2011. “Tunisia Votes in Historic Free Election.” British Broadcasting Commission, 
October 23, 2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15416702. 
Lobban Jr., Robert, and Chris Dalton. 2014. Libya: History and Revolution. Santa Barbara, 
Denver and Oxford: Praeger. 
Lorenz, Astrid. 2005. “How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and Two 
Alternatives.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 17 (3): 339–61. 
Louden, Sarah. 2015. “Political Islamism in Tunisia: A History of Repression and a Complex 
Forum for Potential Change.” Mathal 4 (1): article 2. 
Luong, Pauline. 2000. “After the Break-Up: Institutional Design in Transitional States.” 
Comparative Political Studies 33 (5): 563–92. 
———. 2002. Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, 
Perceptions, and Pacts. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lustick, Ian. 1979. “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control.” 
World Politics 31 (3): 325–44. 
Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2005. Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and 
Institutions. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2009. “Legislative Elections in Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes: Competitive 
Clientalism and Resistance to Democratization.” In Democratization by Elections: A 
New Mode of Transition, edited by Staffan Lindberg, 226–45. Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Lynch, Dov. 2004. Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and de Facto 
States. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Lynch, Gabrielle. 2006. “The Fruits of Perception: ‘Ethnic Politics’ and the Case of Kenya’s 
Constitutional Referendum.” African Studies 65 (2): 233–70. 
Lynch, Marc. 2011. “Uncertainty and Optimism in Egypt.” Foreign Policy, June 12, 2011. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/12/uncertainty-and-optimism-in-egypt. 
———. 2012a. “Egypt’s Parliament Gets To Work.” Foreign Policy, January 23, 2012. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/23/egypts-parliament-gets-to-work. 
———. 2012b. “Reflections on Egypt’s Latest Crisis.” POMEPS Briefings. Arab Uprisings: The 
Battle for Egypt’s Constitution. Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS). 
———. 2012c. “Reflections on Egypt’s Latest Crisis.” Foreign Policy, December 31, 2012, 
Online edition, sec. Middle East. http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/12/31/reflections-
on-egypts-latest-crisis. 
Lyon, Alistair, and Tamim Elyan. 2012. “Egypt’s Opposition Rejects Constitutional 
Referendum.” Reuters, December 9, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-
politics/egypts-opposition-rejects-constitutional-referendum-
idUSBRE8B30GP20121209. 
Maboudi, Tofigh, and Ghazal Nadi. 2016. “Crowdsourcing the Egyptian Constitution: Social 
Media, Elites, and the Populace.” Political Research Quarterly 69 (4): 716–31. 
Maddy-Wietzman, Bruce. 2011. The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North 
African States. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
173 
Mady, Abou Elela. 2011. “ALF Austrian Network Common Action- June 2011: Conference: 
‘Egypt in Transition – Ready for Democracy?’” Anna Lindh Foundation, EUROMED. 
http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/networks/austria/news/alf-austrian-network-
common-action-june-2011-conference-egypt-transition-ready. 
Magalhaes, Pedro. 2014. “Government Effectiveness and Support for Democracy.” European 
Journal of Political Research 53 (1): 77–97. 
Maggetti, Martino. 2007. “De Facto Independence After Delegation: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis.” 
Regulation and Governance 1 (4): 271–94. 
Mahjoub, Rym. 2016. “From Division to Consensus: The Role and Contribution of the 
Consensus Committee.” Constitution of Tunisia: Part 2. United Nations Development 
Program: Arab States. 
Mansfield, Edward, and Jack Snyder. 2005. Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go 
to War. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Mansouri, Fethi, and Shahram Akbardazeh. 2006. “Islamism and Political Violence in the New 
World Order.” In Political Islam and Human Security, edited by Fethi Mansouri and 
Shahram Akbardazeh, 3-14. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press. 
Mansouri, Fethi, and Riccardo Armillei. 2016. “The Democratic ‘Transition’ in Post-Revolution 
Tunisia: Conditions for Successful ‘Consolidation’ and Future Prospects.” R/Evolutions: 
Global Trends & Regional Issues 4 (1): 156–81. 
Marks, Monica. 2011. “Tunisia: Zero-Sum Game?” Open Democracy: Free Thinking for the 
World, November 15, 2011. https://www.opendemocracy.net/monica-marks/tunisia-
zero-sum-game. 
Marks, Stephen. 2010. “The Process of Creating a New Constiuttion in Cambodia.” In Framing 
the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, edited by Laurel 
Miller, 207–44. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Masmoudi, Radwan. 2016. Interview with Radwan Masmoudi. Interview by Jessica Genauer. 
Skype. 
Masoud, Tarek. 2014. Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt. New York and 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mattes, Hanspeter. 1999. “Libya.” In Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook, edited by Dieter 
Nohlen, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut, 523–30. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
———. 2014. “Rebuilding the National-Security Forces in Libya.” Middle East Policy 21 (2): 
85–99. 
Maye, Diane. 2016. “Understanding the Sunni Realignment in Iraq with Complexity Theory.” 
Digest of Middle East Studies 25 (1): 132–54. 
McAllister, Ian, and Stephen White. 2017. “Economic Change and Public Support for 
Democracy in China and Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies 69 (1): 76–91. 
McDougall, James. 2017. A History of Algeria. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
McKittrick, David, and David McVea. 2002. Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the 
Conflict in Northern Ireland. Chicago: New Amsterdam Books. 
Megerisi, Tarek. 2018. “Libya Elections 2018: The Missing Ingredient.” European Council on 
Foreign Relations. 
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_libya_elections_2018_the_missing_ingred
ient. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
174 
Mellon, James. 2002. “Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism and Inter-state Relations in the Arab 
World.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 8 (4): 1–15. 
Melton, James, and Tom Ginsburg. 2014a. “Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really 
Matter? A Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence.” Working Paper 
612. University of Chicago Law School: Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics. 
———. 2014b. “Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter? A Reevaluation of 
Explanations for Judicial Independence.” Journal of Law and Courts 2 (2): 187–217. 
Menaldo, Victor. 2012. “The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs.” The Journal 
of Politics 74 (3): 707–22. 
Miller, Laurel. 2010a. “Designing Constitution-Making Processes: Lessons from the Past, 
Questions for the Future.” In Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in 
Constitution Making, edited by Laurel Miller, 601–65. Washington DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press. 
———, ed. 2010b. Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution 
Making. Washington DC: The Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace. 
Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 2001. “Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: 
Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures.” International Political Science Review 22 
(4): 303–20. 
Moehler, Devra. 2008. Distrusting Democrats: Outcomes of Participatory Constitution 
Making. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 
Mokhefi, Mansouria. 2011. “Gaddafi’s Regime in Relation to the Libyan Tribes.” Al Jazeera 
Centre for Studies. 
Moore, Jina. 2017. “Violence Flares and Tensions Rise After Kenya Presidential Vote.” New 
York Times, October 28, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/world/africa/kenya-election-uhuru-
kenyatta-raila-odinga.html. 
Moraski, Bryon, and Gerhard Loewenberg. 1999. “The Effect of Legal Thresholds on the 
Revival of Former Communist Parties in East-Central Europe.” The Journal of Politics 
61 (1): 151–70. 
Morris, Mike, and Doug Hindson. 1992. “South Africa: Political Violence, Reform and 
Reconstruction.” Review of African Political Economy 19 (53): 43–59. 
Morrow, Jonathan. 2005. “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost.” Special 
Report 155. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr155.pdf. 
Moser, Robert. 2009. “Electoral Engineering in New Democracies: Can Preferred Electoral 
Outcomes Be Engineered?” In Is Democracy Exportable?, edited by Zoltan Barany and 
Robert Moser, 131–54. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mozaffar, Shaheen. 2006. “Elections, Violence and Democracy in Iraq.” Bridgewater Review 
25 (1): 5–9. 
Mujtaba, Bahaudin. 2013. “Ethnic Diversity, Distrust and Corruption in Afghanistan: 
Reflections on the Creation of an Inclusive Culture.” Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: 
An International Journal 32 (3): 245–61. 
Munck, Gerardo, and Carol Leff. 1997. “Modes of Transition and Democratization: South 
America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics 29 (3): 
343–62. 
Murphy, Emma. 2013. “The Tunisian Elections of October 2011: A Democratic Consensus.” 
Journal of North African Studies 18 (2): 231–47. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
175 
Murray, Rebecca. 2015. “Libya: A Tale of Two Governments.” Al Jazeera, April 4, 2015, sec. 
Politics. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/libya-tale-governments-
150404075631141.html. 
Myers, Christine. 2013. “Tribalism and Democratic Transition in Libya: Lessons from Iraq.” 
Global Tides 7 (5): 1–28. 
Myers, Steven. 2010. “Politics Delay an Iraqi Census.” New York Times, December 6, 2010, 
sec. Middle East. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/world/middleeast/07iraq.html. 
Nagle, John, and Mary-Alice Clancy. 2012. “Constructing a Shared Public Identity in Ethno 
Nationally Divided Societies: Comparing Consociational and Transformationist 
Perspectives.” Nations and Nationalism 18 (1): 78–97. 
Najem, Tom. 2012. Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society. Ebook. The Contemporary 
Middle East. Oxon and New York: Routledge. 
National Constituent Assembly. 2011. “The Tunisian National Constituent Assembly (NCA) 
Rules of Procedure: 16 December 2011.” International IDEA: ConstitutionNet. 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/tunisia-constituent-assemblys-rules-
procedure. 
National Democratic Institute. 2011. “Final Report on the Tunisian National Constituent 
Assembly Elections: October 23, 2011.” National Democratic Institute. 
Ndulo, Muna. 2010. “Zimbabwe’s Unfulfilled Struggle for a Legitimate Constitutional Order.” 
In Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, edited 
by Laurel Miller, 176–92. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Nisan, Mordechai. 2002. Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self 
Expression. Second. Jefferson: McFarland. 
Nordlinger, Eric. 1972. Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Harvard University: The Center 
for International Affairs. 
Norris, Pippa. 1995. “Introduction: The Politics of Electoral Reform.” International Political 
Science Review 16 (1): 3–8. 
———. 1997. “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian, and Mixed Systems.” 
International Political Science Review 18 (3): 297–312. 
———. 2002. “Ballots Not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral 
Systems, and Democratization.” In The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional 
Design, Conflict Management and Democracy, edited by Andrew Reynolds, 206–47. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2004. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2009. “All Elections Are Not the Same: Why Power-Sharing Elections Strengthen 
Democratization.” In Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition, edited 
by Staffan Lindberg, 148–75. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 
NTC Libya. 2012. “NTC Libya.” National Transitional Council (NTC) Libya. http://ntclibya.org/. 
Obermeyer, Carla. 1992. “Islam, Women, and Politics: The Demography of Arab Countries.” 
Population and Development Review 18 (1): 33–60. 
Oberschall, Anthony. 2007. Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to 
Ethnic Violence. Oxon and New York: Routledge. 
O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Phillippe Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
176 
O’Leary, Brendan. 2013. “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places: An Advocates 
Introduction.” In Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places, edited by Joanne McEvoy 
and Brendan O’Leary, 1–64. Philadelphia: The University of Philadelphia. 
O’Leary, Carole. 2002. “The Kurds of Iraq.” Middle East Review of International Affairs 6 (4): 
17–29. 
Omar, Manal. 2014. “Libya: Legacy of Dictatorship and the Long Path to Democracy.” In 
Elections and Democratization in the Middle East: The Tenacious Search for Freedom, 
Justice, and Dignity, edited by Mahmoud Hamad and Khalil Al-Anani, 67–87. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 2016. “Tunisian Quartet in 
Conversation.” Security Community Issue 1/2016. Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. http://www.osce.org/magazine/248471. 
Osman, Tarek. 2013. Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to the Muslim Brotherhood. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press. 
Ostby, Gudrun. 2008. “Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict.” Journal 
of Peace Research 45 (2): 143–62. 
O’Sullivan, Meghan, and Razzaq Al-Saiedi. 2014. “Choosing an Electoral System: Iraq’s Three 
Electoral Experiments, Their Results, and Their Political Implications.” Harvard 
Kennedy School: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. 
Owen, Roger. 1992. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Ozen, Ege. 2017. “Egypt’s 2011–2012 Parliamentary Elections: Voting for Religious vs. Secular 
Democracy?” Mediterranean Politics. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2017.1327171. 
Pacek, Alexander, Grigore Pop-Eleches, and Joshua Tucker. 2009. “Disenchanted or 
Discerning: Voter Turnout in Post-Communist Countries.” The Journal of Politics 71 (2): 
473–91. 
Pachachi, Adnan. 2005. “Delay the Elections.” The Washington Post, January 2, 2005. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40055-2004Dec31.html. 
Pack, Jason, and Haley Cook. 2015. “The Libyan Election and the Origin of Post-Qadhafi 
Appeasement.” The Middle East Journal 69 (2): 171–98. 
Palmer, Allan. 1992. The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. London: J Murray. 
Palmer, Monte, and Princess Palmer. 2008. Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity, and 
Challenges. Lanham and Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Pan, Esther. 2005. “Iraq: Organizing the Elections.” Backgrounder. Council on Foreign 
Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-organizing-elections. 
Paoletti, Emanuela. 2011. “Libya: Roots of a Civil Conflict.” Mediterranian Politics 16 (2): 313–
19. 
Papagianni, Katia. 2008. “Participation and State Legitimation.” In Building States to Build 
Peace, edited by Charles Call, 49–72. Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Pargeter, Alison. 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power. London: Saqi 
Books. 
Partlett, William. 2012. “The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making.” Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 38: 193–238. 
Patsiurko, Natalka, and John Campbell. 2012. “Measuring Cultural Diversity: Ethnic, Linguistic 
and Religious Fractionalization in the OECD.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 35 (2): 195–
217. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
177 
Pereira, Juan. 1999. “Tunisia.” In Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook, edited by Dieter 
Nohlen, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut, 911–24. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Perelli, Carina. 2004. “Coalition Provisional Authority Briefing: Election Preparations in Iraq.” 
Baghdad, Iraq: The Coalition Provisional Authority. 
Perkins, Kenneth. 2014. A History of Modern Tunisia. Second. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Pickard, Duncan. 2011. “Challenges to Legitimate Governance in Post-Revolution Tunisia.” 
Journal of North African Studies 16 (4): 637–52. 
Posen, Barry. 1993. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy 35 (1): 27–47. 
Posusney, Marsha. 2002. “Multi-Party Elections in the Arab World: Institutional Engineering 
and Oppositional Strategies.” Studies in Comparative International Development 36 
(4): 34–62. 
Powell, Bingham. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional 
Visions. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Project on Middle East Political Science. 2013. “The Battle for Egypt’s Constitution.” POMEPS 
Briefings. Arab Uprisings. Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS). 
Rabushka, Alvin, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1972. Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of 
Democratic Instability. Columbus: Charles Merrill. 
Rahat, Gideon, and Reuven Hazan. 2011. “The Barriers to Electoral System Reform: A 
Synthesis of Alternative Approaches.” West European Politics 34 (3): 478–94. 
Rashid, Ahmed. 2008. Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building 
in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. London: Viking, Penguin Group. 
Reilly, Benjamin. 2001. Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict 
Managment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2002a. “Elections in Post-Conflict Scenarios: Constraints and Dangers.” International 
Peacekeeping 9 (2): 118–39. 
———. 2002b. “Electoral Systems for Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 156–
70. 
Remmer, Karen. 2008. “The Politics of Institutional Change: Electoral Reform in Latin America 
1978-2002.” Party Politics 14 (1): 5–30. 
Ries, Matthias. 1999. “Egypt.” In Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook, edited by Dieter 
Nohlen, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut, 329–50. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Reynolds, Andrew. 1995a. “Constitutional Engineering in South Africa.” Journal of Democracy 
6 (2): 86–99. 
———. 1995b. “The Case for Proportionality.” Journal of Democracy 6 (4): 117–24. 
———, ed. 2002. The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management 
and Democracy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2011. “Egypt’s Doomed Election.” The New York Times, November 22, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/opinion/egypts-doomed-election.html?_r=0. 
———. 2015. Interview with Andrew Reynolds. Interview by Jessica Genauer. Skype. 
Roberts, Joel. 2005. “Sunnis Protest Iraq’s Constitution.” CBS News, August 30, 2005. 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sunnis-protest-iraqs-constitution. 
Romero, Juan. 2011. The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: A Revolutionary Quest for Unity and 
Security. Maryland and Plymouth: University Press of America. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
178 
Rose, William. 2000. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypotheses.” 
Security Studies 9 (4): 1–51. 
Roy, Oliver. 2004. “Development and Political Legitimacy: The Cases of Iraq and Afghanistan.”    
Conflict, Security & Development 4 (2): 167–79. 
Ruedin, Didier. 2009. “Ethnic Group Representation in a Cross-National Comparison.” The 
Journal of Legislative Studies 15 (4): 335–54. 
Ruiz-Rufino, Ruben. 2013. “Satisfaction with Democracy in Multi-Ethnic Countries: The Effect 
of Representative Political Institutions on Ethnic Minorities.” Political Studies 61 (1): 
101–18. 
Sadiki, Larbi. 2012. “Egypt: The Triumph of Hassan Al-Banna.” Al Jazeera, July 5, 2012. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/07/20127212233901118.html. 
Saideman, Stephen, David Lanoue, Michael Campenni, and Samuel Stanton. 2002. 
“Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series 
Analysis, 1985-1998.” Comparative Political Studies 35 (1): 103–29. 
Sakamoto, Takayuki. 1999. “Explaining Electoral Reform: Japan versus Italy and New 
Zealand.” Party Politics 5 (4): 419–38. 
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (3): 259–82. 
Sampson, Isaac Terwase. 2014. “Religion and the Nigerian State: Situating the de Facto and 
de Jure Frontiers of State Religion Relations and Its Implications for National Security.” 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 3 (2): 311–39. 
Samuels, Kirsti. 2006. “Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making.” Chicago 
Journal of International Law 6 (2): 663–82. 
Schedler, Andreas. 2001. “Taking Uncertainty Seriously: The Blurred Boundaries of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation.” Democratization 8 (4): 1–22. 
Schneider, Gerald, and Nina Wiesehomeier. 2008. “Rules That Matter: Political Institutions 
and the Diversity–Conflict Nexus.” Journal of Peace Research 45 (2): 183–203. 
Schwedler, Jillian. 2007. “Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties.” 
Development 50 (1): 56–61. 
Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. 2008. “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study 
Research.” Political Research Quarterly 61 (2): 294–308. 
Selassie, Bereket. 2009. “The Eritrean Experience in Constitution Making: The Dialectic of 
Process and Substance.” In The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, 
Conflict Management, and Democracy, edited by Andrew Reynolds, 357–72. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Selway, Joel, and Kharis Templeman. 2012. “The Myth of Consociationalism? Conflict 
Reduction in Divided Societies.” Comparative Political Studies 45 (12): 1542–1571. 
Serodio, Diana. 2013. “Internal Dynamics of the Second Constituent Assembly.” Arab-West 
Report: The Center for Intercultural Dialogue and Translations. 
http://www.arabwestreport.info/sites/default/files/pdfs/AWRpapers/paper45.pdf. 
Serodio, Diana, and Jayson Casper. 2013. “The Development of Egypt’s Constitution: Analysis, 
Assessment, and Sorting through the Rhetoric.” Cairo, Egypt: Arab-West Report: The 
Center for Intercultural Dialogue and Translations. 
http://www.arabwestreport.info/sites/default/files/pdfs/AWRpapers/paper45.pdf. 
Shafiq, Najeeb. 2010. “Do Education and Income Affect Support for Democracy in Muslim 
Countries? Evidence from the Pew Global Attitudes Project.” Economics of Education 
Review 29 (3): 461–69. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
179 
Shain, Yossi, and Juan Linz. 1992. “The Role of Interim Governments.” Journal of Democracy  
3 (1): 73–79. 
Shehata, Dina. 2010. Islamists and Secularists in Egypt: Opposition, Conflict & Cooperation. 
Routlede Studies in Middle Eastern Politics. London and New York: Routledge. 
Shvetsova, Olga. 2003. “Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects.” 
Constitutional Political Economy 14 (3): 191–212. 
Simon, Reeva. 2004. “The View from Baghdad.” In The Creation of Iraq 1914-1925, edited by 
Eleanor Tejirian, 36–49. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Simonsen, Sven. 2005. “Addressing Ethnic Divisions in Post-Conflict Institution-Building: 
Lessons from Recent Cases.” Security Dialogue 36 (3): 297–318. 
Siperco, Ian. 2017. “Iraq’s Overdue Census.” Middle East Policy Council. 
https://mepc.org/commentary/iraqs-overdue-census. 
Sisk, Timothy. 1996. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. 
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. 
Smith, Anthony. 2010. Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History. Second. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Smith, Ben. 2012. “Libya’s General Assembly Election 2012.” SNIA/6389. International Affairs 
and Defence Section. House of Commons Library. 
Smyth, Frank, and John Gershman. 2005. “After Iraq’s Wartime Elections.” Institute for Policy 
Studies, October 3, 2005. https://ips-dc.org/after_iraqs_wartime_elections. 
Solijonov, Abdurashid. 2016. “Voter Turnout Trends Around the World.” Stockholm: 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
St John, Ronald. 2017. Libya: From Colony to Revolution. Third. Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications. 
Stansfield, Gareth. 2007. Iraq: People, History, Politics. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press. 
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. 1990. The Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development, and Human Rights. 
Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
Stepan, Alfred. 2012a. “Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations.” Journal of Democracy 
23 (2): 89–103. 
———. 2012b. “Two Perspectives on Egypt’s Transition: The Recurrent Temptation to 
Abdicate to the Military in Egypt.” Freedom House. 
Stepan, Alfred, and Juan Linz. 2013. “Democratization Theory and the Arab Spring.” Journal 
of Democracy 24 (2): 15–30. 
Stepan, Alfred, and Graeme Robertson. 2003. “An ‘Arab’ More Than a ‘Muslim’ Democracy 
Gap.” Journal of Democracy 14 (3): 30–44. 
Stigant, Susan, and Elizabeth Murray. 2015. “National Dialogues: A Tool for Conflict 
Transformation?” PeaceBrief 194. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB194-National-Dialogues.pdf. 
Strauss, Scott, and Charlie Taylor. 2009. “Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 1990- 2007.” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, 3-6 September.  
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. 2011. “The Provisional Constitution of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt (Constitutional Declaration), 30 March 2011.” International IDEA: 
ConstitutionNet. https://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/interim-constitution-
egypt-2011-2012. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
180 
Tavana, Daniel. 2012. “Consensus After Conflict: Electoral System Choice in Revolutionary 
Egypt.” The Project on Middle East Democracy. 
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2296222.pdf. 
Tayel, Abeer. 2011. “Egyptian Leaders to Discuss New Election Law amid Conflict about 
Transition Plan.” Al-Arabiya News, October 4, 2011. 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/04/170094.html. 
Temehu. 2016. “Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC).” 
https://www.temehu.com/ntc.htm. 
Tessler, Mark. 2002. “Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious 
Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries.” Comparative 
Politics 34 (3): 337–54. 
Tessler, Mark, and Eleanor Gao. 2005. “Gauging Arab Support for Democracy.” Journal of 
Democracy 16 (3): 83–97. 
Tessler, Mark, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins. 2012. “New Findings on Arabs and 
Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 23 (4): 89–103. 
Teti, Andrea. 2011. “Political Parties and Movements in Post-Revolutionary Egypt.” Working 
Paper 42. Institute for the Study of International Politics. 
The Carter Center. 2012a. “National Constituent Assembly Elections in Tunisia 23 October 
2011.” Final Report. The Carter Center. 
———. 2012b. “Final Report of the Carter Center Mission to Witness the 2011-2012 
Parliamentary Elections in Egypt.” Final Report. The Carter Center. 
———. 2013. “General National Congress Elections in Libya 7 July 2012.” Final Report. The 
Carter Center. 
———. 2014. “The Constitution-Making Process in Tunisia:” Final Report. The Carter Center. 
The Economist. 2012. “Egypt’s Constitutional Referendum: A Dubious Yes.” The Economist, 
December 22, 2012, Online edition. https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-
and-africa/21568756-flawed-constitution-will-be-endorsed-argument-far-over. 
The President of the Tunisian Republic by Interim. 2011. Decree-Law No. 2011-14 23 March 
2011. 
Theuerkauf, Ulrike. 2010. “Institutional Design and Ethnic Violence: Do Grievances Help to 
Explain Ethnopolitical Instability?” Civil Wars 12 (1–2): 117–39. 
Thier, Alexander. 2010. “Big Tent, Small Tent: The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan.” 
In Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, edited 
by Laurel Miller, 535–62. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Thurber, Ches. 2011. “From Coexistence to Cleansing: The Rise of Sectarian Violence in 
Baghdad, 2003-2007.” Al-Nakhlah: The Fletcher School Online Journal for Issues 
Related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring: 1–13. 
Tignor, Robert. 2016. Anwar Al-Sadat: Transforming the Middle East. The World in a Life. New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Toaldo, Mattia. 2017. “A Constitutional Panacea for Libya?” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 
Toaldo, Mattia, and Mary Fitzgerald. 2016. “A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players.” European 
Council on Foreign Relationa. http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict#. 
Torcal, Mariano. 2014. “The Decline of Political Trust in Spain and Portugal: Economic 
Performance or Political Responsiveness?” American Behavioral Scientist 58 (12): 
1542–67. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
181 
Toth, James. 2013. Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Tripp, Aili Mari. 2010. “The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda.” In Framing the State 
in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, edited by Laurel Miller, 
158–75. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Tripp, Charles. 2007. A History of Iraq. Third. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Tunisian State. 1959. “Constitution of the Tunisian Republic.” Edited by Gisbert Flanz. Oxford 
Constitutions of the World. http://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ocw/law-
ocw-cd1146-H1993.regGroup.1/law-ocw-cd1146-
H1993?rskey=RDiCY6&result=2&prd=OCW. 
United Nations. 2004a. “Iraq: Electoral Fact Sheet.” The United Nations (UN). 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/iraq/election-fact-sht.htm. 
———. 2004b. “Press Briefing on Iraq Fact Finding Mission.” Press Conference. United 
Nations. 
United Nations Development Program. 2014. “New Constitution a Historic Landmark on 
Journey to Democracy for Tunisia.” Announcement. United Nations Development 
Program. 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/01/27/ne
w-constitution-a-historic-landmark-on-journey-to-democracy-for-tunisia/. 
United States Department of Defense. 2005. “Constitutional Referendum Seen as Security 
Success,” October 24, 2005. http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2005/Iraq-
Referendum. 
Vandewalle, Dirk. 2006. A History of Modern Libya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2015. Interview with Dirk Vandewalle. Interview by Jessica Genauer. Skype. 
Volkel, Jan. 2017. “Sidelined by Design: Egypt’s Parliament in Transition.” The Journal of North 
African Studies 22 (4): 595–619. 
Wagner, Wolfgang, and Sofie Dreef. 2014. “Ethnic Composition and Electoral System Design: 
Demographic Context Conditions for Post-Conflict Elections.” Ethnopolitics 13 (3): 
288–307. 
Wallis, Joanne. 2014. Constitution Making During State Building. Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wangnerud, Lena. 2009. “Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive 
Representation.” Annual Review of Political Science 12: 51–69. 
Ware, L. B. 1988. “Ben Ali’s Constitutional Coup in Tunisia.” The Middle East Journal 42 (4): 
587–601. 
Wehrey, Frederic. 2017. “The Challenge of Violent Extremism in North Africa: The Case of 
Libya.” Testimony. U.S. House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Wheatley, Jonathan and Micha Germann. 2016. “Outcomes of Constitution-Making: 
Democratization and Conflict Resolution.” In Patterns of Constitutional Design: The 
Role of Citizens and Elites in Constitution-Making, edited by Fernando Mendez and 
Jonathan Wheatley, 49-68. London and New York: Routledge. 
Wheatley, Jonathan, and Fernando Mendez, eds. 2016. Patterns of Constitutional Design: The 
Role of Citizens and Elites in Constitution-Making. Ebook. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
182 
Wickham, Carrie. 2004. “The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of 
Egypt’s Wasat Party.” Comparative Politics 36 (2): 205–28. 
Widner, Jennifer. 2005. “Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution.” The Round Table 94 
(381): 503–18. 
———. 2008. “Constitution Writing in Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview.” William and Mary 
Law Review 49: 1513–41. 
Wimmer, Andreas. 1997. “Who Owns the State? Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Post-
Colonial Societies.” Nations and Nationalism 3 (4): 631–65. 
———. 2002. Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2003. “Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq.” Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy 45 (4): 111–34. 
Winslow, Charles. 1996. Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Wolf, Anne. 2017. Political Islam in Tunisia: The History of Ennahda. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Worth, Robert. 2005. “Sunni Arabs Rally to Protest Proposed Iraqi Constitution.” New York 
Times, August 27, 2005. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/27/world/middleeast/sunni-arabs-rally-to-
protest-proposed-iraqi-constitution.html. 
Yaphe, Judith. 2004. “The View from Basra: Southern Iraq’s Reaction to War and Occupation, 
1915-1925.” In The Creation of Iraq 1914-1925, edited by Eleanor Tejirian, 19–35. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Yesilada, Birol, and Barry Rubin, eds. 2011. Islamization of Turkey Under the AKP Rule. Oxon 
and New York: Routledge. 
Yousef, Tarik. 2004. “Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North 
Africa since 1950.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (3): 91–115. 
Zargoun, Taha, and Oliver Holmes. 2016. “Libyan Parties Reject Draft Election Law.” Reuters, 
January 16, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-law-election/libyan-
parties-reject-draft-election-law-idUSTRE80E0FS20120115. 
Zheng, Yongnian. 2007. De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central-Local 
Relations. Hackensack and London: World Scientific Publishing. 
REBUILDING CONTESTED STATES 
Jessica Genauer, Doctoral Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Australian National University, November 2018 
 
183 Appendix	A:	Survey	methodology	
Table A.1 Survey methodology for World Values Survey, Arab Democracy Barometer, and PEW Global 
Attitudes and Trends 
Survey  Field dates Sample size Sampling and weighting 
World values 
survey (WVS) 
WVS Wave 4: 
 
Iraq:  
19 Nov –  
16 Dec, 2004 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
Iraq: 2,325 
 
Nationally representative sample adults 18 +. Stratified 
by governorate and urban / rural. Interviews distributed 
proportional to population size, clustered by 1. census 
districts, 2. census sub-districts, 3. sampling blocks 
(primary sampling unit) 
20 interviews conducted in each block, random 
selection of households. Interviewee selected using ‘last 
birthday’ method* 
 
Arab 
Democracy 
Barometer 
(ADB) Wave II 
 
 
 
 
Arab 
Democracy 
Barometer 
(ADB) Wave III 
 
Egypt:  
16 June –  
3 July, 2011 
 
Tunisia:  
30 Sep –  
11 Oct, 2011 
 
Egypt:  
31 March –  
7 April, 2013 
 
Tunisia:  
3 – 25 Feb, 
2013 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
Egypt: 1,219 
Tunisia: 1,196 
 
 
 
 
Face-to-face 
interviews 
Egypt: 1,196 
Tunisia: 1,199 
 
National probability sample, adults 18+. Stratified by 
governorate and urban-rural. Interviews distributed 
proportional to population size.** 
Egypt: Within each strata, sampling blocks were 
selected proportional to population size and served as 
the primary sampling unit. Within each sampling block, 
clusters of 10 households were randomly selected.  
Tunisia: Within each strata delegations were selected 
proportional to population size. Within each delegation, 
sectors were selected proportional to size and within 
each sector, blocks were randomly selected each 
containing 10 households. Within each household, 
individuals randomly selected using a Kish table 
informed by quotas for gender and age. 
Weighting Egypt and Tunisia: Weighted for probability 
of selection and post-stratification weighted by age and 
gender 
 
PEW Global 
Attitudes and 
Trends (PEW) 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PEW Global 
Attitudes and 
Trends (PEW) 
2013 
Egypt:  
19 March – 
10 April, 
2012  
 
Tunisia:  
22 March – 
20 April, 
2012  
 
Egypt:  
3 -23 March, 
2013 
Telephone and 
face-to-face 
interviews 
Egypt: 1,000 
Tunisia: 1,000 
 
 
 
 
 
Telephone and 
face-to-face 
interviews 
Egypt: 1,000 
Egypt and Tunisia: Representative, national sample of 
adults 18 and over, multi-stage cluster sample stratified 
by governorate and proportional to population size and 
urban/rural population*** 
Weighting Egypt and Tunisia: Correcting for unequal 
selection probabilities. Adjusting of key socio-
demographic distributions (gender, age, education) to 
align with reliable, official population statistics 
*Where security concerns prevented interviews in a Kurdish or Sunni-Arab majority city, the interviews were 
reallocated to another Kurdish or Sunni-Arab majority city, respectively 
** Wave II in Egypt - 20 interviews were conducted in Red Sea and Suez governorates  
*** PEW 2013 in Egypt excluded frontier governorates (approx.. 2% of population) for security reasons 
Sources: http://www.arabbarometer.org; http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org; http://www.pewglobal.org  
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184 Appendix	B:	Parliamentary	election	results	per	communal	group	
Table B.1 Egypt: Party allocation per communal group and distribution of seats in Nov 2011-Jan 2012 election 
 Party Communal group Seats: PR-tier + 
majoritarian-tier  
= total 
% Seats 
1 Democratic Alliance 
(FJP) 
Islamist 
124 + 108 = 232 
45.7 
2 Islamist Bloc (al-
Nour) 
Islamist 
94 + 27 = 121 
23.8 
3 
al-Wafd 
non-Islamist (nationalist 
liberal) 38 + 2 = 40 
7.9 
4 Egyptian Bloc non-Islamist (social liberal) 33 + 2 = 35 6.9 
5 
al-Wasat 
Islamist (moderate Islamist 
pro-liberal-democracy but 
advocates Sharia as a basis 
for law) 10 + 0 = 10 
2 
6 Revolution Continues 
Alliance 
non-Islamist (liberal social) 
8 + 2 = 10 
2 
7 Reform and 
Development Party 
non-Islamist (liberal) 
9 + 1 = 10 
2 
8 Egyptian National 
Party 
non-Islamist (ancien regime) 
4 + 2 = 6 
1.2 
9 Freedom Party non-Islamist (ancien regime) 4 + 0 = 4 .8 
10 Egyptian Citizen non-Islamist (ancien regime) 3 + 1 = 4 .8 
11 Union Party non-Islamist (ancien regime) 2 + 0 = 2 .4 
12 Democratic Peace 
Party 
non-Islamist (ancien regime) 
1 + 0 = 1 
.2 
13 
Justice Party 
non-Islamist (revolution-
based) 0 + 1 = 1 
.2 
14 Egyptian Arab Union non-Islamist (ancien regime) 1 + 0 = 1 .2 
15 Arab Democratic 
Nasserist 
non-Islamist (nationalist) 
1 + 0 = 1 
.2 
 Other (non-party 
affiliated) 
 
20 
3.9 
 SCAF appointed  10 2 
 Total  508 100 
Sources for electoral result: Results are no longer available on the Egyptian High Electoral Commission website: 
http://parliament2011.elections.eg/results is inactive. Results taken from: Electoral Institute for Sustainable 
Democracy in Africa (2012, 45–47) and the IPU Parline database on parliamentary elections, available at: 
archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2097_11.htm   
Sources for communal alignment of political parties: Teti (2011); The Middle East Institute’s “Egyptian Political 
Party Explorer” that provides information on Egyptian party ideology available at: 
www.mei.edu/transitions/political-parties  
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Table B.2 Tunisia: Party allocation per communal group and distribution of seats in Oct 2011 election 
 Party Communal group Seats  % Seats 
1  Al-Nahda Islamist 89 41 
2 Congress for the 
Republic 
non-Islamist 
29 
13.4 
3 Popular Petition non-Islamist 26 12 
4 Democratic Forum for 
Labour and Liberties 
non-Islamist 
20 
9.2 
5 Progressive 
Democratic Party 
non-Islamist 
16 
7.4 
6 The Initiative non-Islamist 5 2.3 
7 Democratic Modernist 
Pole 
non-Islamist (did not promote 
Islamist policy) 5 
2.3 
8 Afek Tunis non-Islamist 4 1.8 
9 Tunisian Workers’ 
Communist Party 
non-Islamist 
3 
1.4 
10 People’s Movement non-Islamist 2 .9 
11 Movement of Socialist 
Democrats 
non-Islamist 
2 
.9 
12 Free Patriotic Union non-Islamist (anti-Islamist) 1 .5 
13 Democratic Patriots 
Movement 
non-Islamist (anti-Islamist) 
1 
.5 
14 Liberal Maghreb Party non-Islamist 1 .5 
15 Social Democratic 
Nation Party 
non-Islamist 
1 
.5 
16 New Constitutional 
(Destour) Party 
non-Islamist 
1 
.5 
17 Progressive Struggle 
Party 
non-Islamist 
1 
.5 
18 Justice and Equality 
Party* 
non-Islamist 
1 
.5 
19 Cultural Unionist 
Nation Party 
non-Islamist  
1 
.5 
20 Independent (non-
party) lists  
1. Voice of the Future 
1. Independent  
1. Fidelity  
1. Hope 
1. Tunisian National 
Front  
1. Justice  
1. Socialist struggle 
1. Loyalty to Martyrs  
 
8 
3.7 
 Total  217 100 
Sources for electoral result: Election results per constituency on the Tunisian High Electoral website, at: 
www.isie.tn/resultats/election-2011 Commission; Carey (2013); and IPU Parline database on parliamentary 
elections, available at: archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2392_11.htm 
Sources for communal alignment of political parties: Bollier (2011); Brody-Barre (2013); detailed outline of 
ideational platform of Tunisia’s political parties preceding 2011 elections from The Guardian available at: 
image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2011/10/19/Tunisian_Parties_2010.pdf 
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Table B.3 Iraq: Party allocation per communal group and distribution of seats in Jan 2005 election 
 Party Communal group Seats  % Seats 
1 United Iraqi Alliance Shi’a (sectarian) 140 50.9 
2 Democratic Patriotic 
Alliance of Kurdistan 
Kurdish (sectarian) 
75 
27.3 
3 Iraqi List Shi’a (secular) 40 14.5 
4 The Iraqis Sunni (secular) 5 1.8 
5 Iraqi Turkmen Front Turkmen 3 1.1 
6 National 
Independent Cadres 
and Elites 
Shi’a (sectarian)  
3 
1.1 
7 Islamic Action 
Organization in Iraq 
Shi’a (sectarian)  
2 
0.7 
8 Islamic Group of 
Kurdistan 
Kurdish (sectarian) 
2 
0.7 
9 People’s Union Communist 2 0.7 
10 National Democratic 
Alliance 
Secular non-denominational 
1 
0.4 
11 National Rafidain 
List 
Assyrian Christian 
1 
0.4 
12 Reconciliation and 
Liberation Bloc 
Sunni (sectarian) 
1 
0.4 
 Total  275 100 
Sources for electoral result: Maye (2016, 135); O’Sullivan and Al-Saedi (2014); IPU Parline database on 
parliamentary elections, available at: archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151_05.htm  
Sources for communal alignment of political parties: Guide to Iraqi Political Parties organized according to Shia, 
Sunni, and Kurdish parties from the British Broadcasting Commission, available at: 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4051977.stm; corroborated with outline of major party orientation available 
at: online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-iraqelect0105.html?printVersion=true  
